Testimonies on the so-called Menkae Movement: Adhanom Fitwi

 

Testimonies on the so-called Menkae Movement: Adhanom Fitwi

Interviewed by Aida Kidane  Holland 14.10.04

 Aida Kidane: Can you tell me about your experience?

Adhanom Fitwi: True, many think I'm an Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF or Jebha) member.  It is because when I left the field (Meda) from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Forces (and Front later, EPLF, or Shaebea); I did not sit idle and immediately joined with the ELF. When I fled from the EPLF in 1977, people who are at similar situation like me either continued supporting the EPLF norms, or kept themselves shut up.  It is very few who continued opposing the EPLF after they leave. In fact, I started being against EPLF already from 1974. 

When I joined the EPLF in 1974, the Menkae movement had already started in September 1973, and I found the leaders of Menkae in prison. I was a student at the Addis Ababa University and we knew nothing about the Menkae. Very few people knew of it. And in the field immediately we were suspected without justification of sympathizing with the Menkae movement - because we came from Addis Ababa University. This made us concerned. 

Discussing about the Menkae movement in the field at mid-70s and later was forbidden. I was naïve then and when I started asking why we cannot discuss, a comrade, who now resides in England, told some people who knew me that I should be careful not to mention the Menkae movement. And it baffled me and others – why? , and why it was forbidden to talk about the Menkae movement? 

Solomon Woldemariam told us why the Menkae movement leaders were imprisoned? He said that they had no political causes. He also said, the women members of Menkae were baking cakes for the men, killing lice off their heads, were having sex with them, etc. His words shocked us and how could such anti-women words come out from Shaebea, a Marxist oriented progressive front. We became disillusioned. 

Later, meeting or seeing former Addis University students in the field became a rarity, unless they were connected with the EPLF leadership, otherwise they were taken away being accused as a member of this and that movement and affiliations. 

I remember, there was Dawit (??) who joined the front after 2nd or 3rd year law school in Addis Ababa and he became completely against us, that we suspected him to be tied with the leadership. Character assassination was made on those they suspected.   In 1976, almost all units were gathered and though we had thought the Menkae movement had died out, many were being picked and taken. People like Tesfai Temnew were imprisoned.   I have seen the names list and because I joined the EPLF after the movement, I cannot say who was who on their personality.  But I had asked thoroughly of the movement and I know a lot.

I met Goitom Berhe (Bitsay) and Alem Abraha before they were executed. Alem was my superior. Goitom was sent to Nakfa area, of Tigre speaking area with only one rank (MesRie) of 8 members and actually he did not speak Tigre language. Then he was confined there for some time. And there he wrote an article 'Who is the revolutionary?' handwritten in 30 pages. I and Alem Abraha read it at night with kerosene lamp, though it was forbidden to read the article. About two weeks from then, Goitom was taken away and never seen again. Alem Abraha was soon taken and killed. He was one of the long-served fighters, with Sebhat Efrem etc, a leader of our squad (fesli). I had heard he was from or around Dekemhare city. 

Aida Kidane: Was the Menkae Movement a regionalist or a sub-national movement? And what did you hear about the beginning? 

Adhanom Fitwi: When Solomon Woldemariam told us of this movement, the leadership said it was a regionalist action (allege with mainly emphasis on Akele Guzai district). And Alem Abraha asked where do they want to send Afeworki Teclu (Amhray) then? And also the others from Serae and Hamasien districts? We knew that the members of the Menkae movement composed of all the districts of Tigrinya speaking highlands. We were questioning the leadership’s aims. 

At the beginning of the Menkae movement, Solomon Woldemariam was at first with the Menkae movement. The initial issue that brought the Menkae movement was that the three members of the Selfi-Nasnet EPLF leadership – Solomon Woldemariam, Tewelde Eyob and Asmerom Gerezghier were in no friendly terms. Those Menkae leaders like Mussie Tesfamichael, Yohannes Sebahtu (John), and others said we came to this front of its progressiveness and democratic aspirations and the leadership is fighting against each other? Let us work and make them reconcile. This was the main reason and even Isaias admits to it, and the leadership agreed. In the meeting, the core leadership, with Isaias, accused Solomon Woldemariam of regionalism. Solomon was from Hamasien district. And at that time according to the internal laws of EPLF, though there was no constitution or written laws, a regionalist was to be executed. Mussie, Yohannes and their friends said why waste the life of such a veteran fighter? To eradicate regionalism it is better to enlighten and educate for a solution. The situation became violent when Tsegai Keshi who died latter from inhalation of lice insecticide, hit Mussie with his rifle butt. Tsegai Keshi was in the highest military rank, being leader of platoon (Haili), since the EPLF had not formed battalion yet. 

Tsegai Keshi was not reprimanded for his actions and this had consequences and concern that fighters should be treated equally.  Isaias had once hit Temesgen Berhe and in a gathering with us Isaias admitted to it, stating that he saw him sleeping by a river bank when there was a civil skirmish and after he sent him to deliver bullets, and he angrily hit Temesgen. 

The Menkae group stated then that a fighter should be treated equally, not looked or punished as a shepherd. And civilians coming to join us were dying in 20s by thirst etc. No human life should be regarded cheap, they said. Why civilians were beaten, they asked. Many questions were raised close to 400 questions and opinions, which were then combined to 13 big demands. The situation was getting bigger. 

Then without the initiatives of Mussie, Yohannes, Afeworki and Co., the committee was extended to 36 members, to solve the widened disagreements. This brought the question of leadership policies and the rights of EPLF fighters. Then the method of solving the disagreements changed courses. 

Isaias and the core leadership held a meeting and the disagreeing members - Solomon, Tewelde Eyob and Asmerom Gebrezghier were made to forgive each other. When the forgiving and reconciliation of the core leadership was announced, the other members now said - all right it is good, but we have other problems and others have to solve them. Isaias, without the consent of the other participants then ordered the 36 member committee to be disbanded.  

The tension worsened and the leadership then decided to bring together all units from all fronts. The cases were told and all EPLF members agreed that the demands were right, and 95% of the fighters sided with the Menkae movement. The leadership was isolated and stayed hidden under ‘Adai' tree (a name of tree). The fighters said this was a reactionary leadership that cannot solve problems and brought the front into a mess. Up to this time, Solomon Woldemariam had sided with the Menkae movement, saying they were right and the issues should be brought to final conclusion.

Now, after the reconciliation of the core leadership, he became against Menkae.  Before he used to say that he would bring 4 -500 commandoes of his region and defeat Tewelde Eyob etc. But now they came to an agreement. Solomon used this situation and told the Muslims that the Christians wanted to take power, and at the same time gathered the Karneshim people, writing letters. [As the front of Selfi-Nasnet started in Alla, in Akele Guzai area, it was natural that most of youths who early joined will be from that area. And when the movement was into Semenawi Bahri, it included members of Karneshim youths.] 

 I believe Mussie, Yohannes, Afeworki and Co. went too far in their demands. As they saw some people were going away from their side, they used microphones stating they were not regionalists. Afeworki Amharay and Co. would not budge from their convictions and became martyrs to the end. That they used loud speakers was a mistake, we saw. The leadership was looking for reasons to fail and accuse them and they said - look at these Addis Ababa University students, are they aware this is a guerrilla front, and not a student demonstration? And the Menkae movement lost ground. 

Aida Kidane: Were the Menkae Movement demands legitimate? And what other observations did you have? What about the prisons? 

Adhanom Fitwi: The Menkae demands and questions were still in my time necessary topics and legitimate. I can give instances. Once at end of 1975, we were attacking Ethiopian Commando forces near Afabet, where we had battalions, and we did not succeed and lost half of our fighting force there. A meeting was held after and the topic was about Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). EPLF did not have good relationship with them, but with Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). We the educated ones asked questions why the EPRP did not state that the Eritrean question was a colonial question? Why the EPRP have opportunistic stand? The TPLF gathered in Tsorona and stated it was a colonial question, a smart move on their part. I raised several questions, and spoke carefully not to suspect to be a Menkae and my question was similar to theirs. Berhane Gebrezghier was tactician (teketatali mela) previously of our battalion, and Ali Ibrahim, a former Obel member who had fled to Osman Sabbe and then back to us was our battalion leader. He was replaced by Hasan Amor from the Red Sea people. 

Berhane was Isaias' right-hand man and had all the power and he said in front of all the fighters that what Adhanom Fitwi (I) expressed as question was of the Menkae type. There was nobody to defend me but myself. Once someone is implicated with the Menkae, everyone alienates that person, so not to be suspected.  Now when difficulty came upon us, we started to question how the Menkae were treated. Tesfai Temnew was a battalion leader and a brilliant person. He left the front and went to Saudi Arabia. He and his likes were explaining to us how the Menkae movement started and the details. 

Even though the EPLF was supposed to be a democratic split of the ELF, we were undemocratically progressing from 1970 to the end of 1976. The Obel group didn’t change and they were as they came; the Sabbe group with Romadan and Mesfin Hagos from Dankalia etc were not changed, though more fighters had joined. 

We demanded that even the ELF are holding congress and why not us, and why not elect our leaders democratically? Now we are sitting being considered between ELF and Menkae sympathizers. The rightists (Yemaniyn in Arabic) were accused as regionalists and the leftists (Tsegamai) were accused as radicals. This is a contradiction in itself and one has to come to that point one time or another.   No body was questioning the leadership, and doing that, one is unquestionably taken to Halewa Sewra (Revolutionary Guards). Even an educated person who knows or didn’t know Menkae has to attack the Menkae movement. Whenever the matter is raised in discussions it has become a norm saying the Menkae were opportunists trying to damage our front. Else the person is targeted as their sympathizer. 

Aida Kidane; How where the Menkae sentenced? And how did you hear about the verdict?

Adhanom Fitwi:  I had seen Worku Zerai in Nakfa when re-shuffling (Tekhlit) was made. She was with Kifle Hizbi (public relations). The Menkae prisoners were in Bleqat. There were 5 prisons from 1973 until I left in 1977. All the 5 prisons were in Sahel area. The biggest one was in Bleqat, one in Algain, and one in Fah. Fah was a secured place and the leadership moved there as it had only one entry and the youth (manjus) guarded it well that no one could slip inside. They were very large prisons. 

For the Menkae, if I'm not mistaken, a military court with those like Mesfin Hagos sentenced them. Apart from the Menkae, countless others were made to disappear, also counting those who bombed themselves. Those who made suicide are told to put down their arms and follow. Meaning they will be horribly imprisoned, and instead they decide to blow themselves up. The disappeared ones were countless. In 1976 there was the Second Menkae purge; the forces were getting fewer and fewer fighters.  

The fighters of 1973 were considerably fewer than of 1976. Had the conflict, arrests and death been publicly done with; nobody would have questioned. But the happenings were too secretive and become suspicious. The fighters felt that while they were sacrificing their life, why they were not informed of the happenings. Those who were brave and asked were not seen again.  When a person is taken to Halewa Sewra, the person disappears.  There was a prison guard confessing later, guarding Mussie and Co., - the lice were so many that a bullet was preferred. A prisoner cannot by himself scratch or move himself because he was beaten for that action. It was such a hot weather that the lice should not have survived but spread more in contrast. The Menkae leaders and members suffered much. Some fighters on their way to bring water saw Mussie and Co., and said they were unrecognizable, living skeletons and eyes bulging out. Though food was scarce all around, the prisoners were full of lice, tortured and least fed. 

The EPLF leadership told us about their executions publicly before or after the time of the EPLF Congress. Berhane Gerezghier who was our tektatali mela did not gather us in battalions as supposed to, but in small platoons. Our patriotism was strong and seen suspiciously to have been Menkaeized. They placed machine guns at mountain and hill- tops unnecessarily fearing of an uprising, guarding us by their trusted fighters from other platoons. They said a big decision has been made, the highest decision, and when they told us about the fate of the Menkae leaders, there was no support or opposing voice whatsoever. I was sitting and scratching the ground with a stick and Berhane Gerezghier looking at me said why don't you people respond than scratch the ground? 

The only way of fleeing from the front was via ELF. Many EPLF members were caught fleeing and were executed.   When it was said that they were given their dues, it meant killed. And they would be gunned down (not throats cut as Memhir Tesfu said in 17.4.04 in paltalk). An instance, when a decision was made on the 30 and more, it was beginning of 1975 while I was in training. Because end of 1975 we were up in Nakfa area.

In training, we went away from the river to the slopes to gather wood; we heard sounds of machine guns. We wondered if their guns were malfunctioning and one fighter told me once that it was executions being done. Also when they were tortured in Bleqat, since we were first there in training in our platoon, the young members -Menajus- used to play drums near the Halewa Sewra. The noise was made so that we would not hear the tortures as we were near it. The prisoners were interrogated and tortured at nights. It was terrible times and Solomon Woldemariam was the head. 

While Amnesty Intl searches for crimes against humanity world-wide, they did not find the atrocities of Bleqat. The torturers were dedicated ones and from the uneducated population. 

 Aida Kidane: What about Solomon WoldeMariam? 

Adhanom Fitwi:  Solomon Woldemariam and Isaias had very big differences and Isaias feared Solomon’s power. Solomon at that time was security head and head of Halewa Sewra, of training center, of the enemy lines, army front leader, of Central command. Isaias was only of front and chairman in name only; he was not that powerful as Solomon. It was the power of Solomon who crushed the Menkae movement. He came to power because of his experiences in military and ability. He put his trusted men in positions in all ranks up to brigade, battalion leaders. This power concerned Isaias. 

In the first cadre graduation in Semanawi Bahri, Haile Woldetinsae (Durue) was the head instructor who we did not differentiate from Isaias and he called Solomon worthless. Because Durue was totally Isaias’ yes man, and his right hand man. Durue was in prison in the Menkae uprising. He did not try to solve later. Solomon's men had been in the cadre school after Menkae purges. Solomon was biding for his power against Isaias and sent rumors that Isaias had said the Menkae case should have been solved democratically. Since Solomon had more powerful officers though Isaias was the chairman, Solomon's men said Isaias himself can be charged and put into prison. It had gone that far, and this reached to the ears of Isaias, and their relationship began getting worse. 

Issaias is a very smart person and told Solomon Woldemariam - Osman Sabbe had closed our incomes and may close the Sudan route. We may be forced to give ourselves up to the Ethiopians, which are horrible, and you are the best suited person to go there and solve the problem. Secondly, Issaias added to Solomon, that his health was disturbing the EPLF leadership and he wanted him to get medication in the meantime. Solomon had liver problem. Solomon was a naïve (gerhi) person. Solomon thought he must be an important person that Issaias is concerned about his health, and he went to Port Sudan as advised by Issaias. He was at the office and started medication and city life suited him. No supporter of Solomon was allowed to travel to Sudan then, in front of our eyes. Solomon was now sent to Port Sudan. Solomon was later charged of being a Yemin or rightist and he disappeared. 

Immediately, it was said that being anti Menkae and being Yemin was destructive to the front and all supporters of Solomon, leaders of brigades, battalions etc were imprisoned. These were put together with the Menkae left-overs. We became confused who the faulty party was. Menkae and anti-Menkaes were imprisoned together. Solomon's supporters now realized the game played by Isaias, but it was too late. 

It is worth commenting that the EPLF first Congress supposedly to have been the first principled and democratic, was completely undemocratic. First, anyone suspected with Menkae or the Yemin was not to be elected, meaning only Issaias' people were to be elected. The congress was preconditioned and Issaias' people were the nominators. The leadership was nine members with Solomon, and the 8 continued in the leadership with some new ones added to them. And the Central Committee became 36 people. Then Solomon realized the game played up on him. He had studied to 10^th grade and was brilliant militarily, though not politically. It was feared then that after being demoted, Solomon might shoot Issaias. Solomon was asked about his opinion on the First Congress. He said in the Congress 'I, Solomon, brought this front to this stage - and there - you are… who are more knowledgeable - so you lead'. 

Solomon was leading one ganta or two in Keren region, and they did not let him to go to Kebessa and he said ' This Tigrayan has lured me' meaning Issaias, we heard later. Claims that Issaias was of Tigrayan origin, it was only then from Solomon that we heard. Nobody knows how deep their disagreement was. Issaias used to make comrades enemies of each other, even after entering Asmara he made Durue, Petros Solomon, Sebhat, and Sherifo dislike each other and not cooperate. It was tactic used by Issaias. He would tell one of the leaders, he is a good fighter but keep away from that scoundrel (another leader). And he tells the same to the other leader making both sides suspicious of each other. Earlier, he would easily have solved the disagreements between Solomon, Asmerom and Tewolde Eyob. They were in leadership and they ignored each other. They were later nine in leadership, from the Obel like Abu Tyara and Abu Ejal. Romadan Mohammed Nur and Mesfin Hagos etc were from Shaebea who were more in numbers. Solomon, Issaias, Tewolde Eyob, Asmerom etc were from Selfi-Natznet group. 

Aida Kidane: What about the death of Tewolde Eyob one of the leaders of Selfi-Natsenet?

 Adhanom Fitwi:  The killing of Tewolde Eyob was baffling. Because he said the verdict against Menkae was not correct and should have been solved democratically – that became the reason of his execution. He was also charged of being a regionalist. It surprised us because even if he was from Akele Guzai region, it was not a correct cause of his demise. All fighters were sacrificing their life for the country, not a region. We later saw, the same content; Solomon was accused of regionalism also. He himself with Issaias had accused the Menkae of regionalism and he was charged of it.  Bistay Goitom said all issues are mingled and regionalism was not a case.

 And joining the ELF?

 Adhanom Fitwi: I started exposing EPLF right after I fled through the ELF. We used to think that the ELF bullets could not kill the enemy. We fighters of EPLF were brainwashed that the 'Ama' were not fighting for liberation. When I met the ELF, I was most astonished how bad I was brainwashed. The Das Capital of Karl Marx that we read in Addis Ababa was only two volumes inside the EPLF and we were snatching from each other to read them. I saw about 16 volumes of Das Capital with the ELF and their library in the field. I told the ELF the political education I got from EPLF was from brilliant leftists and reading in no battle times.

 When Osman Sabbe left the EPLF, and my platoon were in Nakfa, there was scarcity of materials. Issaias' theory must have been to oppress the EPLF fighting army, because in the department they were eating meat etc. We, in the armed forces (Hailitat), ate one loaf of bread for seventeen men and ate vegetables that our urine was colored. We were almost naked except for the females. We then sent one platoon to Ruba (river) Anseba as EPLF was not established in Barka area. This platoon continued to Barka as the civil war had subsided then. The ELF felt very sorry for the destitute fighters and gave the whole EPLF Haili cloths and food. But we said that 'Ama' was giving us what was due ours originally, we did not thank them.

 

 

Testimonies from members of so-called Menkae Movement: Woldemariam Abraham

 

Weldemariam Abraham on ‘Menkae’: Interview with Aida Kidane Sweden 2004

 Introductory Note:

When the Isaias group (Selfi Nezanet/Alla group) split from the ELF in 1970, alongside two other factions, and later established the EPLF in 1972, presenting themselves as a democratic alternative to the ELF, they faced a significant internal challenge from a reform movement that called for democratic changes within the organization, 51 years ago, September 1973.  According to its members, this movement sought to democratize the EPLF’s leadership structure. The EPLF leadership, however, labelled it as an "ultra-leftist" group and referred to it as "Menkae." The conflict between the EPLF leadership and the Menkae faction has since played a defining role in shaping the EPLF's security policies. The language was edited for fluency.

Mohamed Kheir Omer

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Highlights:

“We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters in the surroundings encouraging them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.

Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians, and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious differences.

The leadership, however, declared that these articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF) for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and reading the Quran.”

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Aida, “I extend my deepest gratitude to Weldemariam Abraham for taking the time to share his experiences with me. Although he was initially reluctant to discuss his life before joining the front, I insisted, and he agreed.”

Personal History (2004)

As a student, I was involved in the revolts and was subsequently imprisoned at Sembel. At the time, I was attending the technical school, known as Point 4. I was among the last to be released because I had claimed that my parents were deceased. After my release, I started working in Wenji but was dismissed under the pretence of having Bilharzia. I then moved to Jima, and later to Assab, where I worked at the refinery before enrolling in a technical school. Despite being accepted for 3-4 scholarships, I was denied access. I believe this was due to my Eritrean identity, as I had passed the examinations at the top of my class but was still denied the opportunity.

During my time in Assab, I met four Eritrean men under house arrest who were required to sign in four times daily to prevent them from fleeing. They were accused of collaborating with the front. It was through them that I learned about the front, which led me to leave my job and move to Addis Ababa, where we formed the Tihisha secret group, keeping it hidden even from close friends.

While in Alem Bekagn (I have had enough of life) prison in Addis, (It was a prison for those served life sentences or where in a death raw.) I encountered Eritrean fighter prisoners who informed us that the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) was splitting, and a new front, Shabia (EPLF), was emerging. Along with Mesih, I established contact with Rustom. When Rustom was captured in Asmara, I took advantage of having a passport and fled to Italy, then to Austria, and eventually to Czechoslovakia and Germany. This long route was taken due to a lack of information. We only knew a little about Italy because of our familiarity with Catholicism. I did not realize at the time that I did not need a visa to enter Germany. I went to Czechoslovakia because many students were there, and a General Congress was to be held in Munich. It was there that the path to meda (the field) opened up to me, and after an eight-month stay in Germany, I joined the front. Even in meda, I opposed the leadership, which remains unchanged to this day.

On the Battle of Gereger

We entered meda (the field) through Yemen at the end of 1972. We had captured arms from the ELF and transported them using camels. Habte Selassie and I led the camels on foot, dressed in military attire. As we attempted to enter Eritrea, the Sudanese ordered us back and escorted us to avoid being ambushed by the ELF or being denied water access. Many ELF fighters under Abdella Idris’s command were killed, and the corpses were left to decay until the Sudanese buried them with bulldozers.

I was new to meda when the Battle of Gereger in Sudan began. Initially, we were at the temporary base of the EPLF, Selfi Nezanet, and Obel. We had come through the Red Sea from Aden under the leadership of Solomon Weldemariam and others, evading capture by the ELF. As we neared Gereger, we received a radio message informing us that the battle had begun. If not for this message, we might have been forced to flee further into Sudan or been captured by the ELF.

The battle intensified as we were few in number, carrying arms, and navigating rough terrain in the dark. I lost my way and unintentionally led the camel carrying weapons toward the Sudanese side. Fortunately, I was able to reunite with my comrades, and we avoided being caught by the ELF.

At the time, it was widely believed that no force could defeat the ELF. Their fighters were known as "Aremrem" (resilient), being numerous and strong, often finding ways to escape difficult situations. The Gereger battle occurred within Sudanese territory, and the ELF pursued us to that point. They outnumbered us and were better equipped. However, their lack of strategic planning prevented them from wiping us out. We had just acquired Kalashnikovs with 30 bullets each, while the ELF had Simonov’s with only 10 bullets, which could have given them an advantage.

After this, we entered Eritrean territory on March 4, 1973, passing through Arag to Gereger Asmara, which we held as a stronghold for an extended period. There were two Geregers: one in Sudan (Gereger Sudan) and another on the Eritrean side (Gereger Asmara). From there, we moved to Beiqat. I don’t recall much of the journey as I was wounded in battle with the ELF at Deqsem village near Zager on October 13, 1974. Bleqat and Fah became strongholds until the liberation.

During one encounter, Abdella led an attack, targeting a weapons depot held by a few Medada (Arabic for counter revolutionaries) reactionaries and bringing in many fighters. We fortified our position by building stonewall chains, 2-3 kilometres long and about one and a half meters high, to shield ourselves from enemy fire and the harsh winds. Despite this, the situation remained tense due to the ELF snipers. In one skirmish, we surrounded a group of 20 ELF fighters and asked them to surrender. While most complied, one defiant fighter opened fire, leading to a shootout that left all 20 dead.

The bodies of the ELF fighters began to decompose, and we could not bury them as the ELF still surrounded us, maintaining pressure. After our departure, the Sudanese buried them in mass graves. This was my first experience of the brutality and inhumanity of fratricidal warfare.

Our defense area spanned 2-3 kilometres in diameter. The Sudanese grew concerned when we began using artillery, such as the "Haun" bombs, which disrupted their security. They were surprised by our extensive use of weapons and ordered us to leave their territory.

Entering Eritrean Territory Again

The initial Battle of Gereger lasted only a morning, but sporadic skirmishes and tension persisted for about a week. Precise dates and details are difficult to recall as all our writings were confiscated, and the trauma of beatings, imprisonment, and time took their toll.

After regrouping, we devised a plan to send a signal indicating our movement and direction. We joined our group at night and participated in ongoing skirmishes. Eventually, the Sudanese ordered both organizations to leave Sudanese territory and cross into Eritrea, which took us two days, with the Sudanese army patrolling us throughout the journey.

As all sides were in combat positions, they were easily targeted and hit by machine-gun fire. Tragically, 20 of our brothers from the ELF were killed in a senseless manner. On our side, from the Selfi Nasnet group, we lost only one fighter, Gebretsadik Guangul, who was also known as "Cuba" because he had spent time there. He was peering through a small opening in the wall when a bullet struck him in the forehead, killing him instantly. Tewelde Eyob was wounded as a bullet passed through both his thighs. I cannot recall if there were any other injuries on our side.

At that time, we had not yet united with Shabia (PLF 1), and 6 or 7 fighters (the exact number is uncertain) were killed, but I did not know their names. Although we were fighting in the same area, our leaderships and administrations remained separate. We had only a coordinating committee to manage the distribution of arms and food according to the number of fighters.

In late May 1973, the ELF came to Gereger Asmara and captured a fighter who was guarding a mountain while others fought their way out. He was taken to the ELF stronghold in Barka but later fled to Kenya, as I heard. I believe his surname was Gebre Mikel.

Hilal, a brave and well-educated man from Dankalia, was killed in the battle of Qebir Wu'ut. He had ongoing disagreements with Isayas and Omaro. Another fighter, Solomon Mengesha, originally from Tigray and raised in Massawa, joined the struggle after coming from Germany. He had exhausted all his ammunition and was killed. Solomon had come with me from Germany and, in my presence, asked Isayas if he could fight for Eritrea, despite having only an Eritrean mother and no other demands. He was granted permission, but only two months later, he was martyred—an innocent and courageous man.

The Bleqat area had been under my unit’s control for a long time before the leadership moved there to ensure it was secure from the ELF. When fighting intensified in Kebessa, my unit relocated there. In September 1974, fighters like Wedi Fenkil were killed in the battle in Filfil.

The Bleqat-Fah area had previously been an ELF front. We were stationed about two kilometres apart, separated by mountains and valleys, making it challenging to distinguish our positions from theirs. The ELF fighters monitored our movements from the high ground using binoculars.

On the beginnings of the so-called Menkae Movement

We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters encouraging them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.

Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians, and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious differences.

The leadership, however, declared that these articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF) for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and reading the Quran.

We, the new and inexperienced fighters, were caught in the traps set by both Isayas’s EPLF and Abdella’s ELF. I consider myself fortunate to have survived, as I often protested against Isayas. In fact, I once openly stated—and even wrote down—that we should kill him.

The Rise of the Menkae Situation

When Isayas realized that the situation was not working in his favour and he feared losing in the internal elections, he sought to manipulate the circumstances. He relied on the support of Asmerom Gerezghier, Tewelde Eyob, and Tsegai Keshi. (Keshi later died from DDT poisoning—he had washed his clothes with DDT to kill lice, but when he wore them again, the poison slowly absorbed into his body and killed him.)

At the time, Adhanom Gebremariam and Wedi Fenkil were also part of Isayas’s group, which soon expanded to a meeting of 11 individuals. Their plan was to eliminate Solomon, but they knew that if he were killed, it would be obvious that the leadership was behind it. To cover up their actions, they aimed to involve all the leadership and veteran fighters. They initially accused him of regionalism and other charges but failed to carry out their plan. Solomon sensing danger, confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, shedding tears on his shoulder.

The root cause of the conflict was purely a struggle for power. When the veterans realized that the situation was spiralling out of control and that many fighters were becoming aware of it, they agreed to resolve their differences internally. Otherwise, they feared that the more educated fighters would gain an upper hand. The conflict escalated to a meeting of 65 fighters and eventually became known to the common fighters. Isayas, Solomon and Omaro made an oath to never oppose each other, marking the beginning of what would be called the Menkae situation.

I’ve previously explained the meaning of "Menkae." The term was originally used in 1970 by Naizgi Kiflu to describe the ELF. Having come from the United States, Naizgi was working with the Selfi Natznet to reconcile them with the ELF at Wina. When asked about his opinion on the ELF, he responded that the front was like "Menkae"—a bat. This term later stuck, and when he joined the front as a fighter, we travelled together through Aden. Naizgi, whose character was questionable, had studied at Lumumba University in the USSR and supposedly had contacts with Soviet security apparatus.

We had three haili units in Sahel, and two were dispatched to Kebessa to receive new recruits. Unfortunately, they missed their destination and ended up deeper in Kebessa, where they encountered fierce battles. Naizgi, wanting to avoid death, was seen firing into the sky while hiding—a behaviour noticed by his comrade, Abraha Chaalo. Fighters like Yohannes Sebhatu, Dehab, and Werku disliked Naizgi. Werku once even questioned how Naizgi had earned his MA degree, as he was often seen making foolish and ignorant statements.

The educated fighters were against Isayas, but Naizgi sided with him. When asked about this movement, Naizgi labelled it the "Menkae" movement, the same way he had described the ELF. The name stuck, but some of us tried to reframe it, saying that "Menkae" represented leftists or progressives, encouraging people not to be deterred by the label.

The female fighters also faced derogatory remarks. They were accused of coming to Sahel for men and were labelled as prostitutes. They were criticized for visiting beauty salons and were shamed for washing their hair. In reality, after cutting their hair short and enduring muddy conditions, they simply needed to maintain basic hygiene. Such unfounded accusations were used to demean them. While they weren’t beaten while free, anything could happen in prison. When men asked to marry them, the women declined, stating they were there to fight for liberation. They argued that if they wanted men, there were plenty in the towns.

There are individuals today who remember the precise timing of the executions during the Menkae purges. One person, now part of a civic society in Frankfurt, was a former prisoner. Two others are here with me, and another served as a prison guard.

One such prisoner was Abraham Antonio, whom we captured from the ELF in a battle near the Dekemhare-Keren road. He was an ELF political cadre covering the Senhit to Asmara area. We brought him to Sahel, where Mesih and I intervened to stop his execution. He had been a schoolmate of Isayas, Musie, and others, and he was imprisoned on the day the Menkae members were executed.

The "correction centre" served multiple purposes. One was to prevent fighters from spreading information about their prison experiences. When a prisoner was released, they were kept at the centre until they recovered from their wounds. During this time, they were threatened not to disclose how they were treated or name other prisoners. In the early 1970s, we had such centres in Sahel, and as our controlled areas expanded, more centres were established in various locations. Dr. Bereket was put in one of these centres after we captured him.

One of my friends, Mesih Rusom (also known as Mesih Berhe), and I were together in the Tihisha movement. He was the head of a department at the Commercial Bank of Addis and had studied at the Commercial School.

The Menkae movement was not an attempt to oust Isayas. Initially, there were five people involved: Tsegai Keshi, Wedi Fenkil, Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, and Asmerom Gerezghier, who met to discuss how to defend themselves from the growing opposition. Later, Adhanom Gebremariam joined them, increasing their number to 11.

The leadership of Selfi Nasnet (PLF 2) consisted of five key figures: Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, Asmerom Gerezghier, Mesfin Hagos, and Solomon Weldemariam. When it came to decision-making, the first three (Isayas, Tewelde, and Asmerom) had the majority vote, often leaving Solomon and Mesfin in the minority. Isayas saw Solomon as a threat because they frequently clashed. However, he couldn’t easily remove or kill Solomon without a legitimate reason, given that they were both in leadership positions.

Isayas’s group grew from 11 to 35 fighters and convened a meeting where they accused Solomon of regionalism. This tactic was used to rally support against him. At this point, Isayas had begun seeking alliances in all hailis, telling them that Solomon’s closeness with Shabia leadership was concerning.

During one of these meetings, Tsegai Keshi hit Musie Tesfa Mikel with his rifle butt after Musie told Isayas, "Can you silence your dogs? We can’t understand each other." Tsegai, frustrated, retorted, "Didn’t we say before that we should get rid of these students before fighting the ELF?"

The accusations of regionalism against Solomon made him fear for his life. He confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, saying they would kill him. Mebrahtu tried to reassure him, saying, "They cannot even demote you from leadership, let alone kill you." But that’s when the Menkae situation truly emerged.

During the meetings, Musie pointed out that if they were to accuse someone of regionalism, they should also consider which region the accusers were inclined to. He noted that Isayas was from Hamasien, Tewelde from Akele Guzai, and Asmerom from Serae, suggesting that their regional affiliations were no less evident than those of others. This enraged Tsegai, who couldn’t control himself and struck Musie.

After this incident, Musie came to the sickbay where I was stationed and spoke to Afwerki Amharai and me. I advised him to remain calm and consider it a comrade’s mistake, but he insisted, “Weldemariam, this is not the case,” and he narrated the whole ordeal.

I told him, “There are only three civilian families in this large area. You won’t win by spreading this message here. The leadership might crush you in the meantime. Wait until we move to Kebessa and then spread the word quietly to our people.” He agreed, saying he hadn’t thought of it that way before.

The Menkae movement did not rise against the leadership or the front but sought to expose the truth behind Isayas and Solomon’s longstanding animosity. However, when the veterans realized that the tide was turning against them, Isayas, Solomon and Omaro made a pact, vowing never to rise against each other or reveal secrets about one another. This blood oath marked the beginning of the purge against the Menkae.

In response to the growing influence of the Menkae, Isayas used the phrase, "Better to have 10 cheguar dangas (simple peasants) than 100 pens." The cheguar dangas were loyal and unquestioning fighters who followed orders without asking about their rights. In contrast, educated fighters knew their rights and often challenged the leadership, making them a thorn in Isayas’s side.

The Female Fighters in the Menkae Crisis

The female Menkae fighters were beaten just like the men. Werku, still alive, has remained silent until the right time comes. I do not believe she ever turned against her comrades. There was a situation where her menstrual bleeding would not stop. Fearing for her life, she was sent to Aden for treatment. Since her passport was held by the leadership, she had nowhere else to go. The others were executed while she was in Aden, and the matter was left unresolved.

In Kuwait, Ramadan once held a meeting for all women workers. Ghirmai Bahre openly challenged him in front of everyone. On his return to Eritrea by boat, Berhane Gherezghiher, who is now imprisoned, and others killed him and cast his body into the Red Sea.

From Beirut, two wounded fighters, Habte Gorilla and Habte Ab Seyum, were taken away to Sahel and killed. We wanted to escape the field and expose these actions to our people.

The Executions

The first Menkae members executed were six: Musie, Yohannes, Afwerki, Tareke, Habte Selassie, and Rusom. A former head guard stationed at the execution, now residing in Germany, has agreed to share his account of what happened, as did two others present at the execution. During the National Congress, Isayas pulled out a small and dirty piece of paper from his pocket and stated that the proper measures had been taken against these individuals. This was understood as code for their execution.

In preparation for the Congress, which took place three months prior, participants were required to have been involved in the struggle for at least 2-4 years. They also had to be free from any association with the Menkae, Yemin (right-wing), or Hub-aan (unknown opposition), or any form of dissent. Those suspected of being potential challengers were sent away for training courses in meda. Haili units would send delegates, but those already in courses were ineligible. During the Congress, these individuals were left without instructors and given books to read in the meantime, ensuring they could not be nominated for ranks.

One person, Alem Abraha, somehow managed to slip through this filter, but you can read about how Mesfin Hagos ensured his return to the field.

 

Final Thoughts

The Menkae uprising was not an attempt to overthrow the leadership but rather a struggle to defend the truth from Isayas’s manipulations and accusations against Solomon. We did not rise against the leadership or initiate the movement.

The following individuals were notable members of the Menkae movement:

1. Musie Tesfamikael
2. Mebrahtu Weldu
3. Yohannes Sebhatu
4. Weldemariam Abraham
5. Afworki Tekhlu
6. Gebresadik Isaak
7. Habte Kidane (Gorilla)
8. Habte Selassie
9. Tareke Yihdego
10. Dehab Tesfatsion
11. Aberash Melke

 

Italian Colonialism: Eritrean Muslims the Khatmiya and Mirgani Family

 

Italian Colonialism: Eritrean Muslims, the Khatmiya and Mirgani Family

الاستعمار الإيطالي: المسلمين الارتريين و الختمية وٱسرة الميرغني

Sitt Sharifa Al Alawiya

The Italian colonial history of Eritrea regarding Muslims can be divided into three distinct periods:

1. First Colonial Period (1885-1910): This phase focused on territorial conquest, responding to the Sudanese Mahdist threat, and implementing Governor Martini's "Muslim policies." The Italian colonial authorities aimed to pacify the region and secure control over the unstable Eritrean-Sudanese border. During this time, they established relations with the Mirgani family—a prominent Muslim family respected for its religious authority in both Eritrea and Sudan. The Italian authorities saw cooperation with the Mirgani family as essential for maintaining public order and unifying the colony.
2. Second Colonial Period (1910-1920): Following the conquest of Libya, Italy sought to refine its approach to Muslim communities by studying Islamic law and institutions. This understanding helped strengthen colonial rule by incorporating the Islamic legal system into colonial administration, consolidating control over Muslim populations.
3. Third Colonial Period (1920s-1941, Fascist Era): Italy adopted an openly pro-Muslim stance, projecting itself as the "Sword of Islam" and positioning itself as a protector of Islamic communities. During this period, the colonial authorities promoted a specific form of hierarchical and urban-centered Islam represented by the Mirgani family.

Role of the Mirgani Family

The Mirgani family, tracing its lineage to ‘Ali b. Abi Talib and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, had significant religious influence in Sudan and Eritrea through the Khatmiya tariqa (Sufi order). The Italian colonial authorities first engaged with Sayyid Hashim al-Mirgani, who had relocated to Massawa after the Mahdist movement's rise in Sudan. Following his death in 1902, the Italians sought another prominent figure from the family to maintain their influence and settled on Sayyid Ga'far b. Bakrī al-Mirgani, who moved to Keren.

Sayyid Ga'far’s Role and Influence

Sayyid Ga'far’s presence in Keren, facilitated by the Italian authorities, helped establish an Islamic sphere of influence within colonial Eritrea, drawing many Muslim faithful to his leadership. His collaboration with the colonial authorities was crucial in maintaining public order and fulfilling the Italians' administrative goals. However, his growing influence led to internal disputes within the Khatmiya order, particularly with his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, daughter of Sayyid Hashim, who resided in Massawa.

Eritrea’s Complex Ethnic and Religious Landscape

Eritrea's strategic position as a trade hub between the East, Africa, and the Mediterranean resulted in a complex ethnic, linguistic, and cultural makeup. Religious affiliation was only one of the many factors contributing to this diversity, and colonial authorities leveraged these dynamics to maintain control over the region.

The Italian authorities formalized agreements with the Mirgani family to ensure their influence over local Muslim communities, particularly in the Barka region, to counterbalance other Islamic powers outside the colonial borders. This relationship allowed Sayyid Ga'far to become a central figure in organizing the socio-religious life of the area, solidifying Italian colonial objectives.

In an attempt to resolve the disputes between Sayyid Ga'far al-Mirgani and his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, the Italian colonial authorities brokered an agreement with Sayyid Ga'far in which:

1. Sayyid Ga'far agreed to provide a list of eight to ten of his Khulafa in Eritrea, from which the government would select two to reside in Keren as his advisors.
2. Two of his Sudanese advisors, Mūsā Muhammad, and Muhammad 'Utmān, would be removed from Keren, with Mūsā Muhammad being reassigned to Barentu and Muhammad 'Utmān to Nakfa to counteract rival influences.
3. The role of scribe, previously held by Mūsā Muhammad, would be taken over by Khalifa Ga'far, someone preferred by the colonial authorities.

The conflict was fuelled by the competition between Sayyid Ga'far and Sharifa Al Alawiya over religious influence and collecting donations from the local Muslim community. Sharifa’s authority was limited by gender, and she could not appoint a new Khulafa. Despite her claim to the mosque where her father was buried, her intervention in religious affairs was not well received by the local population, who viewed such matters as traditionally male responsibilities.

To ease tensions, the colonial authorities recommended that Sharifa use Keren as a summer residence rather than a permanent home. A reconciliation was reached in December 1910 through the mediation of qāḍī Muhammad al-'Arabī, where Sharifa agreed to recognize her nephew as the head of the Khatmiya in Eritrea and refrained from interfering in his religious affairs.

However, despite the reconciliation, many followers stopped paying donations and began turning to the Khatmiya of Kassala in Sudan. This strained relationship between the Sudanese and Eritrean branches continued to create challenges for both leaders.

Despite these internal conflicts, Sayyid Ga'far remained supportive of Italian colonial policy. During the conquest of Libya, he urged Eritrean soldiers to fight against the Turks, whom he criticized as illegitimate heirs of the caliphate and "false Muslims." His support for the Italians reinforced colonial propaganda that distinguished his legitimate religious authority from the Turkish claim to Islamic leadership.

The dispute between Sayyid Ga'far al-Mirgani and his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, centered around the appointment of Khulafa (representatives) within the Kshatriya order. The Khatmiya had a tradition of appointing representatives in a three-tiered hierarchy: the Kḫalīfat al-Khulafa, the Kḫalīfa muqaddam al-ḥadra, and ordinary Khulafa. Sayyid Ga'far's authority to appoint these representatives was challenged by Sharifa, who sought to influence decisions concerning the mosque where her father was buried.

The conflict intensified when some of the Khulafa, feeling marginalized by the new appointments, sought Sharifa’s intervention. Colonial authorities feared a split within the Khatmiya and stressed that male members traditionally handled appointments. Despite recognizing her nephew’s position as head of the Khatmiya in Eritrea, Sharifa asserted her control over the mosque and its religious activities.

The competition was primarily driven by their followers’ desire to control donations from the faithful. The relocation of Sharifa’s residence to Keren was perceived as an attempt to regain influence over donations that had been redirected to Keren by Sayyid Ga'far’s appointments.

To resolve the matter, the Governor of Eritrea arranged a meeting between Sayyid Ga'far and Sharifa in January 1911, with the presence of Italian authorities. During the meeting, Sayyid Ga'far agreed to share management of the donations with his aunt, while Sharifa agreed not to establish Keren as her permanent residence and returned to Massawa. This compromise helped to ease tensions and solidified the Italian strategy of maintaining religious influence within colonial borders.

Following the conquest of Libya in 1911, the Italian colonial authorities developed a more structured approach towards Islam in their colonies. Recognizing Islam as the majority faith and understanding the need to maintain colonial order, the administration began to show greater interest in studying and accommodating Islamic practices to prevent any religious unrest.

The Italian School of Arts and Crafts opened in 1911 in Keren, was reserved for the sons of Muslim notables. Initially, the local Muslim community was wary, suspecting attempts at Catholic proselytization. To alleviate these fears, Sayyid Ga'far enrolled his son, Sayyid Bakri, in the school, reassuring the community and leading to broader acceptance of the institution.

Sayyid Ga'far was pivotal in promoting the region's Islamic education and religious practices. He invited many Muslim scholars to Keren and utilized his hierarchical network of Khulafa’(deputies) to centralize the socio-religious organization of the area. These deputies conducted religious ceremonies such as marriages and burials, which previously varied among individual communities.

Sharifa Alawiya and Fascist Italy

During the fascist era, Italy adopted an explicitly pro-Islamic policy in its colonies, particularly in Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, to gain support and counterbalance the influence of the Orthodox Church and other local religious authorities. This policy sought to project Italy as a protector of Islam and a champion of Muslim interests.

A key figure in this strategy was Sharifa Al Alawiya, a respected Islamic authority and descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who actively supported the fascist pro-Islamic policy. After returning to Eritrea in 1923, Sharifa played an influential role in promoting Islam in the region, acting as an intermediary between the Italian colonial authorities and local Muslim communities. Her support was utilized in propaganda campaigns, particularly during the conquest of Ethiopia, where her influence was overemphasized to gain legitimacy among Muslims.

The fascist regime's pro-Islamic stance included promoting the Arabic language, constructing and restoring mosques and Quranic schools, and facilitating Muslims' travel to the Middle East for religious studies. One notable achievement was the construction of the Sitti 'Alawiyya Mosque in Harar, Ethiopia, which was built in 1937 in honor of the Sharifa and symbolized the regime's commitment to supporting Islamic communities.

Although Sharifa's role was heavily highlighted in Italian propaganda, her influence in Ethiopia was limited. Nonetheless, her collaboration helped solidify Italy's image as a patron of Islam in the colonies, strengthening its presence and gaining support from neighboring Muslim communities.

Sharifa Al Alawiya was a key contact for the Italian colonial authorities, particularly during the fascist period, as part of a strategy to establish relationships with prominent Islamic figures. In May 1938, she travelled to Rome and was received by Mussolini at Palazzo Venezia and other Islamic dignitaries. The Italian press emphasized her role, presenting her as a descendant of the Prophet and a supporter of fascist Italy.

Her loyalty to the fascist regime was reciprocated with favorable treatment from the colonial authorities. In 1939, a book titled La Sceriffa di Massawa (The Sharifa of Massawa) was published in Italy, highlighting her support for the regime and her opposition to Mahdism, which she described as a "fanatical" movement. The sharifa’s influence and loyalty to Italy were reinforced through colonial propaganda, portraying her as a "queen without a crown."

Oral traditions among members of the Khatmiya reflect a similar admiration for Sharifa Al Alawiya and her close ties to the Italian regime. Her death in 1941 in Keren coincided with the British occupation of the city and the defeat of the Italians. According to these traditions, the sharifa’s heart stopped from the pain of Italy’s defeat, illustrating her unwavering loyalty to the fascist regime until her death.

In her own words, Sharifa Al Alawiya praised Mussolini as the "Sword of Islam," recalling her visit to Rome as a moment of deep honor and expressing her gratitude for Italy's support to Muslims, particularly Eritreans.

 During the British Administration

Later in life, Sayyid Ga'far expressed a wish to be buried in Kassala, Sudan. He moved from Keren to Agordat and then to Tessenei, where he passed away in 1944. His burial in Kassala, now the main center of the Kshatriya order, symbolized the cross-border solid influence of the Mirgani family.

After his death, his son, Sayyid Bakri, took over the administration in Keren, continuing the established system of khulafa’. The family's socio-political influence in the region was further solidified in 1946 when Sayyid Bakri was elected president of the Muslim League.

Sayyid Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Mirgani, despite his prestigious position in the Khatmiya Sufi Brotherhood, was often criticized for his lack of engagement in local affairs. He only became more active after receiving strong encouragement from Major R. Signals. Al-Mirani's shift to support the unionist cause was primarily influenced by Massawa-born merchant and lawyer Muhammad Umar Kadi, who advocated for a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Kadi toured several cities to garner support for reforms within the League and reduce hostility towards unionists for economic reasons. Faced with losing influence within the League or seeing it align with the Pro-Italy Party, al-Mirgani chose to support the unionists to preserve his own status and power in 1948

Openly derided by Sultan as an “opportunist and egoist,” al-Mirgani thus built support for the union after having served nearly two years as the President of Eritrea’s largest nationalist organization. In theory, al-Mirgani’s shift to the unionist camp should have placed the League’s mission in greater jeopardy.392 As the spiritual head of Eritrea's largest and most influential Sufi brotherhood, al-Mirgani and his inner circle still carried influence in many Muslim communities as khalifas and former League officials. For some BMA observers, the rebellion against the “religious chief” (al-Mirghani) left most League supporters “without a clear and capable guide” to carry on their objectives as a united nationalist force.

As the spiritual head of Eritrea's most prominent Sufi brotherhood, his switch to the Unionist Party initially threatened the League’s cohesion. However, his defection ultimately reinforced the League's claims that confident Muslim leaders supported the union with Ethiopia to protect their economic and political interests. Al-Mirghani’s political reputation suffered greatly, especially when he switched his allegiance back to the Muslim League-dominated Independence Bloc in mid-1949. His inconsistent stance eroded his credibility, making him less influential in Eritrean politics.

Despite al-Mirghani’s defection and the complications it caused, the League continued to pursue its goals, including the first steps toward Tigre emancipation by establishing new autonomous clan structures in the Western Province in 1948. Al-Mirghani's wavering loyalty and diminished reputation illustrated the League’s resilience in advancing its agenda even when prominent Muslim leaders withdrew their support.

Kennedy Travaskis, the British officer in charge of Keren at the time, recalled an incident when a Muslim dignitaries, led by the Islamic Judge (Qadi) of Keren, visited his office one morning. The Qadi stated that they were there to protest, on behalf of the Muslim community, the mistreatment of their revered leader, Seyid Babiker Al-Mirgani, by a Christian police constable. A call to the police clarified the situation: Seyid Babiker had been caught drunk driving after crashing his car into a wall and vomiting whiskey on the officer.

When Travaskis sought guidance on enforcing the law or showing leniency, the Qadi suggested a discreet approach. Publicly fining Seyid Babiker could incite unrest and diminish the community’s respect for the Mirgani family, which would be disastrous. Instead, he advised handling the matter privately by revoking Seyid’s driver’s license and imposing a hefty fine without public exposure. Travaskis accepted this recommendation and resolved the issue quietly.

 Sources:

1.     S. Bruzzi, “Il Colonialismo Italiano e la Khatmiyya in Eritrea (1890-1941)”, Africa, Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO), Rome, 2006.

2.     Joseph L. Venosa. Paths toward the Nation: Islam, Community, and Early Nationalist Mobilization in Eritrea, 1941–1961. (Ohio University Research in International Studies, no. 92.) Athens:  Ohio University Press,  2014. Pp. xix, 283

3.     Kennedy Travaskis's The Deluge: A Personal View of the End of Empire in the Middle East