Saturday, 23 December 2023

برقيد نحمدو ظلال التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع: نظرة تحليلية بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

 برقيد نحمدو ظلال  التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع

بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

:المقدمة

إن الحراك الذي ينتظم الكثير من مدن المهجر تحت مظلة (برقيد نحمدو) أو لواء الأرض وفق الترجمة الشائعة، وإن كان حراكاً في الخارج لكن يمكن وصفه بأنه ضمن الحالات النادرة التي حدث فيها تحدي حقيقي لسلطة النظام مما أفقده البوصلة، وبدأ في توجيه الاتهام الى الموساد الاسرائيلي والمخابرات الغربية، وكأنه يريد أن يقول أن عمل منظم بهذا الشكل هو فوق قدرات الجاليات الإرترية المعارضة في الخارج، وهو أكبر من قدرات الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير تغراي والتي إلى وقت قريب كانت متهمة من قبل أذرع النظام الظاهرة والخفية بأنها من تقف خلف هذا الحراك بسبب هزيمتها العسكرية في الحرب الأخيرة في إثيوبيا.

بيد أن المعارضة الارترية بشكل عام وفي شقها المنظم على وجه الخصوص ليست أفضل حظاً في فقدان البوصلة تجاه هذه الحراك من النظام، حيث نشهد انقسام واضح تجاه (برقيد نحمدو) هو ما ستحاول هذه المقالة الاجتهاد في مناقشته، لعلها قد تفتح الباب لنقاش موضوعي بناء حول هذا الحراك أسبابه ومآلاته وكيفية التعاطي معه.

الخاتمة:

إن حراك برقيد نحمدو هو في جوهره تمظهر لغضب متراكم جراء سياسات النظام، وقد ساهمت عوامل اجتماعية وسياسية داخلية واقليمية في ظهوره في هذا التوقيت وبهذا الشكل، وهو واحد من الظواهر المعدودة التي أربكت النظام الإرتري، وبالتالي ليس من الحكمة التماهي مع توصيفات النظام أو سياساته في شيطنة الحراك، ولكن في نفس الوقت ليس من الحكمة أيضاً التغافل عن أوجه القصور التي تتعلق بطرحه ومنهجه. واضعين في الاعتبار القواعد التي أرستها المقالة في الفقرة السابقة، فإن المطلوب تعاطي إيجابي بناء مع هذا الحراك وليس التماهي الأعمى معه. إن القوى السياسية والمدنية والناشطين والباحثين عليهم مسؤولية أكبر في صياغة خط يراعي الظروف الاجتماعية والسياسية التي أدت الى ظهور الحراك بشكله الحالي، وفي ذات الوقت تنتبه لطبيعة الحلول التي يقترحها قادة الحراك سواء ذات الرافعة الاجتماعية المحدودة، أو الهويات العابرة للحدود القومية للدول، ولا يتم هذا إلا من خلال مد خطوط التواصل وبناء جسور الثقة مع الحراك وقادته وقواعده، ودعمه في الأهداف المشتركة المتمثلة في التصدي للنظام القمعي وسياساته، في ذات الوقت الاشارة الى كل أوجه القصور التي تعتري الحراك، والمساهمة الفاعلة والمباشرة أو غير المباشرة في معالجة أوجه القصور إذا كان ذلك متأتياً، فحراك بهذه الأهمية ليس من الحكمة تجاهل وجوده أو تأثيره على الحاضر والمستقبل الإرتري

يتناول الكاتب

المقدمة:

البدايات:

الرافعة الاجتماعية:

التمظهر السياسي لإعادة التأسيس النفسي والاجتماعي:

استدعاء التاريخ في فهم الظاهرة:

حراك برقيد نحمدو من منظور محلي: 

حراك برقيد نحمدو والحلول التجزيئية لمشكل يتطلب حلول شاملة:

كيفية التعاطي معه:

الخاتمة:

للمزيد:

https://www.mediafire.com/file/n5semyjd94aymwx/برقيد+نحمدو-+ظلال+التاريخ،+مخاض+الانتماء+وحقائق+الواقع.pdf/file

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea November 2023

 

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea, reviewed and updated on November 17, 2023,



Unlike the 2022 US strategy, which described Eritrea as
one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States; the new 2023 strategy commends Eritrea on some sectors and intends to engage with Eritrea. It has also watered down its criticism of the country's human rights record. While the 2022 strategy called, "Prepare for the post-Isaias era: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for better relations in the post-Isaias era by building ties with the Eritrean people. The president is in his late seventies. He will not rule forever. Our public diplomacy programs, including the American Center, which attracts 100-250 visitors per day, are designed to cultivate close relations with students, educators, artists, intellectuals, businesspeople, religious leaders, technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civil society contacts. We also coordinate closely with local diplomatic counterparts who share our values and vision for a more democratic Eritrea." 

The current strategy aims to  "Sharing American values and fostering relations with Eritreans: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for building ties with the Eritrean people."


Can be downloaded at the link below:

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

 Chief of Mission Priorities 

The November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement brought an end to a two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia and precipitated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the Tigray region. The peace process and Eritrea’s de-escalation of military presence provides an opportunity to reshape bilateral relations with Eritrea to a more productive end, including peace and development in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Eritrea, strives to build on this positive change and increase the understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Eritrea. Eritrea’s return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also presents an opportunity to encourage positive and constructive relations between Eritrea, its neighbors, and regional organizations, and to promote resolution of Horn of Africa matters with a focus on sustainable regionally led solutions. 

The Embassy’s ability to capitalize on such initiatives to promote democracy and good government, however, is constrained by the absence of the usual foreign assistance and constructive policy tools. In 2005, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) ordered USAID, other bilateral donors, and international NGOs to depart the country. In 2022, the GSE ordered the Embassy to close the American Center indefinitely, restricting the Embassy’s ability to engage with the citizens of Eritrea. Further, the U.S. government implemented sanctions against Eritrean individuals and entities for their involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, in addition to human rights abuses committed by Eritrean troops. An atrocities determination also was issued against all parties in the conflict, including Eritrea’s military. Eritrea’s tier 3 rating for Trafficking in Persons, and designation as a Country of Particular Concern with regard to religious freedom, further impede use of funds for targeted programs.

While sanctions remain in place, the embassy will endeavour to open communication lines to establish commonalities that serve the interests of the people of both countries. To accomplish these goals, the embassy will share information on American values and interests, seek opportunities to increase cultural and professional exchange programs between Americans and Eritreans, listen to Eritrean perspectives on regional and international issues, and promote the positive inclusion of Eritreans in regional initiatives

As a priority, the Embassy will continue to encourage Eritrea to become a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including continued pursuit of improved relations with neighbouring countries, and within the region. 

Compare it with the 2022 strategy:

1. Chief of Mission Priorities 

Eritrea’s destabilizing military involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia that began in November 2020 destroyed any hope that the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement would usher in a new era of stability and development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean forces committed widespread and serious human rights abuses in Tigray. In August 2021, the United States imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on the head of the Eritrean Defense Forces and in November, under Executive Order 14046, sanctioned several Eritrean entities and individuals. Since September 2021, the Embassy has maintained an NSC-endorsed policy of “disciplined confrontation” with the Eritrean government under which it rigorously challenges government mis/disinformation, seeks to isolate Eritrea’s toxic regional influence, and limits its engagement with political-level regime officials. The policy supports the Administration’s goal to defend and advance American values abroad, including by combatting threats to free societies by limiting Eritrea’s anti-democratic and destabilizing influence in the Horn of Africa. Our primary strategic policy goal is to cultivate Eritrea’s next generation and prepare for a post-Isaias era. 

Embassy Asmara’s team consists of 12 USDHs, six EFM/EPAP hires, and 237 LE staff, led since 2010 by a Chargé d’Affaires because the Eritrean government will not accept the credentials of an American ambassador. In addition to the Chargé, the current USDH staffing pattern includes a Deputy Chief of Mission, Management Officer, Pol/Econ/Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, Security Technical Specialist (currently staffed with a one-year TDYer, will be vacant again starting in late 2022), Consular Officer, Information Management Officer, entrylevel Information Management Specialist, Office Management Specialist, an EFM RSO Office Management Assistant (currently vacant), a part-time EFM Community Liaison Officer, an EFM General Services Assistant, and an EPAP Assistant PAO. In 2022, we expect to add PAO and GSO positions. This ICS aligns the Embassy’s ends with its modest means, i.e., our mission goals and objectives are realistic for a small post with a limited budget operating in one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States. 

Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our ACS “customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during 

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

Wednesday, 20 December 2023

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni

 

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni




The situation in Sudan is becoming increasingly complex with the recent advances of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Their capture of Wad Medeni, the capital of Gezira State, marks a significant strategic gain. Gezira, a key agricultural region and a symbolic heartland for the northern and central elites, is now under RSF control. This move not only provides the RSF with critical access points to other states but also represents a psychological blow to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), historically plagued by poor equipment and limited combat experience.

The rapid fall of Wad Medeni has led to internal questioning within the SAF's supporters, especially regarding the leadership of Al Burhan. This event is likely to exacerbate existing tensions between Islamist factions and other groups within the army. Furthermore, the RSF's control over this region could alter the regional dynamics, particularly in terms of regional support for both SAF and RSF. The proximity of RSF to the Ethiopian border is notable, as Ethiopia's alliance with the UAE could facilitate logistical support for the RSF. Similarly, Eritrea, bordering eastern Sudan, might perceive a threat from RSF dominance in the area and consequently enhance its support for the SAF. Egypt, distracted by election issues, and Gaza conflict might now redirect attention and support towards the SAF.

The geopolitical landscape is further complicated by Iran's interests in Sudan, considering its conflict with the US and the strategic position of its allies in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in its rivalry with the UAE, might also choose to back the SAF. However, the outcome of this conflict remains uncertain, as history has shown that initial defeats in battle do not necessarily predict the final result of a war. The RSF currently seems to have the upper hand, but significant support from Egypt, Eritrea, and Iran to the SAF could shift the balance.

Ultimately, the prolongation of this conflict is likely to exacerbate the suffering of the Sudanese people, many of whom have already faced multiple displacements in recent months. The situation remains fluid, and the impacts of these developments on both the regional and international stages are yet to be fully understood.

Wednesday, 13 December 2023

Testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s

 


Recent testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s


Irwa to the right of Meles: Mekelle 1991

In six episodes of YouTube videos Al Fateh Irwa, has documented his testimonials on his role in the Horn of Africa. He is a seasoned intelligence professional from Sudan, who claims to have played a pivotal role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. His career spanned various regimes in Sudan, starting with President Numeri’s rule (1969-1985) and extending into President Omer Al Bashir's era (1989-2005). Initially part of the Sudanese army, Irwa transitioned to the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Sudan National Security Agency in 1976. His focus was primarily on Ethiopia, but his expertise also took him to Moscow for a year (1977-1978), where he engaged in intelligence operations, including recruiting Ethiopian officers.

Irwa's tenure included a significant diplomatic assignment as a security officer at the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa from 1980 to 1984. Following the dissolution of Sudan's National Security after Numeri’s overthrow in 1985 and a brief imprisonment, he worked in Saudi Arabia, advising on Horn of Africa affairs and advocating for support of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). He says the TPLF had an office in Saudi Arabia but he helped promote their presence there. , Irwa advised Saudi Arabia against supporting ELF factions, asserting their nationalist and Arabist stance would not lead to Eritrea's liberation. He argued that their efforts would be futile, even over a span of 600 years.

Recalled by Al Bashir in 1989, Irwa resumed his intelligence role, later ascending to state minister in the president's office and special advisor on intelligence. Despite challenges, including conflicts with Islamist leaders over their support for Eritrean and Ethiopian Islamist groups, he maintained influential connections, facilitating discussions between leaders like Isaias, Meles, and Islamist ideologue Hassen Al Turabi.

Irwa's strategic vision for the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, culminated in a policy formulated in 1990 that aimed at regime change and the establishment of a decentralized Ethiopian state. Their aim was to weaken Ethiopia contrary to the Egyptians who wanted Ethiopia’s disintegration. His illustrious career also saw him serve as State Minister at the Ministry of Defence in 1995 and as Sudan's delegate to the United Nations from 1996 to 2005, navigating complex international dynamics including sanctions and legal challenges.

Connections to Eritrean and Ethiopian oppositions organizations

Al Fateh Irwa recounts his early  interactions with Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition organizations. He described  the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), as a leftist group with connections to the Soviet Union, comprising nationalist and Arab-oriented factions like those led by Osman Sabbe. According to Irwa, while most Arab countries favoured the ELF, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) aligned more with Chinese leftist ideologies, finding limited Arab world support, primarily in Kuwait. As a personal note,  when the ELF observed that Khalifa Kerar of Sudan's General Security Agency, favoured and promoted  the EPLF, the ELF leadership  tried to gain Kerar's favour with ordinary unexpensive gifts, he pointedly showed them a new Land Cruiser, indicating it was a gift from the EPLF, highlighting the competitive dynamics between these groups.

Irwa's connections extended to Ethiopia, until 1984 when he was declared persona non grata in retaliation for Sudan's expulsion of an Ethiopian security officer. During his period in Ethiopia he recruited numerous Ethiopian military officers and developed strong ties with Ethiopian armed opposition, especially the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Convinced of Ethiopia's threat to Sudan, particularly due to its support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Irwa advocated for weakening Ethiopia to induce regime change favourable to Sudan. He sought a decentralized Ethiopia with autonomous nationalities, countering Amhara dominance, rather than Ethiopia's disintegration. He believed the TPLF and EPLF were key to achieving this regime change in Ethiopia.

On Isaias Afwerki

Al Fateh Irwa's depiction of Isaias Afwerki paints a picture of a fearsome and uncompromising leader. According to Irwa, Afwerki's reputation as a brutal dictator was well-known, and he commanded fear even among his closest associates, unhesitatingly quashing any opposition to his ambitions.

Irwa recounts a visit to EPLF-controlled areas in 1990, where he experienced Afwerki's intimidating presence first-hand. During a dinner at an underground guest house in Amberbeb, a disagreement between Ali Seid Abdella and Mohamed Ali Omaro was abruptly silenced by Afwerki's stern command, ‘Shut Up’ demonstrating his authoritative control over his colleagues. Irwa notes that even in the presence of a guest, Afwerki's scolding was fierce, leaving no room for apology.

The narrative continues with the 'Peace and Democracy conference' in Addis Ababa in July 1991. Irwa recalls a conversation with Afwerki at the State Guest house, where Afwerki, in a reflective and intoxicated state, lamented inheriting a barren Eritrea in contrast to the TPLF's lush and green Ethiopia. Afwerki expressed regret for not heeding Paul Hentz's early advice to aim for control over all of Ethiopia rather than just Eritrea, revealing his broader ambitions.

Irwa also shares an incident where Afwerki publicly humiliated Haile Menkerios, a Harvard-educated colleague, during a meeting, dismissing the value of his education compared to the 'real Harvard' of field experience. Afwerki's complex relationship with the TPLF, as described by Irwa, was marked by a sense of paternalism and rivalry, contributing to his eventual decision to go to war with them. His animosity towards the Amhara was also notable during this period.

Irwa recalls the events surrounding Eritrea's independence in 1993, highlighting Afwerki's refusal to allow Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia to attend the celebrations, despite Sudanese presidential intervention. Afwerki's dismissive stance towards international diplomacy, preferring to engage with 'masters' in the USA or Israel rather than intermediaries, further underscores his assertive and often confrontational approach to foreign relations.

On Meles Zenawi

Al Fateh Irwa offers a highly favourable assessment of Meles Zenawi, depicting him as an exceptional leader. He praises Meles for his intelligence, strategic thinking, and dedication to his cause, describing him as far-sighted, humble, and friendly. Irwa notes the strong relationship that developed between Meles, Sudanese President Al Bashir, and himself, highlighting their close friendship. He recalls participating in preliminary meetings in Mekelle with both Isaias and Meles, planning the 'Peace and Democracy' Conference that was later held in Addis Ababa, which he also attended.

On The Sudanese role in arming and advising the EPLF and TPLF

Regarding the Sudanese role in supporting the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements, Irwa shares his initial involvement with the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) led by Ras Mengesha. However, he quickly shifted his support to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), seeing it as the most viable force against Mengistu's regime. He asserts that Sudan sourced weapons from China to arm both the EPLF and TPLF and provided military advice for their offensives.

As the geopolitical landscape shifted with the Soviet Union's support moving from Somalia to Ethiopia, Irwa describes Ethiopia becoming a significant threat to Sudan, which was allied with the West. This situation was compounded by interventions from southern Yemen and Libya, which supplied arms to Ethiopia and the SPLM, destabilizing the region further. He details a covert operation in 1984 where Sudanese intelligence, posing as opponents of the Numeiri regime, duped Libya into supplying weapons that were then used by the Sudanese military.

The rivalry between the EPLF and TPLF posed a challenge to Sudan's objectives, leading to efforts to reconcile the two groups. Irwa underscores the mutual assistance between these organizations and Sudan in countering the SPLM, heavily supported by Ethiopia. He recalls the deployment of two EPLF divisions to Sudan to combat SPLA fighters in Kurmuk  and drive them back To Beni Shangul in 1990.

Under the civilian government of the Umma Party led by Al Sadig Al Mahdi in 1986, Sudan's policy shifted. The Umma Party's historical ties with Ethiopia and animosity towards Eritreans led to a decline in support for the liberation movements and increased Ethiopian aid to the SPLM. Irwa mentions a plan by the Interior Minister, Mubarek Al Fadel, to arrest Isaias Afwerki and extradite him to Ethiopia, reflecting the changing dynamics during the civilian government's rule.

Irwa also discusses the TPLF's strategic shift from advocating Tigray's self-determination to seeking control over the Ethiopian state. He recalls a critical moment during the TPLF's final offensive on Addis Ababa, facing a severe shortage of tank ammunition. Persuading President Omer Al Bashir to supply the TPLF from Sudan's border reserves, despite military reservations, significantly aided their advance. Omer Al Bashir later convinced them saying, “ We have all the tanks on the border to fight against the Habesh and the TPLF are now doing  this job for us.” Sudan's swift recognition of the TPLF regime in Ethiopia following their victory underlined the depth of their support.

He recalled that Eritrean forces entered Addis with the Tigrayan forces and played an important role to secure Addis, he added that the Eritrean community in Addis was bigger and well organised than its Tigrayan counterpart. Thus, Eritreans knew Addis very well. He travelled to the London conference together with Isaias and Meles. He said the aim of the negotiation with the Derg government was meant to keep the negotiations until there was nothing to negotiate about. This was later what happened when EPLF took Asmara and TPLF Addis.

He came back from the London Conference with Meles in a charter plane. As Meles was keen to go to Addis quickly to assert his TPLF’s rule. He piloted a Sudanese Cessna plane with five seats to take Meles, Sium Mesfin, Fessaha Afwerki, AliMireh Hanfare and an Amhara dignitary to Addis.  When they landed at Addis Ababa airport they were received by Kinfe Gebremedhin, TPLF’s Security Chief. later took Meles in a plane to Mekelle and Isaias arrived from Asmara and the three planned the preparations for ‘Peace and Democracy Conference’. He later took Isaias to Axum where they visited the main church there and later took Isaias to back to Asmara and came back to Mekelle to take Meles back to Addis. He attended the deliberations of the conference in Addis. He also had strategic discussions with Meles and Isaias.

On the US relations with the EPLF and the TPLF

Al Fateh Irwa recounts that initially, the United States showed little interest in establishing relations with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), viewing them as leftist organizations. Despite his advisories, the U.S. continued to support the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), even after he warned them of EDU's infiltration by Mengistu's regime. This oversight led to a significant setback for the U.S. when Ethiopian forces exposed and expelled the EDU.

Irwa notes that the EPLF had earlier begun cultivating ties with American entities, possibly aided by American and Israeli lobbying efforts. However, the U.S. only expressed significant interest in the TPLF as they were advancing towards Asmara and Addis Ababa. Herman Cohen from the U.S. approached Sudan to facilitate meetings with the leadership of both organizations. These leaders agreed to meet but insisted the meetings occur in Khartoum under the observation of Sudanese security, to demonstrate their transparency and respect for Sudan.

On The Oromo

Regarding the Oromo people, Irwa states that the Sudanese security saw them as the largest but most oppressed ethnic group in Ethiopia, unable to independently effect regime change due to divisions along religious, geographical, and cultural lines. Despite this, Sudanese security was keen on assisting the Oromo in their resistance against the regime. The tensions between the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were notable, especially after the TPLF formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), created from Derg soldiers captured by the TPLF. Although the OLF historically had more Oromo support, the OPDO proved more effective, leading Sudan to work towards reconciling these groups to contribute to the downfall of Mengistu's regime.

Relations of TPLF and the Islamist regime after 1991

According to Irwa the relations between Meles and Al Bashir were excellent. They consulted on important regional issues and the TPLF opened their depots of weapons to the regime in Sudan to help them fight the SPLM. The Sudan also brought army boots and uniform from Sudan sometime for money but most of the time free. He also recalls an incident in 1992 where a unit of the TPLF stationed in Gambella and led by Tadesse Werede, current leader of the Tigray defence Forces, helped them to control an important SPLM outpost inside South Sudan.

Sudan’s  Islamic regime links to the apartheid regime of South Africa

In one of the episodes Irwa narrated that Sudan under Numeri had relations to the security services in Apartheid South Africa, where both exchanged information. This relationship extended to close relations as South African regime helped Sudan to repair and maintain its aircraft, after the relationship deteriorated with the US.  Irwa was the link where he travelled to South Africa from time to time and even met the president, de Klerk in one of those meetings.

 

 


Friday, 1 December 2023

The Ona and Besikdira massacres November 30 - December 1, 1970

This day in 1970: The Ona and Besikdira massacres by by Ahmed Raji 

 1 December 2015, source https://www.facebook.com/ahmed.raj

 This day in 1970: The Ona and Besikdira massacres

On the morning of November 30, 1970 (which also happened to be the Muslim holiday of Eid-al-Adha), Ethiopian troops entered the village of Besikdira, 15km north-east of Keren, rounded up the population and crammed them into a mosque. The soldiers were on a mission of revenge following the killing of an Ethiopian army general by Eritrean Liberation fighters the week before, and had already burned several villages in the area in the preceding days. The soldiers positioned their machine guns at the entrance to the mosque and on windows. They opened fire indiscriminately, killing 118 innocent civilians, including women and children.

(Despite the Ethiopian officers' attempts to separate the population by faith, people stuck together. After all, they were family. Hence, the victims included Muslims as well as Christians). However, Besikdira was only a prelude to a bigger massacre. On the morning of the following day, December 1, 1970, soldiers stationed in Keren descended on the nearby village of Ona and proceeded on a killing spree never seen before in Eritrea. Soon the the entire village was in flames. Those who were not burned in their huts, were gunned down as they attempted to flee. An estimated 700 villagers and their guests (there was a funeral in progress) died. My own memory of that day (I was in 2nd grade) is one of utter terror hearing the seemingly interminable sound of machine guns and of the slow-moving shower of soot and little pieces of charred straw that were scattered by winds over parts of Keren.

[The picture shows the ruins of the mosque in Besikdira, which still remains in the same state of ruin as a reminder of that terrible day. Photo is courtesy of Dr. Kiflemariam Hamde]

A Book Review. Paulos Tesfaldet (2013). በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ. Besikdira and Its Children.

Författares Bokmaskin, Stockholm, 102pp. Written by By Kiflemariam Hamde, Umeå, Sweden

Besikdira and its children, በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ is the latest Blin literary work, in the fiction genre, mainly based on historical, real events in Eritrea since 1960s. The book consists of 21 chapters opening up with a Preface and Acknowledgement. In this review, I find only point out the main story lines. The narrative is centred around, but not limited to, the massacre in the village of Besikdira, 15km east of Keren town. After burning seven villages the previous days, the uninvited Ethiopian army visited Besikdira in November 30, 1970 only to destroy it. The officer (ሻምበል) Teshome, and his Amharic-speaking troops, also including Eritrean-born Kumandos, posed two immediate questions to the people in Tigrigna (only 5 adults could speak it) as the people did not understand Amharic: (1) if the village is free from bandits (ሽፍታ, shifta)[i], in his own words bedbugs and fleas), and (2) if they were either Muslims or Christians. Mr Mender Beimnet, the village chief, and Mr Tesfu Almedom responded that they did not know of any bandits and that the people belonged to both Christianity and Islam. Upon learning that the people did not want to get separated along religious lines, the troops forced the inhabitants into the village Mosque and shot them down indiscriminately, killing 118[ii] civilians 11 of whom were pregnant mothers, 20 were children, and the rest were youngsters and adults[iii]. The author narrates in his fictional work about the details in the killing.

The next day, December 1, 1970 was the turn of Ona village, only 4-5 Kms north east of Keren, when the military forces headed by Colonel Welana massacred almost 800 civilians indiscriminately, and without any notice. There was no question that the people supported the liberation movement since 1962. The story starts off with the general political instability since the 1960s when the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) confronted Ethiopia’s domination after the latter had annexed Eritrea as its 14th Province, revoking the UN arranged Federation (1952-1961). As the ELF was active in the Western lowlands, Ethiopian atrocities increased heavily and the apex of that came in the fall of 1970 when the ELF ambushed and killed General Teshome Ergetu, head of the Second Military Division in October 1970. He was heading toward his new headquarters in Keren town to crash the ELF and the people, to ‘dry the sea in order to catch up the fish’, i.e., to target the civilians in order to weaken and consequently destroy the ELF. Those massacres are put in this context, and one man’s life was to be compensated for by around 1000 within less than 24 hours in Besikdira and Ona. Interestingly enough, the author accounts for how the atrocities became catalyst and intensified struggle for independence.

 In his fictional description, the author exemplifies the events in a life of a nuclear[1]and extended family members, the inhabitants of Besikdira, its environs, the Sekwina district, the Senhit Province, events all over Eritrea, the fate of youngsters in their yearning for freedom, justice and equality, and finally, the inflicting cruelty of Ethiopian soldiers. The centre stage actor becomes the family of Fickak and his wife Afiet, their only son Terexbe[iv] who got married to the beautiful Melika and begot two sons, Aybu and Abbe. Unfortunately, on the bloody Monday massacre at Besikdira where the people were forced into a small mosque only to be shot down, ((እልላ, ኣጣቅዕዳ, p. 57-60) the young wife of Terexbe, and the mother of the two, Malika, fell dead alongside the other 117 victims in the mosque. Survivors discovered that it was her bold that they were covered by, and that her younger son suckled her dry breasts for milk.

On the one hand, Paulos beautifully crafts the Blin language to narrate how the family not only suffered physically the painful events of the period such as imprisonment (when Terexbe was imprisoned, (ንሽዋ p. 32-37), continued house burning (48-49), sexual harassment and abuse but also in terms of psychological inhumation. He also describes in detail some more events, such as forced displacement (ገዓዳ, p. 49) etc., On the other hand, Paulos depicts how the Fickak family enjoyed the good sides of life, often highlighting underlying cultural values and societal norms, entertaining daily communal routines such as coffee break, child rearing and development, engagement, initiation rite, Blin-style brethren hood, story-telling (dannar–jigna, p. 12-13), neighbourly life (gor-dannar, 14-17), wedding festivities (ferwenter, p. 24-28), youth love, socialization and friendship (wrznet, p. 12-15), pastoral life, initiation rite ceremonies (Hiche, shngalle, kxan, p. 18-23), wealth-sharing, development, dreaming for peace, avoiding hatred or disagreement, war and conflict.

 family exemplified the fate of Eritreans at that time. Terexbe was imprisoned (p. 32) because a certain informant (ሺኩት) spied to the Amhara[v] that Terexbe was a member of the village lajnet, with the responsibility for collecting the monthly dollar per family, qesem, which every Eritrean adult had to contribute for the liberation movement, i.e., ELF. Malika was shot dead in the Mosque, and Terexbe’s parents were also dead because they could not bear the pain. Eventually, once on age, the two brothers joined ELF and the EPLF, respectively, in order to revenge their mother’s loss in the Mosque, leaving Terexbe alone in the house (pp 77-80).

The reader also finds a lot of Blin liberation songs, praising the independence and rebuking the enemy, such as –“Na Shugutl: Shebab Axnima genjew DeAritl”, literally, aren’t the youth reside in Deari in such a tender age” (p. 34). +A recurring worry of the author, however, lies in the never-ending disagreement between the two ‘siblings’, ELF and EPLF, that “resulted in unnecessary loss of Eritrean lives and consequently, prolonged the independence day to 1991” (interspersed in the overall text). Paulos also notes the series of Ethiopian war crimes and major massacres and since 1961 in Eritrea, narrating the events not only as they occurred but also rhetorically in their connection to the dreams of people to live together in good or bad times, peacefully.

Finally, in 1980, the ELF and EPLF clashed in Halhal, the worst event which occurred to many Eritrean families who sided with the wrong side (p. 99-100), and Aybu shot down his own brother Abbe ‘simply assuming that he was the foe. Aybu was not alone in that incident as many other Eritreans also shared that fate’, narrates the author. The story culminates in an eventual meeting of the EPLF fighter Aybu and his father Terexbe after the latter wanted to meet his son, Abbe. Unfortunately, Aybu was forced to reveal the truth, and finally exclaimed, “Daddy, I will tell you a taboo, (ኤበ, ዲደትድውየከ ግን), I killed my own brother even I if rejoiced at first when I thought I won over the enemy in that civil war” (p. 99). “That is the fruit of disagreement among brothers and sisters”, laments the author (p. 99-100).

Disappointed, sad and frustrated, Terexbe returns home and continued living alone. Terexbe had only one hope, supporting the even much more independence movement for which he was imprisoned and waiting for the return of his only remaining family member alive, Aybu – “as did many Eritrean parents”, notes Paulos.

The concluding chapter (p. 102) is in fact a methodological note on the writing process. The author advises potential authors to follow standard referring system, interview the living witnesses of events in Eritrea, and coming up with a quality research work: “My advice to potential authors is that we have to write different kinds of literature because there lies our cultural capital. We praise those who have already written something, and at the same time we criticize those who did not write anything (yet). Future generations need to benefit from our literature as their heritage. Thus, I encourage you all to write about something” … so that one can improve the style and content in the literature, to sustain existing knowledge and create new knowledge – for the sake of future generations” (p. 102).

 This unique work in narrative genre is a welcome contribution to the literature in Blin with its rich documentation of knowledge of values, norms and daily lives, with substantial contents as well as presentation. በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ[vi], ‘Besikdira and its Children’ fills a badly needed gap about historical events delving into Eritrean/Blin mentality in coping with problems and bad situation. I only commend Paulos work as one the boldest contribution so far on the emerging Blin (and other Eritrean) literature with its deep narration of events that will live for many generations to come.

 As a reader, I enjoyed reading በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ and I hope that this work will only be the beginning. ኣጃሀብሪዅይዳን. Well-done a young author!  I recommend this book to anybody who is interested to know more closely the situation in Eritrea during (and shortly after) the war for independence from a local point of view. Those who want to develop literacy work in the Blin language are also ecommended to read this book as well as those who want to write and learn in Blin script. A father of two, Paulos Tesfaldet lives in Oslo, Norway. For any contacts about the book, mail Paulos at: ptesfldet@gmail.no

[i] When the Ethiopians referred to the liberation fronts as shifta (ሽፍታ) as bandits, Eritreans in general (excluding the shikut, jasus, and some of the wedo-geba) reacted that ‘they did know anything about shifta”, implicitly protesting that the ELF and later on the EPLF were not bandits but liberation fighters. Yn shifta aerini, runs in Blin.

[ii] There were more than 50 survivors, including this reviewer’s close relatives, who still narrate the sad events vividly. The victims, however were not only from Besikdira village but also from adjacent villages who were forced to settle in Besikdira in May 1970, including Sanqa, Hangol, Feledarb and Fissoruxw, victims from the latter two were passersby. The author mentions other displaced villages in the former Senhit District (p. 48-56).

[iii]There are a couple of historical work on Ethiopian War Crimes (massacres) in Eritrea, including (1) Abba Teweldebrhan Geberemedhin and Abba Zerayakob Okbamikael, Capuchin friars (2001): መሪርግፍዒኣብበስክዲራንከባቢኣን (A Painful Massacre at Besikdira and its Environs), ትምጻእመንግስትከ (Adveniat Regnum TUUM), 44th Year, Nrs 73/74, 2000-2001, page 1-14; (2) Amina Habte (2001), Ethiopian war Crimes in

Eritrea: A Case Study of the Massacres of Besik-dira and Ona in 1970. BA thesis, Asmara University; Kiflemariam Hamde (2004)

“The Impact of war and climatic changes on the environment in Eritrea: The Case in Senhit Villages”

(www.daberi.org); (3) Downey, Marty & Hugh (1996), On Heart’s Edge. Arvada, CO: Mikeren Publications, and (4) (Habtu (Fr. Athanasius) Ghebre-Ab (2013), “The

Massacre at Wekidiba: The Tragic Story of a Village in Eritrea”, RSP, and (5) “List of massacres committed during the Eritrean War of Independence”, in Wikipedia.

[iv] In Besikdira and Its Children,በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ, the main actor Terexbe sharply contrasts with Salih “Gadi” Johar’s actor, Ghebrebbi in his 2010 book, Of Kings and Bandits. However, if one looks closely both fiction works, they complement each other, in many, many respects, in spite of the common geographical location and the suffering incurred to them by the Ethiopian army (and their collaborators), illustrating social life in the then Senhit area, rich in diversity of values, norms and languages. Issues of religion come close in both readings, Gebrebbi being from a Muslim family, while Terexbe is from a Christian family. These are shown in the rites of passage, child development, training, and other issues. It seems to me that the authors communicated with each ‘in spirit’, without clashing, and thus made their point jointly that people can live together peacefully only if they accept and respect each other’s difference, the same way as the Besikdira residents refusing to get separated in terms their religion (to heaven or hell we got together’, expressed the late Mr. Meibetot Berih, a survivor in an oral communication with the reviewer, Besikdira, January 9th, 2007.

[v] Amharu or Amhara in the text is used synonymously with Ethiopians and Ethiopia, connoting the Ethiopian Military Army.

[vi] The reviewed work is in fact preceded by a dozen literary works in Blin, for example, the recent books by Medhanie Habtezghi (2008), Lexen (lekhen) axramewedi, “The Ring which became a sore”, and (2010) Enkie, (እንከኤ) translated into Tigrigna as lekas. I hope to review these works also so that readers who do not understand Blin may be able to get more information on such literary work. For further works in Blin and on Blin, visit the Blin Language Forum, www.daberi.org In a review of a literary book in Blin that is mainly based on the events of Besikdira, Kiflemariam Hamde gives the following list of related works (under footnote iii):

1) Abba Teweldebrhan Geberemedhin and Abba Zerayakob Okbamikael, Capuchin friars (2001): መሪርግፍዒኣብበስክዲራንከባቢኣን (A Painful Massacre at Besikdira and its Environs), ትምጻእመንግስትከ (Adveniat Regnum TUUM), 44th Year, Nrs 73/74, 2000-2001, page 1-14;

(2) Amina Habte (2001), Ethiopian war Crimes in Eritrea: A Case Study of the Massacres of Besik-dira and Ona in 1970. BA thesis, Asmara University; Kiflemariam Hamde (2004) “The Impact of war and climatic changes on the environment in Eritrea: The Case in Senhit Villages” (www_daberi_org);

(3) Downey, Marty & Hugh (1996), On Heart’s Edge. Arvada, CO: Mikeren Publications,

Thursday, 30 November 2023

Haile Menkerios on the PLF leadership crisis and the Menkae Movement 1973

 

 The PLF leadership crisis and the Menkae Movement 1973

Aida Kidane Interview with Haile Menkerios 24.10.2004

Question: When did you join the struggle?

I went to field early 1973.

Question: Why did you go?

You have to understand there was a lot of idealism, student movement, and it was not only I but many students. It was a duty which we happily accepted. We knew that harsh life was expecting us. We decided that we should be examples to all Eritreans for such a commitment. I was in graduate school then. We were the first ones going from here. We were about 5 who started but only I and another friend went to field.

We went through Yemen to field since we had contact with field. Aboi Welde Ab was in Cairo in the PLF- Peoples Liberation Forces- office. The ELF and PLF were in civil war then. Going to Sudan was falling into the hands of the ELF and the main office of PLF was in Democratic republic of Yemen – Aden. There was another office in Beirut too, in these 3 countries. In Cairo office was Taha Mohammed Nur, Osman Sabbe himself in Beirut and fighters in Yemen who had direct contact with field. And anyone joining field goes through Yemen in those days.

So we went to Cairo and then to Yemen. From there we took a small boat, a fisherman’s dhow across the Red Sea to the Eritrea-Sudan border to Sahel, and at nighttime. While in the US, we had contact with field through members as Tsegai Khasai had come, and also Mahmoud Sherifo and Gebre Medhin Gidey who were in Kassala. We had contact with them from end of 1970 and 71, and after they went to field we had contact through Aboi Welde Ab and Taha.

All the fighters split from ELF. Some went to Ala, others in small groups to the Sudan when killing started. Those PLF1 mostly Red Sea people, were taken by Sabbe to Aden and then to field. Sherifo had stayed in Kassala, and we corresponded with him. Then Gebre Medhin went to Cairo.

When I joined the front, there was no regular military training. We were joining in small numbers, 2 or 3 in one time. At daytime those not trained were called out to the riverbanks and we got some military exercise as we went along and at nights we slept in hills. Then a large group of about 30 came from inside Eritrea and we had a 2-week training together in a place called Arag, in Sahel.

We heard of the civil fighting of Geregir and that the Sudanese had told the Eritreans to get inside Eritrean border. When we reached Eritrea, there were fighters waiting for us since supplies and weapons too were brought with us. They told us of having heard shooting in Geregir when coming to us that our forces must have moved camp. The civil strife continued when we were there for 6 months.

 

There was registration of newcomers, written in notebooks, not properly as was later used. One to be fighter is already known of, coming to Yemen. For those joining from inside Eritrea, the town agents gathered them in Bahri. The person’s name and background are known then and proceed to Sahel. The PLF 1 (Shabia) were about 150 man strong and PLF 2 (Selfi) about 120 and Obel 20-30 men. All sides had their circles, it was not totally integrated then. We the  new ones and the 30 other new ones and some coming in few numbers had made training for 2 weeks, numbering to about 50. This is a large number of force that reorganisation (tekhlit) was made, and a new haili (platoon) formed.

Then, I and Mehari Gimatsion from the USSR were told that we should go abroad and organize students, workers etc organizations and to return to Europe. I did not want the job after coming determined to fight in the field. It was better to send a veteran fighter who had many experiences because we cannot be called fighters in only 6 months’ time.

While we were at the river side, there had been a long-time competition between Selomon W Mariam and two leadership members, Tewelde Eyob and Asmerom Gerezghier. Selomon was an active person who used to make cliques of his own, he was a city man with connections with civil organizations, not much a military man.

Tewelde Eyob was the strongest of the three and Asmerom was not much educated or active, but they were regarded militarily leadership by the fighters. As the country had feudal society, people depended more on persons from their region. Selomon was rumoured on being a regionalist and had sometime spoken the Akele Guzai being more numerous. We were surprised that such backward thoughts were in field, even Eritrea was seeming little for us let alone think in region, and we did not know who was from where.

All soldiers slept in hill tops while the leadership rested in riverbank guarded making it not easy for the enemy to enter. Water was so important it had to be well guarded surrounding the area lest the enemy control the water areas. We were expecting to be sent abroad. We had come to understand the confrontations of Selomon on one side and Tewelde and Asmerom on the other side. One day, Selomon came to us and said that from now on he will eat in our group. The first female fighters Dehab and Werku were already with us.

As we were distributed radios, Selomon took our radio. I asked him why he did not use the leadership’s radio than ours because we wanted to hear news too. He answered no, theirs is the mesafinti (feudal) radio, and I was shocked that the leadership had such disagreements.

In the daytime next day, I talked to some officers saying we are seeing a not strong leadership. We had the criticism and self-criticism customs. That Selomon openly calls the others feudalistic, how could a weak leadership continue, meaning the whole front is not strongly led. They told me I should say to Selomon himself and I answered that the leadership makes us criticizes for the loss of needles and they should together do their own criticism. I cannot go to Isaias and tell him Selomon calls him a feudalist.

This was the start of the whole situation that expanded into other matters. This called for a meeting of 12 persons, the leadership, and some cadres. Isaias wondered why the meeting was called. I was then asked what happened. I repeated what had happened and said I think the fighters see you as a solid leadership and matters should come into agreements. These fighters had long time relationships and said it was Selomon who was feudalist and was regionalist tendencies too. They talked of past experiences what had happened, and the majority were against Selomon. Isaias then said that he cannot continue acting like their priest and the issue must be resolved among these people once and for all. When he said that, the issue became wider. We were there to reconcile and the some of the accused cadres and leadership now became the accusers. We said to them that they could not solve the problem as they were seen accusing each other and it should be examined. Selomon is accused of being regionalist, and you who should in between be becoming accusers. We were 7 together. I suggested that those who knew them all should hold a large cadre discussion. This radio incident was the opener of the conflict history.

Then 52 members from all units and veterans gathered. They told us to run it and we saw there was a deeper division amongst them, Akele Guzai and Hamasien divisions. As the front’s strongholds were in Ala and Semanawi Bahri-Hamasien, it was the people from there who joined in most numbers. Many from Serae and other regions joined ELF because ELF was in those areas. Joining the front for many was not an ideology question, but proximity to join. Many who joined were specifically from Karneshim and Tsena Degle areas because they lived in these areas.

Selomon had his gangs of supports and Tewelde/Asmerom had their own gang. It was much later we learnt that Asmerom was from Debarua, Serae. It is common that people connect to their near folks and feudal traditions are not overcome yet.

The worst situation came from the educated fighters who did not like the way the leadership run the front, saying the leadership are backward and are attacking Selomon for regionalism. That the leadership should be thoroughly changed, and we should be guided by scientific socialism, saying this was a national democratic revolution, socialist in character to lead to communism. These fighters were strongly leftist, with many opinions which we believed in too. They claimed that the leadership is feudal and Isaias was with these men that it should be changed. Our aims should be changed making it a socialist revolution.

The leftists sided with Selomon claiming the leadership wanted to kill him, to get alliance from the Hamasien side were more in number and stronger, and gain support from his side. And Selomon became their ally.

In this meeting of the 52 members, the leftists were attacked saying they are using Solomon’s regionalism to remove him later and take power because they themselves are regionalists. The leftists wanted to use the cracks on the leadership. They wanted larger fighters’ meetings and that the educated should lead etc. This led to the movement known as the ‘Menkae movement’.

Then Musie Tesfa Mikel from the leftists said these people use the front as their personal power who ‘pee and make faeces’ as they wished. Musie was not at loss to use words. They suppress people and charge anyone as they wish would be it in regionalism or other to kill him. Since we were the ones who gathered this meeting, we had called fighters who could make changes from the leadership and Musie and co were one of these. We invited them specifically too.

When Musie used these words, there was Tsegai Keshi, a platoon leader, who was against Selomon, though he was Hamasien too. He was a very forward and honest but uneducated man and no talker. He got so angry saying ‘now you say this leadership pees and makes faeces!’ and hit Musie on the head with his rifle butt. This should not have happened, and we demanded that Tsegai be imprisoned. I, Mehari Girmatsion and a third man were the responsible for holding this meeting. As it was according to PLF rules, I myself imprisoned Tsegai. He did not shoot at his comrade but hit him and putting a guard on him, he was sentenced to punishment.

That became the end of meetings and the leftists said did we not say so that they pee and have faeces on us. And they took over and Musie used that. Musie was a smart guy. Thinking about it later, there was nothing bad about it, it was true.

The traditional leadership did not have capacity to lead, although they started the military wing. Tewelde Eyob was a good military leader. Isaias was the only politically capable person. Basically many fighters had come from the rural areas and the conflict situation had come untimely, otherwise their opinions were not disagreeable. And that they attacked the leadership. The timing and way they conducted was not right.

 

So they went and said that the leadership should go down and be replaced, we shall have a scientific socialism and we know about it. And the other side disagreed that Yohannes etc – the leftists- should rule and we thought it was opportunistic talking only about the leadership.

Their mistake was their arguing on the leadership than reshape the line, and nobody who knew of it did not oppose changing our ways. The situation started growing widely and that Musie was hit, as if we too sanctioned it. What we wanted was taking the right road, recognize the weakness of the traditional leadership and demanded a congress be made and new leadership to be elected. We did not have a programme or constitution and we had the 3 united fronts working in their own rules that the congress becomes our lead.

But there came confusion in the front and the leadership was not obeyed and at that time the Ethiopians came on us in Sahel, the 13 day war. Instead of guerrilla warfare we were forced to fight holding positions.

Petros Selomon and Sebhat Efrem were with the leftists-Menka at the beginning and were thus imprisoned, and that is the first time I saw imprisoning of them, as they had wanted to imprison the leadership. Now all of a sudden, Selomon recognized that these people at the end would break his post and take it, and turned against them.

The front had now split into three groups. One was the Menka who claimed that the leadership was old with no knowledge and should be changed to scientific socialism etc.

The second was Selomon’s group whose region Hamasien were numerous as they were in the ridge to the front, the Semenawi Bahri. When one joined the front one who knows him join too and the geographical location attracted it. These big numbers were the supporters of Selomon. These were against Isaias and the Menka, even though they sided with the Menka at the beginning. They had claimed Selomon was to be killed, but they did not want to glorify Selomon. They started saying Selomon is no different from the others in the leadership and they should be changed. When Selomon realized this he came to opposition to them and had to come back to the leadership mould again. Now the leadership and their supporters built a united front.

Selomon was earlier attacking the Akele Guzai, then changed and supported the Menkae and again attacked both sides. He was a good and active organizer of people and started imprisoning fighters.

The third group said the leadership was feudalistic but should be changed systematically. This would widen the split between the Hamasien and Akele Guzai.

So, it was an uneasy alliance. There were some from Serae too, but we did not know them, being too few.

We started talking to Isaias and others that these two groups are dangerous. We cannot complain on Selomon and the feudalists as we are surrounded wholly by it. It is a secondary issue which will get better with education and time, we cannot oppose all these peasants. There must be an alliance and this extreme leftism will crush us, so we have to create a solid organisation. We cannot teach communism with the mostly peasants and we started organising.

This is what eventually created the Party inside the front. Wedi Selomon and others realized where it was leading and changed sides. Yohannes-Menka was a man of fists, just like Isaias. But Isaias was a good military leader who maintained the balance and was aware of the social traditions. He knew where power was to be taken.

 

We had united with PLF 1 while the situation was going on and these were in between and eventually took sides of the third group. And some of their leadership, particularly Ramadan had a big role. He had balanced opinions and free from regionalism and religion and far sighted, and Ibrahim Afa, Ali Said etc were with him.

There had to be a structure because it was a united front, and a secret socialist party was created, and it went on getting bigger and took over. When the Menkae became imprisoned, it can be said that the rest dispersed. The Menkae did not have a big support and there was much persecution by Selomon.

Our position was that we opposed Selomon’s group and the extreme leftism that came and being in between was considered biased and was dangerous and that’s why we organized and Isaias and Ramadan were key in organising it. And that became the totally dominant force throughout being the instrument of control and leadership at the beginning. There were no more Menkae or Yemin. As time went by, the leadership role got less, and instrument of control got bigger.

Petros and Sebhat had been with the Menkae and when imprisoning started, they changed positions saying the Menkae were trying to take power not for the better of the revolution. Now that we know them, it is us who shall charge them and did so. They were instrumental in organising it and also the secret Party.

The Menkae were imprisoned for a long time and in 1979 when there was no more support for them, a military committee was formed, the military tribunal. The party was formed in 1975 and by 1979 it was totally dominating. The Menkae were charged and killed in secret, and I did not know. Nobody was told when the killings were done, and they were alive in the congress of 1976. Some were freed in 1978 as Werku was freed and  was brought to us. Maybe they were killed, and we heard it much later to justify their case, we did not know. That is when I heard, and it was not officially. Those who knew the whole secret are not more than 5 or 7.

Because I was in the Zena (news) group, it was basically the centre of ideology and materials to read. It was after 1976 that the political office of the Party was formed. When the girls Abeba, Werku and Maasho were freed 1976 and brought to us that we shall indoctrinate them. I tried to explain to them that both sides were incorrect, Selomon being Feudal and the Menka being extremist. Selomon was at his highest. I told them we cannot erase feudalism now and we cannot fight it head on, but with education and time. But this extremism is dangerous for the front and lead to its collapse. Dehab and Aberash were not freed and imprisoned with the rest because they did not repent and believed their cause was just.

The leadership were few and the issue was taken at that level and supposedly trusted by the fighters to do the right thing. The Executive Committee, the Politburo was formed then and made the decision, I was member of the Central Committee. Things like that were secret as it was a military front.

There were two parallel organisations in the front. The Party was secret and had its political office, i.e the Politburo, and they also had a Central Committee. And the front had its politburo and Central Committee. I was member of the latter, the mass organisation, and never in the secret Party’s committee. They did not trust the educated fearing they would topple them.

 

Some of the secret politburo members were Isayas, Ramadan, Ibrahim Afa, Ali Said Abdella, Haile Durue, Alamin. Mesfin Hagos was there at one time. This led to absolute authority of the leader.

Question: In the ‘Destructive Movement of 1973’ supposedly by Isayas, it states that the first female fighters of EPLF were having problems of upbringings and origins, and that they were spoiled. Was that the fact you saw?

This is just false accusations. They were with my unit  from the start until they were imprisoned. We were not interested on others’ origins and were thinking in international socialist ways. They were not in leading positions either. They were idealists like all of us. Once they were convinced their group were right and did not want to go against their comrades. Werku and Masho in our unit, Dehab and Aberash in anotherunit.


Tuesday, 28 November 2023

The Afar Dimension on the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict about the Red Sea Access

 The Afar Dimension on the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict about the Red Sea Access

 The Afar and the Afar Triangle

The Afar people are an ethnic Hamitic group, pastoralists  who speak a Cushitic language. The inhabitants call themselves Afar and the name ‘Danakil’ is given to them by the Yemeni and non-Arab speakers. Their language is called ‘Afar Af’ or ‘Tongue of the Afar’ where ‘Af’ means ‘tongue’ or ‘mouth’. They live in the Afar Region of Ethiopia (2.5 million), as well as in the coastal parts of Eritrea (250,000) and Djibouti (400,000).

The Afar Triangle, also known as the Afar Depression or Danakil Depression, is a geological depression caused by the Afar Triple Junction, which is part of the Great Rift Valley in East Africa. This area is one of the lowest and hottest places on Earth, with some parts lying more than 100 meters below sea level. The lowest point in in the Afar depression and Africa, Lake Asal, less than 155 meters below sea level, lies in Djibouti.

The region is noted for its extreme heat and aridity, as well as its unique geological features, including salt flats, hot springs, and active volcanoes. Despite the challenging environment of the Afar Triangle, characterized by its extreme heat and aridity, the Afar people have adapted over centuries to thrive in these conditions. No foreign forces have entered the Afar territory by force. The region is also known for its rich mineral deposits and the presence of various unique species adapted to the harsh environment.

The Afar Triangle is not only significant for its geological and ecological aspects but also for its importance in the study of human evolution. The area has been a rich source of hominid fossils, contributing significantly to the understanding of human ancestry and evolution.

 

Source: Hashim Al Shami book


 The Afar Interactions with  parts of modern Ethiopia

The independent Afar Sultanates historically controlled the coastal area stretching from  the Dahlak islands (including Buri peninsula) to Zeila. These sultanates entered into 15 agreements[1] with major regional powers, including Italy, France, and England (detailed in Al Shami’s book with copies of these powers' original languages and in Arabic). One notable agreement involved the sale of land in Assab on March 11, 1870, between the Italian shipping company Soreta Rubattino and the leader of the Ankala Afar tribe.

This deal, aimed at acquiring a site in Assab for use as a bunkering station, was signed by Giuseppe Sapeto and A. Buzzolino on behalf of the company, and by Afar chiefs Hassan Bin Ahmed, Abdella Shehim, and Ibrahim Bin Ahmed. Historically, the Afar people have formed strong, unified kingdoms on multiple occasions, characterized by a highly decentralized system. At times, up to twenty-four tribal chieftains held the power to independently declare war against their adversaries, particularly the Habesha (Ethiopia), without needing the sultan’s consent.

Around the first quarter of AD 1528, Ahmed Ibrahim leader of the Adal Sultanate  defeated King Lebna Dingl’s army at Shembra Kure. During 1528–1533, army occupied Dire Dawa, Shoa, Lasta, Bale, Sidama, and Gurage. He moved then to #Tigray and occupied all the regions up to Kassala (Taka) in AD 1535. Sultan Mohamed Hanfare defeated King Menelik’s army at Arrado in 1875 and the Egyptian army led by Munzinger in 1875 at Odoummi, where Munzinger lost his life.

Eritrea and Ethiopia support proxy Afar organisations

The dynamics between Eritrea and Ethiopia are significantly influenced by their interactions with Afar groups. During the rivalry between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), both countries supported different Afar organizations to leverage against each other. In Eritrea, the Ethiopian Afar opposition, supported by Eritrea, advocated for a true Afar state in Ethiopia, free from TPLF control. Conversely, the Eritrean Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO), operating clandestinely in Eritrea but based and supported by Ethiopia, campaigns for an autonomous Afar state in Eritrea, with rights to self-determination and even secession.

The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), also known as Uguguma (meaning revolution), was active in Zones 2 and 4 of Ethiopia's Afar region. After the Ethio-Eritrean war, the Ugugumo split into two factions. One faction, led by Mohamouda Ahmed Gaas, chose to align with the Ethiopian government. The other faction continued its opposition activities and eventually relocated to Eritrea, where it received support.

Ugugumo after Eritrean independence was opposed to both governments  in Addis and Asmara and hence targeted by coordinated attacks by Ethiopian  and Eritrean forces. This opposition faction of the Ugugumo experienced a shift in its stance after Abiy Ahmed became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Heeding Abiy's call for all opposition movements to return to Ethiopia, this faction, along with other groups like the ONLF and OLF who were also based in Eritrea, moved back to Ethiopia. Upon their return, the Ugugumo ceased their confrontations with the federal government. During the recent conflict involving the Tigray forces, the Ugugumo played a central role in the Afar confrontation, indicating their active and significant presence in the region's political dynamics.

Additionally, the Eritrean Afar National Congress (EANC), primarily based in the Canadian diaspora, lobbies for an autonomous Afar region in Eritrea. Ahmed Mohamed, the Chairman of the EANC, is a prominent voice in this cause. Which sometimes raised the question if it were a one-man or a few men organization. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed recently argued that most Afar live in Ethiopia's Afar region and thus should have access to the Red Sea, a contention with implications for regional geopolitics.

This situation mirrors that of the Kurds, an ethnic group native to a mountainous region in Western Asia, Kurdistan, spanning Turkey, Iran, Iraq (including the autonomous Kurdistan region), and Syria. With an estimated population of 25 to 35 million, primarily in Turkey, their situation raises questions about territorial rights and access, similar to the debates surrounding the Afar people. If we were to follow Abiy’s argument, can we say all Kurds ought to have access to Turkey, because the majority of them live there.

First Italian colony in Afar region of Assab and how Eritrean borders evolved

The first Italian colony was founded in the Afar region of Assab on 5 July 1882, by a royal decree of King Umberto I of Italy. Later, parts controlled by Italy were incorporated and Eritrea,  with its current borders was established by Italy in 1890, expanded in 1936 to include Tigray, which was later reorganized into six divisions including the Afar region of Denkalia. The British restored Eritrea's original borders in 1941. Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by a UN resolution in 1952. Ethiopia annexed Eritrea as its 14th province in 1962.

Map of Eritrea 1912

Over time, administrative divisions continued to change, and in 1987, the Derg regime divided Eritrea into two autonomous zones, with the southern coast including Assab and parts of the Tigray and Wollo provinces becoming one zone, accommodating about 60% of the Afar in  both Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was only after the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was approved in 1995, all the Afar in Ethiopia were brought under one state, After Eritrea gained independence in 1991, it reverted to its former borders without physical demarcation due to friendly relations with TPLF. A border conflict in 1998 escalated into a war that lasted until 2000, concluding with the Algiers Agreement, which called for the establishment of a Boundary Commission. Ethiopia accepted the Commission's ruling reluctantly and did not actively implement it, resulting in a tense stand-off that persisted until the rise of Abiy to power in 2018.

It is to be noted that the Afar has actively participated in the Eritrean war of Liberation. Due to their knowledge of the Red Sea and use of boats, they were crucial in bringing military and other supplies to the revolution. Yet some Afar elites remined loyal to Ethiopia.

The Djiboutian Dimension*

Djibouti, situated along the 370-km Red Sea coastline from Ras Doumeria to the Gulf of Aden, is neighboured by the Indian Ocean to the east. This nation is home to two primary ethnic groups: the Afar and the Somali. Historically, in 1892, France shifted its focus from Obock, predominantly Afar, to the city of Djibouti, fostering a diverse community of Afar, Somalis, and Arabs. In 1896, France consolidated its territories into what was known as Côte Française des Somalis et dependences, or French Somaliland. Later, in 1967, it was renamed the French Territory of the Afar and the Issas.

Administratively, Djibouti is divided into five regions and a city. The Afar mainly reside in the Tağura, Obock, and Dikhil regions, while the Somalis are primarily found in Ali Sabieh and the newer Arta region. The Afar region encompasses about 87% of Djibouti's land area. The capital city, Djibouti City, is home to roughly two-thirds of the country's population.

Djibouti gained its independence in 1977. As of 2023, according to the CIA World Factbook, the population of Djibouti is around 1 million, with Somalis making up 60%, Afar about 35%, and the remaining 5% comprising Yemenis and other nationalities. But the Afar dispute this statistics.

In Djibouti and Ethiopia, the Afar and Somali pastoralist communities have experienced ethnic tensions due to competition for land and resources. This conflict is further complicated by their differing perspectives on the history of the Adal State, once led by Imam Ahmed, also known as Ahmed Gran in Abyssinia. Both groups assert their historical connection to this state. Conflicts have erupted between the Afar and Somali regional states in Ethiopia over disputed territories, and these clashes occasionally extend into Djibouti, affecting the broader region.

Zeila, a coastal town in present-day Somaliland, located 37 km southeast of Djibouti, is another focal point of contention. The Afar claim historical dominance in Zeila. From the time the port became significant in Islamic history, it was inhabited by a diverse mix of Arab, Somali, and Danakil (Afar) populations. Over time, these groups gradually merged, creating a unique Zeila culture and dialect, which is a fusion of Arabic, Somali, and Afar languages.

In subsequent years, Somalis moved further into the area, with their population bolstered by arrivals from Italian and Ethiopian territories to the north. By the 19th century, Somalis became the dominant group in this region. It is noteworthy that Awdal, one of the six regions in Somaliland and historically a part of the Adal State, has a secessionist movement. The capital of Awdal is Borama, also known as Awdal, Adal, or Adel.

 

 

 

Italian map 1936

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Map of Ethiopia 1987 during the Mengistu regime

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Before the 1994 constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of #Ethiopia, came into force in August 1995, the Afar were split into four provinces: Tigray, Wollo, Showa and Harar. Though it became a regional state, it was controlled by the deep state of the TPLF until 2018, when Abiy Ahmed came to power, Since then then the TPLF deep state was replaced by Abiy's deep state. It is Abiy's loyalists who control the state.

Map of Ethiopia 1995


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Map of Eritrea 1993

 

 Eritrea was administratively organised  into six regions in 1996


Map of Djibouti




[1] Hashim Al Shami, Al Manhal, The Source in the History and Narratives of the Afar (Danakil). A more than 700 pages  book was published in Egypt in 2018 and is the English translation of the Arabic edition that appeared in 1997 in Egypt. An earlier Arabic edition (Saudi Arabia, 1994) and an Amharic translation (2007) exist as well.

 * Yasin Mohammed Yasin, 2010. PhD. Thesis, Regional Dynamics of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of the Afar-Somali Conflict in Ethiopia and Djibouti