Weldemariam Abraham on ‘Menkae’: Interview
with Aida Kidane Sweden 2004
Introductory Note:
When the Isaias group (Selfi Nezanet/Alla
group) split from the ELF in 1970, alongside two other factions, and later
established the EPLF in 1972, presenting themselves as a democratic alternative
to the ELF, they faced a significant internal challenge from a reform movement
that called for democratic changes within the organization, 51 years ago, September
1973. According to its members, this
movement sought to democratize the EPLF’s leadership structure. The EPLF
leadership, however, labelled it as an "ultra-leftist" group and
referred to it as "Menkae." The conflict between the EPLF leadership
and the Menkae faction has since played a defining role in shaping the EPLF's
security policies. The language was edited for fluency.
Mohamed Kheir Omer
-------------
Highlights:
“We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters in the surroundings encouraging
them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one
occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had
about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We
could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We
argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.
Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with
Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the
loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We
had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians,
and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a
national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious
differences.
The leadership, however, declared that these
articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil
became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and
Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF)
for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim
fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and
reading the Quran.”
-----------------------------------
Aida, “I extend my deepest gratitude to Weldemariam Abraham for taking the time to share his experiences with me. Although he was initially reluctant to discuss his life before joining the front, I insisted, and he agreed.”
Personal History (2004)
As a student, I was involved in the revolts and
was subsequently imprisoned at Sembel. At the time, I was attending the
technical school, known as Point 4. I was among the last to be released because
I had claimed that my parents were deceased. After my release, I started
working in Wenji but was dismissed under the pretence of having Bilharzia. I
then moved to Jima, and later to Assab, where I worked at the refinery before
enrolling in a technical school. Despite being accepted for 3-4 scholarships, I
was denied access. I believe this was due to my Eritrean identity, as I had
passed the examinations at the top of my class but was still denied the
opportunity.
During my time in Assab, I met four Eritrean
men under house arrest who were required to sign in four times daily to prevent
them from fleeing. They were accused of collaborating with the front. It was
through them that I learned about the front, which led me to leave my job and
move to Addis Ababa, where we formed the Tihisha secret group, keeping it
hidden even from close friends.
While in Alem Bekagn (I have had enough of life)
prison in Addis, (It was a prison for those served life sentences or where in a
death raw.) I encountered Eritrean fighter prisoners who informed us that the
ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) was splitting, and a new front, Shabia (EPLF),
was emerging. Along with Mesih, I established contact with Rustom. When Rustom
was captured in Asmara, I took advantage of having a passport and fled to
Italy, then to Austria, and eventually to Czechoslovakia and Germany. This long
route was taken due to a lack of information. We only knew a little about Italy
because of our familiarity with Catholicism. I did not realize at the time that
I did not need a visa to enter Germany. I went to Czechoslovakia because many
students were there, and a General Congress was to be held in Munich. It was
there that the path to meda (the field) opened up to me, and after an
eight-month stay in Germany, I joined the front. Even in meda, I opposed
the leadership, which remains unchanged to this day.
On the Battle of Gereger
We entered meda (the field) through
Yemen at the end of 1972. We had captured arms from the ELF and transported
them using camels. Habte Selassie and I led the camels on foot, dressed in
military attire. As we attempted to enter Eritrea, the Sudanese ordered us back
and escorted us to avoid being ambushed by the ELF or being denied water
access. Many ELF fighters under Abdella Idris’s command were killed, and the
corpses were left to decay until the Sudanese buried them with bulldozers.
I was new to meda when the Battle of
Gereger in Sudan began. Initially, we were at the temporary base of the EPLF,
Selfi Nezanet, and Obel. We had come through the Red Sea from Aden under the
leadership of Solomon Weldemariam and others, evading capture by the ELF. As we
neared Gereger, we received a radio message informing us that the battle had
begun. If not for this message, we might have been forced to flee further into
Sudan or been captured by the ELF.
The battle intensified as we were few in
number, carrying arms, and navigating rough terrain in the dark. I lost my way
and unintentionally led the camel carrying weapons toward the Sudanese side.
Fortunately, I was able to reunite with my comrades, and we avoided being
caught by the ELF.
At the time, it was widely believed that no
force could defeat the ELF. Their fighters were known as "Aremrem"
(resilient), being numerous and strong, often finding ways to escape difficult
situations. The Gereger battle occurred within Sudanese territory, and the ELF
pursued us to that point. They outnumbered us and were better equipped.
However, their lack of strategic planning prevented them from wiping us out. We
had just acquired Kalashnikovs with 30 bullets each, while the ELF had Simonov’s
with only 10 bullets, which could have given them an advantage.
After this, we entered Eritrean territory on
March 4, 1973, passing through Arag to Gereger Asmara, which we held as a
stronghold for an extended period. There were two Geregers: one in Sudan
(Gereger Sudan) and another on the Eritrean side (Gereger Asmara). From there,
we moved to Beiqat. I don’t recall much of the journey as I was wounded in
battle with the ELF at Deqsem village near Zager on October 13, 1974. Bleqat
and Fah became strongholds until the liberation.
During one encounter, Abdella led an attack,
targeting a weapons depot held by a few Medada (Arabic for counter
revolutionaries) reactionaries and bringing in many fighters. We fortified our
position by building stonewall chains, 2-3 kilometres long and about one and a
half meters high, to shield ourselves from enemy fire and the harsh winds.
Despite this, the situation remained tense due to the ELF snipers. In one
skirmish, we surrounded a group of 20 ELF fighters and asked them to surrender.
While most complied, one defiant fighter opened fire, leading to a shootout
that left all 20 dead.
The bodies of the ELF fighters began to
decompose, and we could not bury them as the ELF still surrounded us,
maintaining pressure. After our departure, the Sudanese buried them in mass
graves. This was my first experience of the brutality and inhumanity of
fratricidal warfare.
Our defense area spanned 2-3 kilometres in
diameter. The Sudanese grew concerned when we began using artillery, such as
the "Haun" bombs, which disrupted their security. They were surprised
by our extensive use of weapons and ordered us to leave their territory.
Entering Eritrean Territory Again
The initial Battle of Gereger lasted only a
morning, but sporadic skirmishes and tension persisted for about a week.
Precise dates and details are difficult to recall as all our writings were
confiscated, and the trauma of beatings, imprisonment, and time took their
toll.
After regrouping, we devised a plan to send a
signal indicating our movement and direction. We joined our group at night and
participated in ongoing skirmishes. Eventually, the Sudanese ordered both organizations
to leave Sudanese territory and cross into Eritrea, which took us two days,
with the Sudanese army patrolling us throughout the journey.
As all sides were in combat positions, they
were easily targeted and hit by machine-gun fire. Tragically, 20 of our
brothers from the ELF were killed in a senseless manner. On our side, from the
Selfi Nasnet group, we lost only one fighter, Gebretsadik Guangul, who was also
known as "Cuba" because he had spent time there. He was peering
through a small opening in the wall when a bullet struck him in the forehead,
killing him instantly. Tewelde Eyob was wounded as a bullet passed through both
his thighs. I cannot recall if there were any other injuries on our side.
At that time, we had not yet united with Shabia
(PLF 1), and 6 or 7 fighters (the exact number is uncertain) were killed, but I
did not know their names. Although we were fighting in the same area, our
leaderships and administrations remained separate. We had only a coordinating
committee to manage the distribution of arms and food according to the number
of fighters.
In late May 1973, the ELF came to Gereger Asmara
and captured a fighter who was guarding a mountain while others fought their
way out. He was taken to the ELF stronghold in Barka but later fled to Kenya,
as I heard. I believe his surname was Gebre Mikel.
Hilal, a brave and well-educated man from
Dankalia, was killed in the battle of Qebir Wu'ut. He had ongoing disagreements
with Isayas and Omaro. Another fighter, Solomon Mengesha, originally from Tigray
and raised in Massawa, joined the struggle after coming from Germany. He had
exhausted all his ammunition and was killed. Solomon had come with me from
Germany and, in my presence, asked Isayas if he could fight for Eritrea,
despite having only an Eritrean mother and no other demands. He was granted
permission, but only two months later, he was martyred—an innocent and
courageous man.
The Bleqat area had been under my unit’s
control for a long time before the leadership moved there to ensure it was
secure from the ELF. When fighting intensified in Kebessa, my unit relocated
there. In September 1974, fighters like Wedi Fenkil were killed in the battle
in Filfil.
The Bleqat-Fah area had previously been an ELF
front. We were stationed about two kilometres apart, separated by mountains and
valleys, making it challenging to distinguish our positions from theirs. The
ELF fighters monitored our movements from the high ground using binoculars.
On the beginnings of the so-called
Menkae Movement
We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters encouraging
them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one
occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had
about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We
could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We
argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.
Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with
Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the
loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We
had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians,
and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a
national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious
differences.
The leadership, however, declared that these
articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil
became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and
Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF)
for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim
fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and
reading the Quran.
We, the new and inexperienced fighters, were
caught in the traps set by both Isayas’s EPLF and Abdella’s ELF. I consider
myself fortunate to have survived, as I often protested against Isayas. In
fact, I once openly stated—and even wrote down—that we should kill him.
The Rise of the Menkae Situation
When Isayas realized that the situation was not
working in his favour and he feared losing in the internal elections, he sought
to manipulate the circumstances. He relied on the support of Asmerom Gerezghier,
Tewelde Eyob, and Tsegai Keshi. (Keshi later died from DDT poisoning—he had
washed his clothes with DDT to kill lice, but when he wore them again, the
poison slowly absorbed into his body and killed him.)
At the time, Adhanom Gebremariam and Wedi
Fenkil were also part of Isayas’s group, which soon expanded to a meeting of 11
individuals. Their plan was to eliminate Solomon, but they knew that if he were
killed, it would be obvious that the leadership was behind it. To cover up
their actions, they aimed to involve all the leadership and veteran fighters.
They initially accused him of regionalism and other charges but failed to carry
out their plan. Solomon sensing danger, confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, shedding
tears on his shoulder.
The root cause of the conflict was purely a
struggle for power. When the veterans realized that the situation was spiralling
out of control and that many fighters were becoming aware of it, they agreed to
resolve their differences internally. Otherwise, they feared that the more
educated fighters would gain an upper hand. The conflict escalated to a meeting
of 65 fighters and eventually became known to the common fighters. Isayas, Solomon
and Omaro made an oath to never oppose each other, marking the beginning of
what would be called the Menkae situation.
I’ve previously explained the meaning of
"Menkae." The term was originally used in 1970 by Naizgi Kiflu to
describe the ELF. Having come from the United States, Naizgi was working with
the Selfi Natznet to reconcile them with the ELF at Wina. When asked about his
opinion on the ELF, he responded that the front was like "Menkae"—a
bat. This term later stuck, and when he joined the front as a fighter, we travelled
together through Aden. Naizgi, whose character was questionable, had studied at
Lumumba University in the USSR and supposedly had contacts with Soviet security
apparatus.
We had three haili units in Sahel, and
two were dispatched to Kebessa to receive new recruits. Unfortunately, they
missed their destination and ended up deeper in Kebessa, where they encountered
fierce battles. Naizgi, wanting to avoid death, was seen firing into the sky while
hiding—a behaviour noticed by his comrade, Abraha Chaalo. Fighters like
Yohannes Sebhatu, Dehab, and Werku disliked Naizgi. Werku once even questioned
how Naizgi had earned his MA degree, as he was often seen making foolish and
ignorant statements.
The educated fighters were against Isayas, but
Naizgi sided with him. When asked about this movement, Naizgi labelled it the
"Menkae" movement, the same way he had described the ELF. The name
stuck, but some of us tried to reframe it, saying that "Menkae"
represented leftists or progressives, encouraging people not to be deterred by
the label.
The female fighters also faced derogatory
remarks. They were accused of coming to Sahel for men and were labelled as
prostitutes. They were criticized for visiting beauty salons and were shamed
for washing their hair. In reality, after cutting their hair short and enduring
muddy conditions, they simply needed to maintain basic hygiene. Such unfounded
accusations were used to demean them. While they weren’t beaten while free,
anything could happen in prison. When men asked to marry them, the women
declined, stating they were there to fight for liberation. They argued that if
they wanted men, there were plenty in the towns.
There are individuals today who remember the
precise timing of the executions during the Menkae purges. One person, now part
of a civic society in Frankfurt, was a former prisoner. Two others are here
with me, and another served as a prison guard.
One such prisoner was Abraham Antonio, whom we
captured from the ELF in a battle near the Dekemhare-Keren road. He was an ELF
political cadre covering the Senhit to Asmara area. We brought him to Sahel,
where Mesih and I intervened to stop his execution. He had been a schoolmate of
Isayas, Musie, and others, and he was imprisoned on the day the Menkae members
were executed.
The "correction centre" served
multiple purposes. One was to prevent fighters from spreading information about
their prison experiences. When a prisoner was released, they were kept at the centre
until they recovered from their wounds. During this time, they were threatened
not to disclose how they were treated or name other prisoners. In the early
1970s, we had such centres in Sahel, and as our controlled areas expanded, more
centres were established in various locations. Dr. Bereket was put in one of
these centres after we captured him.
One of my friends, Mesih Rusom (also known as
Mesih Berhe), and I were together in the Tihisha movement. He was the head of a
department at the Commercial Bank of Addis and had studied at the Commercial
School.
The Menkae movement was not an attempt to oust
Isayas. Initially, there were five people involved: Tsegai Keshi, Wedi Fenkil,
Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, and Asmerom Gerezghier, who met to discuss how to
defend themselves from the growing opposition. Later, Adhanom Gebremariam
joined them, increasing their number to 11.
The leadership of Selfi Nasnet (PLF 2)
consisted of five key figures: Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, Asmerom Gerezghier,
Mesfin Hagos, and Solomon Weldemariam. When it came to decision-making, the
first three (Isayas, Tewelde, and Asmerom) had the majority vote, often leaving
Solomon and Mesfin in the minority. Isayas saw Solomon as a threat because they
frequently clashed. However, he couldn’t easily remove or kill Solomon without
a legitimate reason, given that they were both in leadership positions.
Isayas’s group grew from 11 to 35 fighters and
convened a meeting where they accused Solomon of regionalism. This tactic was
used to rally support against him. At this point, Isayas had begun seeking
alliances in all hailis, telling them that Solomon’s closeness with
Shabia leadership was concerning.
During one of these meetings, Tsegai Keshi hit
Musie Tesfa Mikel with his rifle butt after Musie told Isayas, "Can you
silence your dogs? We can’t understand each other." Tsegai, frustrated,
retorted, "Didn’t we say before that we should get rid of these students
before fighting the ELF?"
The accusations of regionalism against Solomon
made him fear for his life. He confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, saying they would
kill him. Mebrahtu tried to reassure him, saying, "They cannot even demote
you from leadership, let alone kill you." But that’s when the Menkae
situation truly emerged.
During the meetings, Musie pointed out that if
they were to accuse someone of regionalism, they should also consider which
region the accusers were inclined to. He noted that Isayas was from Hamasien,
Tewelde from Akele Guzai, and Asmerom from Serae, suggesting that their
regional affiliations were no less evident than those of others. This enraged
Tsegai, who couldn’t control himself and struck Musie.
After this incident, Musie came to the sickbay
where I was stationed and spoke to Afwerki Amharai and me. I advised him to
remain calm and consider it a comrade’s mistake, but he insisted, “Weldemariam,
this is not the case,” and he narrated the whole ordeal.
I told him, “There are only three civilian
families in this large area. You won’t win by spreading this message here. The
leadership might crush you in the meantime. Wait until we move to Kebessa and
then spread the word quietly to our people.” He agreed, saying he hadn’t
thought of it that way before.
The Menkae movement did not rise against the
leadership or the front but sought to expose the truth behind Isayas and Solomon’s
longstanding animosity. However, when the veterans realized that the tide was
turning against them, Isayas, Solomon and Omaro made a pact, vowing never to
rise against each other or reveal secrets about one another. This blood oath
marked the beginning of the purge against the Menkae.
In response to the growing influence of the
Menkae, Isayas used the phrase, "Better to have 10 cheguar dangas
(simple peasants) than 100 pens." The cheguar dangas were loyal and
unquestioning fighters who followed orders without asking about their rights.
In contrast, educated fighters knew their rights and often challenged the
leadership, making them a thorn in Isayas’s side.
The Female Fighters in the Menkae
Crisis
The female Menkae fighters were beaten just
like the men. Werku, still alive, has remained silent until the right time
comes. I do not believe she ever turned against her comrades. There was a
situation where her menstrual bleeding would not stop. Fearing for her life,
she was sent to Aden for treatment. Since her passport was held by the
leadership, she had nowhere else to go. The others were executed while she was
in Aden, and the matter was left unresolved.
In Kuwait, Ramadan once held a meeting for all
women workers. Ghirmai Bahre openly challenged him in front of everyone. On his
return to Eritrea by boat, Berhane Gherezghiher, who is now imprisoned, and
others killed him and cast his body into the Red Sea.
From Beirut, two wounded fighters, Habte
Gorilla and Habte Ab Seyum, were taken away to Sahel and killed. We wanted to
escape the field and expose these actions to our people.
The Executions
The first Menkae members executed were six:
Musie, Yohannes, Afwerki, Tareke, Habte Selassie, and Rusom. A former head
guard stationed at the execution, now residing in Germany, has agreed to share
his account of what happened, as did two others present at the execution.
During the National Congress, Isayas pulled out a small and dirty piece of
paper from his pocket and stated that the proper measures had been taken
against these individuals. This was understood as code for their execution.
In preparation for the Congress, which took
place three months prior, participants were required to have been involved in
the struggle for at least 2-4 years. They also had to be free from any
association with the Menkae, Yemin (right-wing), or Hub-aan (unknown
opposition), or any form of dissent. Those suspected of being potential
challengers were sent away for training courses in meda. Haili
units would send delegates, but those already in courses were ineligible.
During the Congress, these individuals were left without instructors and given
books to read in the meantime, ensuring they could not be nominated for ranks.
One person, Alem Abraha, somehow managed to
slip through this filter, but you can read about how Mesfin Hagos ensured his
return to the field.
Final Thoughts
The Menkae uprising was not an attempt to
overthrow the leadership but rather a struggle to defend the truth from
Isayas’s manipulations and accusations against Solomon. We did not rise against
the leadership or initiate the movement.
The following individuals were notable members
of the Menkae movement:
- Musie Tesfamikael
- Mebrahtu Weldu
- Yohannes Sebhatu
- Weldemariam Abraham
- Afworki Tekhlu
- Gebresadik Isaak
- Habte Kidane (Gorilla)
- Habte Selassie
- Tareke Yihdego
- Dehab Tesfatsion
- Aberash Melke
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