تدهور النظام الصحي في إريتريا

تدهور النظام الصحي في إريتريا 

https://www.mediafire.com/file/qlrxp7cl2ig3bh3/تدهور+النظام+الصحي+في+إريتريا++full.pdf/file

Eritrea's Deteriorating Health System

 

Eritrea's Deteriorating Health System

20 August, 2026

A healthy population is the backbone of a society. It drives a society's wellbeing. Individuals can live longer, be more productive physically and intellectually, have fewer chronic diseases and disabilities, and, through preventive methods, a health service can reduce disease prevalence and respond to new challenges that may arise. But in a country where the government fails to provide basic services such as safe drinking water,  talking of a health system becomes a luxury.

Eritreans currently describe the health services as lacking essential equipment and medicines, with a shortage of trained manpower, and medical staff are all overwhelmed to the point of collapse. 

https://www.mediafire.com/file/7v4q79zr12742oz/Eritrea’s+Deteriorating+Health+System+P1+and+P2.pdf/file

Lifting the US sanctions on Eritrea is long overdue

Lifting the US sanctions on Eritrea is long overdue

As some readers may know, there was a time when I argued for sanctions against Eritrea because of the regime´s persistent and deeply upsetting human rights abuses against its own citizens. As the vast majority of Eritreans, I had an expectation that the attention of the outside world would ensure that those in positions of power would be held to account. However, in the years since and particularly after observing the diverging responses of Western governments to wars in Ukraine versus Gaza, I have become increasingly doubtful about how sanctions are used in international relations. The US sanctions on Eritrea were not implemented in the interest of the Eritrean people, and now they will be lifted for the sake of current geopolitical considerations.

Today, I am not bothered by the principle of accountability itself but rather its selective application. Although sanctions are often discussed as measures to protect human rights and international law, in practice, they seem strongly influenced by political interests and geostrategic alliances. Some states are sanctioned quickly and comprehensively, while others, even accused of similar grievous breaches of rights, but happen to be allied, financially involved or geopolitically advantageous, escaped with caution or are outright protected.

This contradiction is exemplified by Eritrea. Eritrean armed forces have also, rightly, been accused of committing serious abuses throughout the course of the Tigray war. Many of those reports also described atrocities committed by Ethiopian forces, but the Ethiopian army was not sanctioned. The international response was nonsensically weighted towards Eritrea.

In Sudan, we can see another variation of the same song today. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on certain individuals associated with both the SAF and RSF, as well as on foreign mercenaries purportedly fighting on the side of one or the other faction. But the critics point to a refusal to directly challenge regional players such as the UAE, which stand accused of financing or facilitating the war. This, to many observers, further strengthens the view that sanctions are driven not by value-based principles but by self-interested political and economic considerations.

There is also the uncomfortable truth that sanctions hardly ever deliver on their own goals. Over the mountain ranges in Eritrea, where many of the targets are high-ranking military or security officials, whose presence in the West is so limited that individual sanctions have little impact, who work through opaque channels and systems using foreign names and regional alliances to sidestep restrictions. As a result, the impact is fairly limited for ground-level decision-makers.

The rest of us seldom get by unscathed. We already know that economic isolation, banking restrictions, and diplomatic pressure are deepening hardship, which they barely endure under authoritarian rule. Eritrea shows that sanctions produce no political change and do nothing to bolster opposition. Even the opposition has remained divided and failed to turn international pressure into domestic political pressure.

In the end, significant change in Eritrea — as in so many authoritarian cases — will not stem from foreign sanctions alone. It will have to come from within the society, via political change initiated and spearheaded by the Eritreans.

There is no excuse to overlook or justify human rights abuses. Far from it. However, when the principles of justice are binding only at certain times, they cannot be expected to provide moral authority for the international community. Otherwise, sanctions will continue to be seen around the world not as instruments of justice but as tools of geopolitical self-interest disguised in the language of human rights.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Isaias’s Unreciprocated Love for the US: Looking East while Moving West

 

Isaias’s Unreciprocated Love for the US: Looking East while Moving West

Isaias has always been seeking a special relationship with the US, but all previous administrations ignored him, cultivating relations with the larger antagonistic neighbour, Ethiopia. Isaias was regarded as an unreliable partner who waged wars with his neighbours. His overtures to China and Russia were only a means of getting US attention. The 2^nd term of the Trump administration seems to reverse the course for new geopolitical considerations. The release in 2025 of some evangelical Christians detained in Eritrea for many years may have been a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions. If the US administration were to use Eritrea for launching attacks against the Houthis in Yemen, Eritrea may end up being a target in the proxy wars in the region.

Isaias revels in the anti-American tough-guy brand he had cultivated, although he once supported the US war in Iraq, offering it a base. In the build-up to Gulf War 2, Isaias recruited the Beltway lobbyists Greenberg Traurig (at an annualised cost of $600,000) to drum up support for a US naval base in Eritrea. Under the slogan ‘Why Not Eritrea?’, Greenberg Traurig – the Eritrea campaign was headed by now disgraced ex-con, the conservative PR star, Jack Abramoff – sought to make the case that as a pro-American half-Christian, half-Muslim nation surrounded by Muslim theocracies.

More recently, Isaias sealed his position on March 2, 2022, among an isolated club of states, including Iran, North Korea, Russia and Syria, when Eritrea voted against a UNGA resolution Resolution ES‑11/1 condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This didn't surprise observers of Eritrea as its foreign minister visited South Ossetia and Crimea after Russia occupied both territories.

During Independence Day addresses over the last few years, the president primarily delved into current global dynamics, denoting them as a realm dominated by what he labelled as “forces of hegemony and domination,” with a focus on China and Russia, and advocating for a fresh global paradigm.

The regime’s relationship with China and Russia has been notably amicable. On 3 August 2022, Eritrea condemned former US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, regarding it as a deplorable act in contravention of international law, the norms and provisions of State sovereignty, as well as the ‘One-China’ policy and the process of Chinese reunification. It was the only African state to come out so unambiguously in China’s defence.

During a visit to China in 2023,  Isaias defended China’s loan policy in Africa and supported a China-led new world order of cooperation. During his visit to Russia that same year, he stated that the war against Russia did not start with the Ukraine war, but rather began thirty years ago, during the Cold War, to contain Russia. In his meeting with Putin, he asked him to lead the war against Western hegemony.

A delegation from the Russian navy, led by Vice Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, undertook a five-day visit to Eritrea’s Massawa port in April 2024.

Isaias began his political career with relations to the CIA and may end his career there, finally being embraced by the US, his dream love.

 

Wage Labour and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s

 Wage Labour and Mobility in Colonial Eritrea, 1880s to 1920s

By Massimo Zaccaria, 2014, published in International Labor and Working-Class History

Issue: Fall 2014, Volume: 86, Page numbers: 89-106

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547914000118

Abstract:

Mobility and wage labour are two key variables that help to explain some of the complexities of the labour history of colonial Eritrea. Focusing on the initial period of Italian colonization, between the 1880s and 1920s, this article analyzes the relationship between the two above-mentioned variables. Based on previously unexplored archival sources and documents, the authors conclude that wage labor did contribute to the mobility of workers throughout the region (and not vice versa). In the period under consideration, Eritrea did not become a settler colony, despite Italy's initial efforts to import a national labor force. Instead, through a mix of capital investments in construction and transport, and increasing military recruitment, the Italian regime contributed significantly to an increase in free wage labor in the region. Within a year of Italy's 1911 invasion of Libya, it needed to reinforce its colonial army. From 1912 onward, in return for wages, tens of thousands of Eritreans entered the Italian colonial army to fight on the Libyan front. This military employment left voids in the local labor market, which were filled by people from neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopians and Yemenis. A relationship thus developed and continued between mobility and wage labor.

https://www.mediafire.com/file/dvpepuv64vkawrj/Wage_Labor_and_Mobility_in_Colonial_Erit.pdf/file

Resources on Tigrait (language of Tigre)

 

Tigre Language Rescources

When South Yemen offered the ELF qualitative weapons to attack the EPLF

 Who was more nationalist, ELF or EPLF?

In 1979 (one year before the #EPLF and #TPLF attacked the ELF), Ali Nasser Mohammed, the Prime Minister of South #Yemen, invited Abdella Suleiman, the head of the Foreign Office of the #ELF, and Idris Humedai, the Head of the ELF Office in Aden. Ali Nasser stated, this organisation (the EPLF) is dangerous—for the region, for progressive forces, and for you. He added, after consulting with several parties, we concluded that the only solution is to support you with qualitative weapons, supplies, and funds. Additionally, if you wish, we can coordinate with the Ethiopian army to complete the task, as they can organise that.

Ali Nasser asked the ELF to provide a list of all the necessary weapons and logistics they need as soon as possible to the South Yemeni Ambassador in Khartoum. When Abdella rejected the idea, Ali Nasser urged him to present it to the ELF leadership. When Abdella met the South Yemeni Ambassador in Khartoum, the ambassador told him, This is a historic opportunity for the ELF and pleaded with him to bring the list as soon as possible. Abdella Suleiman went to the field and informed only Ahmed Nasser, the ELF Chairman, and both agreed to keep this matter private, as they considered the issue a crime and shameful to present it to the ELF leadership.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIAv8IwqQ8Y

Henry Kissinger on Eritrea-Ethiopia February 1975

Henry Kissinger on Eritrea-Ethiopia, February 1975 

A declassified secret meeting between the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, and his state's Secretaries of State on Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1975. Kissinger predicted Eritrean independence but was not sure if Copts were Black.

https://www.mediafire.com/file/6f87bc2wjvph9ok/Henry+Kissinger+combined+on+Eri+Eth+1975.pdf/file

Thanks to Amer Hagos for sharing

صعود وسقوط الدولة الماركسية الوحيدة في العالم العربي وروابطها مع القرن الإفريقي

 

 

صعود وسقوط الدولة الماركسية الوحيدة في العالم العربي وروابطها مع القرن الإفريقي

محمد خير عمر

ظهرت جمهورية اليمن الديمقراطية الشعبية (جنوب اليمن) عام 1967,ثم تحولت تدريجييا كالدولة الماركسية الوحيدة في العالم العربي، على تحالف وثيق مع الاتحاد السوفييتي، ومحاولةٍ لزرع العقيدة الشيوعية في مجتمع قبلي. كان ذلك اختبارًا أيديولوجيًا قاسيًا غذّى الاضطراب بدل الاستقرار. خلال الحرب الباردة، دعمت  جنوب اليمن عدّة ثورات إقليمية، فيما نخر تدخلُ القوى الخارجية والانقلابات والاغتيالات وصراعات الأجنحة جسدَ الدولة من الداخل. ثم جاءت حرب يناير 1986 الدموية لتطيح بجزء كبير من القيادة، تاركةً الدولة ممزقةً عسكريًا واقتصاديًا واجتماعيًا. ومع انهيار الاتحاد السوفييتي، دخل الجنوبُ عام 1990 في وحدةٍ مع شمال اليمن بقيادة علي عبد الله صالح—زواج قسري بين اشتراكية جنوبية وحكمٍ شماليٍّ يزاوج بين السلطوية والبُنى القبلية والدينية. وكما كان متوقعًا، تفككت الوحدة سريعًا؛ فأنهت حرب 1994 هامشَ استقلال الجنوب. تُجسد تجربة الجنوب كيف تتصادم الأيديولوجيا مع سياسات الهوية والجغرافيا السياسية للقوى العظمى، وكيف تفشل نسخُ النماذج المستوردة. اليوم، لا يزال اليمن مضطربًا: الحوثيون يسيطرون على الشمال، وحراكُ الجنوب يستعيد زخمه، فيما تعقّد تدخلات الخليج المشهد.

روابط اليمن بالقرن الإفريقي

روابط اليمن بالقرن الإفريقي حميمةٌ وقديمة. جغرافيًا، عند مدخل البحر الأحمر الجنوبي، تكاد الضفتان تتلامسان: نحو 65 كلم تفصل ساحل إريتريا قرب عَصَب عن جزيرة بريم/ميون اليمنية، فيما يضيق باب المندب إلى 30 كلم تقريبًا بين رأس سيان (جيبوتي) ورأس منهلّي (اليمن). ثقافيًا، ترتبط الكتابة المسندية اليمنية القديمة بقرابة وثيقة مع الجعزية، لغة كتابة التيغرينية والتيغرايت والأمهرية. وتشير دراساتٌ إلى انتقال جماعات الحبشة/الحبشيت والأقازِي من اليمن إلى إريتريا وشمال إثيوبيا، مسهمةً في نشأة حضارة أكسوم؛ كما تُرجع بعضُ سلاسل العفر جذورها إلى الضفة الأخرى. في العصر الحديث، ساند جنوب اليمن حركاتِ التحرير الإريترية، ثم أنظمة “ثورية” في الصومال وإثيوبيا. وأثناء حرب 1977–1978 بين الصومال وإثيوبيا، تعاطف الرئيس سالم ربيع علي (سالمين) بدايةً مع الصومال، لكن الغلبة مالت للمعسكر السوفييتي دعمًا لإثيوبيا وصولًا إلى إرسال قوات. لاحقًا تدهورت العلاقات مع إريتريا خلال نزاع جزر حنيش في ديسمبر/كانون الأول 1995. وفي 1998، منحت التحكيمات الدولية معظم أرخبيل زقر–حنيش لليمن وبعض الجزر الصغيرة لإريتريا، مع ترسيم للحدود البحرية؛ ونفّذ الطرفان القرار سلميًا.

اليمن الشمالي: لمحة تاريخية

خضع اليمن الشمالي لقرونٍ طويلة لحكم الإمامة الزيدية—مذهبٌ شيعيٌّ بملامح فقهية قريبة من السنّة—جمع بين السلطة الدينية والقبَلية. وبعد انسحاب العثمانيين عام 1918، قامت المملكة المتوكلية بقيادة الإمامين يحيى وأحمد، بنظامٍ أبويٍّ حافظ على عزلة البلاد وبطئها، رغم تسرب الحداثة عبر التجّار والعائدين والطلبة. في 1962، أطاح ضباطٌ متأثرون بثورة ناصر في مصر بالنظام الإمامي وأعلنوا الجمهورية، فاندلعت حربٌ أهلية بين الملكيين المدعومين من السعودية والأردن وبريطانيا، والجمهوريين المدعومين من مصر ودول اشتراكية، حتى  1970 وهكذا صار اليمن ساحةً لحروب الوكالة في الحرب الباردة ومسرحًا للصراع القومي العربي. وقد دعم ناصر حركاتِ التحرير الأفريقية من الجزائر إلى غانا نكروما وكونغو لومومبا.

حربٌ أهلية وتصفية استعمار وولادةُ يمنين (1962–1970)

في الشمال، دارت حربٌ أهلية بين الجمهوريين المدعومين مصريًا والملكيين المدعومين سعوديًا. أرسلت مصر نحو 60 ألف جندي وخسرت قرابة 10 آلاف، واستنزفتها “فيتنام مصر” قبل هزيمة 1967. انتهت الحرب عام 1970 بانتصار الجمهوريين وإلغاء الإمامة الزيدية واعتراف السعودية بالجمهورية العربية اليمنية.

في الجنوب، حوّلت بريطانيا وجودها الطويل في عدن (منذ 1839) إلى مستعمرة عدن ثم اتحاد الجنوب العربي، لكن الكفاح المسلح اندلع في 1963 بقيادة جبهتين: جبهة التحرير القومية (NLF) وجبهة تحرير جنوب اليمن (FLOSY) المدعومة من مصر. وبعد انسحاب بريطانيا في 30 نوفمبر 1967، تفوقت NLF وأعلنت جمهورية اليمن الجنوبية الشعبية بقيادة قحطان الشعبي. وفي 1969، أطاح الراديكاليون به في “حركة تصحيح”، وصعد سالم ربيع علي. وبحلول 1970 تبنّى الجنوب الماركسية وأضحى جمهورية اليمن الديمقراطية الشعبية (PDRY). وتركت الشقاقات السوفييتية–الصينية أثرها على تماسك كوادر الدولة الجديدة.

أثر الانقسام السوفييتي–الصيني (الخمسينيات–الستينيات)

قسم الانقسامُ السوفييتي–الصيني العالمَ الاشتراكي بين لينينية مركزية بموسكو وماوية ثورية ببكين تتهم السوفييت بخيانة الشيوعية. وصل صداه إلى الجنوب اليمني وحزبِه الحاكم الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني

مال سالم ربيع علي (سالمين) إلى النموذج الصيني القائم على تعبئة الجماهير، فيما تبنّى عبد الفتاح إسماعيل الصرامة السوفييتية وتصدير الثورة. وحاول علي ناصر محمد إدارة توازنٍ براغماتي بين النهجين. وتسرّبت المنافسات من أسئلة السلطة والاصطفاف الخارجي إلى سياسات الحياة اليومية: كيف تُباع الخضار—في السوق أم عبر الدولة؟ وهل المروحة والثلاجة “رفاهية” أم حاجة ضرورية؟ كانت تلك قشرةً لجدلٍ أعمق حول وتيرة التحوّل الاجتماعي، وحدود سطوة الدولة، وموقع الجنوب في خارطة الحرب الباردة. ومع تخندق الأجنحة داخل الجيش والأمن وشبكات القبائل، ظل الجنوب هشًا ومأزومًا—ائتلاف رؤى متعارضة أكثر منه دولةً اشتراكية موحّدة.

انقلابات الشمال العاصفة

بعد انسحاب مصر عام 1967، فقد الجمهوريون سندهم الأهم. وفي نوفمبر 1967، أطاح انقلابٌ بالقيادة الراديكالية لصالح عبد الرحمن الإرياني (1967–1974)، الذي انتهج مصالحة مع الملكيين والقبائل، وانتزع اعتراف السعودية، ثم حاول استقلاليةً أغضبت حلفاءها. في 1974، استولى إبراهيم الحمدي (31 عامًا) على السلطة سِلمًا، فقلّص نفوذ المشايخ، وحارب الفساد، ومهّن مؤسسات الدولة، ووسّع البنى والخدمات، وقوّى جمعيات التنمية المحلية، وفتح قنوات حوارٍ مع الجنوب مهّدَت لاحقًا لفكرة الوحدة. جاء اغتياله في 1977—المُنسب إلى تحالف نخبٍ متضررةٍ وأيادٍ سعودية—ليُنهي “فرصةً ضائعة”، ويُخلّد صورته كقائدٍ نظيفٍ مصلح.

اغتيالٌ على طريقة “خاشقجي”: نهاية رئيسٍ مُصلِح

في 11 أكتوبر 1977—عشية زيارةٍ مقررةٍ إلى عدن—استُدعي الرئيس إبراهيم الحمدي إلى منزل نائبه أحمد الغشمي، قيل تحت ضغطٍ سعوديٍّ لوقف الرحلة. في اليوم نفسه قُتل شقيقه عبد الله، قائدُ قوات المغاوير، بالمكان ذاته بعد استدراجه. رُويت شهاداتٌ عن دورٍ لِـعلي عبد الله صالح في إبعاد حُرّاس الرئيس. عُثر لاحقًا على جثماني الشقيقين في منزلٍ آخر، إلى جانب امرأتين فرنسيتين قيل إنهما استُخدمتا لتلويث سمعته. تتهم رواياتٌ لاحقة الغشمي وصالح والملحق العسكري السعودي بترتيب العملية، رفضًا لمسعى الحمدي إلى وحدةٍ شمالية–جنوبية ومبادرة أمن البحر الأحمر في مارس 1977. سريعًا، خلف الغشميُّ الحمدي في الرئاسة.

 

مقتل رئيسين في يومين

بعد اغتيال الحمدي، تولى أحمد الغشمي الحكم في صنعاء، لكنه قُتل في 24 يونيو 1978 عندما انفجرت حقيبةُ مبعوثٍ جنوبي داخل القصر الجمهوري—ورُبطت العملية برئيس الجنوب سالم ربيع علي (سالمين). بعد 48 ساعة، اعتُقل سالمين في عدن وأُعدم وسط صراع أجنحة اليمن الاشتراكي بين معسكره البراغماتي وتيار عبد الفتاح إسماعيل المتشدد. في الشمال، صعد علي عبد الله صالح—المتهم أصلًا بالتورط في اغتيال الحمدي—إلى الرئاسة، ليحكم 33 عامًا (1978–2011). وفي الجنوب، تولى عبد الفتاح إسماعيل القيادة (1978–1980) قبل نفيه، مؤكّدًا اتساع الاضطراب الفئوي.

 

 

صراعات الجنوب الداخلية

بحلول 1978، تحوّلت  الجبهة  القومية إلى الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني، لكن اللافتة الجديدة أخفت شقاقاتٍ أعمق. فرض عبد الفتاح إسماعيل (1978–1980) رؤيةً ماركسيةً–لينينيةً صلبةً متحالفةً بقوة مع الاتحاد السوفييتي وألمانيا الشرقية: حزبٌ واحد، وقمعٌ للمعارضة، وسياسةُ “تصدير الثورة” من ظفار إلى القرن الإفريقي—ما وضع الجنوب في مواجهةٍ مفتوحة مع السعودية وشمال اليمن والغرب. اتسعت الفجوة داخل الحزب: دعا المتشددون إلى تحولٍ اشتراكيٍّ سريع وتوحيدٍ فوريٍّ على أسسٍ اشتراكية، فيما طالب المعتدلون بالبراغماتية—تليين الإيديولوجيا، ترميم العلاقات العربية، وتقديم التنمية. كشفت حرب 1979 مع الشمال كلفة المغامرات الأيديولوجية.

في أبريل 1980، دفعت الضغوطُ إسماعيلَ إلى الاستقالة والنفي إلى موسكو، فخلفه علي ناصر محمد وسعى إلى تليين المواقف، وتحسين العلاقات العربية، وخفض التصعيد مع الشمال. لكن الصدوع لم تُرمَّم. في 1985، عاد إسماعيل من منفاه بضغوط المتشددين؛ وفي مؤتمر الحزب الثالث (أكتوبر)، دخل مجددًا المكتبَ السياسي. انقسمت عدن أيديولوجيًا وجهويًا وقبليًا، وسرّب الطرفان السلاح لأنصارهما انتظارًا لـ“لحظة الحقيقة”. حُدد اجتماعٌ حاسمٌ للمكتب السياسي في 13 يناير 1986. سبق علي ناصر خصومه، فانفجر المشهدُ بحربٍ خاطفة.

 

اجتماع المكتب السياسي… الإشارةُ إلى أفول الماركسية

في 13 يناير 1986، تحوّل اجتماعُ المكتب السياسي في التواهي/عدن إلى فخٍّ دموي: غاب أنصار علي ناصر عمدًا، واقتحم حرسُه الاجتماع، فقُتل قادةٌ عديدون، وفرّ عبد الفتاح إسماعيل قبل أن تظلّ نهايته غامضة. اندلعت حرب 12 يومًا (13–25 يناير) بالدبابات والمدفعية والطيران، دمّرت عدن؛ وبعد عشرة أيام، فرّ علي ناصر بعائلته وآلاف أنصاره إلى الشمال، وبحلول 25 يناير أحكم معسكر علي سالم البيض قبضته على العاصمة—بثمنٍ فادحٍ قُدّر بـ 7–10 آلاف قتيل وتصفيةِ الصف الأول من الحزب. كسرت المجزرة عمود الجنوب الفقري سياسيًا وعسكريًا واقتصاديًا، وسرّعت انحداره، ودَفعت فكرة الوحدة من طموحٍ إلى ضرورة. ومع أفول الشيوعية عالميًا، قدّمت وحدة 1990 لعلي عبد الله صالح عمقًا استراتيجيًا، ومنحت قادة الجنوب طوق نجاة؛ لكنها جاءت غير متكافئة، فحَسم الشمالُ الكفة، وتخمّرت المظالم حتى حرب 1994 التي أنهت محاولةَ الجنوب القصيرة لاستعادة دولته. هكذا يُظهر مسار الجنوب كيف تُطيح الأيديولوجيات المستوردة وصراعات الأجنحة ورياح القوى العظمى بمشاريع ثورية طموحة.

الخلاصة

انتهت التجربة الماركسية لجنوب اليمن بالدم والانهيار، لكن صداها لا يزال حاضرًا. فـيمن اليوم يحمل آثار تلك الحقبة: مظالم جنوبية بلا إنصاف، وإرثٌ سلطوي، ونفوذُ جيرانٍ أقوياء. لم يَطوِ سقوطُ الجنوب صفحة اليمن فحسب، بل مثّل أيضًا تراجع الاشتراكية العربية، فاتحًا المجال أمام القوى المحافظة التي تُمسك بالمشهد الإقليمي حتى الآن.

 

South Yemen: The Rise and Fall of a Sole Arab Marxist State and Links to the Horn

 

The Rise and Fall of a Sole Arab Marxist State and Links to the Horn

South Yemen’s attempt to graft Marxism onto a deeply tribal society delivered real social change yet ultimately proved politically self-undermining. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) emerged from Britain’s withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and soon aligned with the Soviet bloc. Women’s participation increased, education expanded, and local councils established themselves. But Cold War crosswinds, regional rivalry, and unresolved internal fractures steadily eroded the project. As the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) lurched through coups, the south radicalised—each side’s turbulence reinforcing the other’s.

Origins and Diverging Paths (1960s–early 1970s)

North Yemen was ruled for over a thousand years by a Zaydi (a branch of Shi’a Islam that shares notable jurisprudential affinities with Sunni traditions) Imamate that combined clerical and tribal authority. After the Ottoman withdrawal in 1918, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, under the leadership of Imam Yahya, established a patrimonial system that kept the country isolated and stagnant. In 1962, military officers, inspired by Nasser’s coup of 1952 in Egypt, overthrew the Imamate, declaring Yemen a republic. This ignited an eight-year civil war, turning Yemen into a proxy theatre of the Arab Cold War between the royalists supported by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Britain, on one side, and Egypt and socialist states, on the other. Egypt sent some 60,000 troops, lost roughly 10,000 soldiers, and became bogged down in a quagmire dubbed “Egypt’s Vietnam,” which sapped strength before the 1967 Arab–Israeli war.  This war lasted until 1970. Saudi Arabia has been bogged down in the Yemeni war against the Houthis since 2014 and is looking for a peaceful solution.

 In the south, Britain’s long presence in Aden (since 1839) evolved into the Aden Colony and the Federation of South Arabia, but anti-colonial armed struggle erupted in 1963.   The National Liberation Front (NLF)  defeated its Egyptian-backed rival, the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), and declared independence in 1967. A 1969 “Corrective Move” consolidated radical rule, and by 1970, the state adopted Marxism and the PDRY name.

The global Sino-Soviet split of the 1950s and 1960s that divided the socialist world between Moscow’s centralized Marxism-Leninism and Beijing’s Maoist revolutionary model, which accused the USSR of abandoning Communism, filtered into Aden, dividing cadres between Maoist-inflected mass mobilizers and orthodox Marxist-Leninists—schisms that mapped onto security organs, party structures, and regional loyalties. Salim Rubai Ali (Salmeen) leaned toward China’s mass-mobilization approach, Abdul Fattah Ismail championed strict Soviet-style control and revolutionary export. At the same time, Ali Nasir Muhammad tried to strike a pragmatic balance. Their rivalries extended from major questions of state power and foreign alignment to everyday policies, such as food distribution and consumer goods.

Debates over whether vegetables should be sold in markets or by the state, and whether a fan or fridge counted as a “luxury,” masked far deeper battles over South Yemen’s future—how fast to transform society, how much power the state should wield, and where the country fit in the Cold War divide. Nationalization extended even into Hairdresser saloons, fishing, tea shops, and taxis

North Yemen’s Reformist Interlude and Recoil (1974–1978)

After Egypt’s withdrawal, President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani pursued reconciliation and secured Saudi recognition before drifting toward a more independent line. In 1974, the 31-year-old Ibrahim al-Hamdi seized power in a bloodless coup, attempting to curb the influence of tribal sheiks, professionalize the state, empower local development associations, and initiate dialogue with the south. Many Yemenis still regard him as an honest modernizer who glimpsed a path to reform and unity.

On 11 October 1977—one day before a planned unity visit to Aden—President Ibrahim al-Hamdi was summoned to the home of his deputy, Ahmed al-Ghashmi, reportedly under Saudi pressure to stop the trip. Earlier that day, al-Hamdi’s brother Abdullah, a commando commander, was also killed at the same residence after being lured there on a false pretext. Upon arrival, witnesses reported that Ali Abdullah Saleh diverted the president while his bodyguards were kept in another room; hours later, the guards were informed that he had departed. Both brothers were later found dead in a separate house, alongside two French women, who had flown from Paris a few days earlier, widely seen as a staged scandal to discredit al-Hamdi. Subsequent accounts and investigations have alleged a plot involving al-Ghashmi, Saleh, and the Saudi military attaché, with Saudi Arabia opposed to al-Hamdi’s push for North–South unity and his March 1977 Red Sea security initiative. Al-Ghashmi succeeded al-Hamdi as president soon after. His assassination ended that experiment and restored forces more comfortable with a divided Yemen.

Radicalisation, Retrenchment, and Strain in the South (1978–1985)

Al-Ghashmi succeeded al-Hamdi but was killed in June 1978 by a briefcase bomb delivered by a South Yemeni envoy; responsibility is widely attributed to Aden but remains disputed. Two days later, South Yemen’s President Salim Rubai Ali (Salmeen) was executed, accused of killing Al-Ghashmi,  amid Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) infighting, clearing the way for Abdul Fattah Ismail’s hard-line leadership and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s long presidency in the north. By 1978, the National Liberation Front had refashioned itself into the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP, but the new banner masked deepening rifts. Under Abdul Fattah Ismail (1978–1980), the YSP imposed a hard-line Marxist-Leninist vision, tightly aligned with the USSR and East Germany. One-party rule hardened, dissent was crushed, and foreign policy turned outward in support of revolutionary movements from Dhofar to the Horn of Africa, placing the PDRY in open confrontation with Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, and Western powers. The split within the YSP widened as Ismail’s camp demanded rapid socialist transformation and “exporting revolution.” At the same time, moderates urged pragmatism—easing ideological rigidity, repairing ties with Arab states, and prioritizing development. The 1979 North–South war crystallized the split; Ismail resigned in 1980 and went into exile, and Ali Nasir Muhammad took over, adopting a more pragmatic line that never resolved the underlying fissures.

By 1985, dissatisfaction with Ali Nasir’s leadership—seen by rivals as overly conciliatory abroad and increasingly authoritarian at home—prompted hardliners to engineer Ismail’s return; at the YSP’s Third Congress that October, he reentered the Politburo. Aden polarised anew along ideological, regional, and even tribal lines, with both sides quietly arming loyalists and anticipating a reckoning. A decisive Politburo session was set for January 13, 1986. Ali Nasir acted first, and the long-brewing confrontation exploded into the Aden civil war.

The Aden Catastrophe: January 1986

On 13 January 1986, a YSP Politburo meeting in Aden’s al-Tawahi district became a deadly ambush: Ali Nasir’s loyal guards stormed the session while his allies stayed away; several leaders were killed; Abdul Fattah Ismail initially escaped, though his ultimate fate remains uncertain. Twelve days of urban warfare—tanks, artillery, and airstrikes—devastated the city. By day ten, Ali Nasir fled with tens of thousands of followers to the north; by 25 January, Ali Salem al-Beidh’s camp had consolidated control at the cost of thousands of lives and the decimation of the YSP’s senior ranks. The bloodletting shattered the PDRY’s political and military core and turned unity from aspiration into necessity.

Unification and Unravelling (1990–1994)

As global communism faltered, Aden’s options narrowed. For Saleh—firm in power in Sana’a since 1978—absorbing the south promised strategic depth and legitimacy; for the battered southern leadership, unity offered a lifeline. After extended negotiations, the two states merged in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen. Initial euphoria masked asymmetries: the north held demographic weight, tighter tribal networks, and control of security; the south, scarred by purges, struggled to assert its interests. Accusations of northern monopolization mounted, culminating in the 1994 civil war and the swift defeat of a renewed southern independence bid.

Across the Bab al-Mandab: Links to the Horn of Africa

The two shores of the Red Sea are a narrow crossing tied by centuries of trade, migration, and cultural exchange; scholars trace affinities between ancient South Arabian scripts and Geʿez and debate population movements across the strait. In the modern era, South Yemen supported Eritrean liberation movements and aligned with revolutionary governments in Somalia and Ethiopia. During the 1977–78 Somali–Ethiopian war, Aden initially leaned toward Mogadishu, but the Soviet camp’s support for Addis Ababa ultimately prevailed. After unification, the 1995 Hanish Islands crisis with Eritrea was resolved through international arbitration in 1998—an essential reminder that disputes in this corridor can end without war.

Outcome and Lessons

The PDRY’s gains—in education, women’s participation, and attempts at accountable local institutions—were real. Yet imported ideological templates were not adapted sufficiently to Yemen’s social fabric and economic limits; factionalism within the revolutionary elite turned fatal when mediation failed; and small states anchored to distant patrons without balancing regional realities invited blowback. Today’s fractured Yemen—Houthis dominant in the north, renewed southern mobilisation, and deep Gulf involvement—bears the imprint of those choices. The rise and fall of South Yemen reads as both a record and a caution: modernisation without inclusion is brittle; unity without power-sharing curdles into resentment; and ideology, unmoored from its local context, is outmatched by the stubborn arithmetic of geography, institutions, and interests on both sides of the Red Sea.

Today, Yemen remains unsettled: the Houthis hold the north, the southern independence movement has re-emerged since the Arab Spring in 2011, and Gulf power interventions compound the turmoil.

 

 

 

 

 

هل دخلت إريتريا وإثيوبيا الحرب بالفعل؟

 

هل دخلت إريتريا وإثيوبيا الحرب بالفعل؟

بقلم محمد خيرعمر

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Are Eritrea and Ethiopia already at war? - Pan African Review

ترسم هذه المقالة خريطة اصطفافات قوى الوكالة ومخاطر التصعيد في أقاليم  تقراي والعفر وألامهرا، وتقيّم كيف يؤثر نهج إريتريا في إدارة الحروب بالوكالة، وإلحاح إثيوبيا بشأن الوصول إلى البحر، والتحالفات المتبدلة داخل  تقراي، في احتمال الانزلاق إلى مواجهة بين دولتين.

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