The Horn and Middle Powers: A collection of articles
The international order as we have known it for the past eighty years is being dismantled. What is emerging in its place is not yet a new system, but an age of uncertainty: a world increasingly defined by the pursuit of economic advantage, political opportunism, territorial ambition and the growing willingness to use force not as a last resort, but as an instrument of first choice. The emerging logic is simple: create facts on the ground and negotiate afterwards.
Restraint is no longer necessarily rewarded with influence or legitimacy. For now, there is no universally accepted arbitrator of last resort, and the foundational assumption of the post-war era — that collective security depends on a voluntary commitment to common rules — has been weakened. The system was always imperfect and often inconsistently applied. But its erosion carries profound consequences. Now, status and leverage are defined by one’s influence over logistical corridors, energy routes, investments and a role in shaping or controlling conflicts.
In practice, privateering, redolent of the chartered companies of the 17th and 18th centuries, replaces partnership. Regional spheres of influence substitute for global rules of the game. Global cooperation – and hegemony – give way to regional protection rackets. The common language of diplomacy is lost. In this process, geographical visions narrow, fears of encirclement dominate and alliances are transient. Hedging has replaced trust.
Nowhere are these global shifts more consequential and evident than in fragile regions such as the Horn of Africa. The weakening fraying of the old order does not affect all regions equally. Those with the weakest institutions, the most contested states and the greatest strategic importance are the first to experience the consequences. The Horn of Africa is one of the regions where the emerging global disorder is being tested.
It is no coincidence that across much of the region — Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia — governments struggle to project authority beyond their capitals. Many no longer possess a monopoly over organised violence, nor can they convincingly claim to be the ultimate providers of security or political settlement. In this environment, any actor able to assert local authority, command resources or mobilise armed power can claim a role in determining the future.
The result is the multiplication of centres of power and violence. Non-state actors increasingly compete with governments not only militarily, but politically, claiming legitimacy in their own right. Power and conflict are driven by momentum: advance attracts followers, and control creates its own political reality. New geographies of economics, identity and authority are being created. In this context, even the inherited frontiers of African states can no longer be assumed to be beyond question.
Nothing, therefore, can be excluded in a region already experiencing multiple wars, dangerously close to wider regional confrontation, increasingly abandoned by collective security mechanisms, and drawn into shifting alliances shaped by the adventurism of emerging middle powers.
The relationship between geo-economics and traditional ideas of sovereignty is entering a period of collision. The minerals, energy corridors, ports and supply chains required for the next technological revolution are transforming the strategic value of territories. Control of geography is no longer only about borders; it is about controlling the arteries through which future wealth will flow.
This explains why north-east Africa is increasingly divided between competing externally supported networks of influence. One claims to defend the territorial sovereignty of existing states. Another increasingly prioritises control over strategic corridors, resources and supply chains rather than traditional definitions of territorial authority. Both seek access to mineral wealth, infrastructure and routes to global markets. Both depend on competing local elites.
At the centre of this transformation is the renewed engagement of the Gulf states, Turkey and other regional powers. The commercial, cultural and political ties between the two shores of the Red Sea are not new; they are being revived. What is new is the scale, speed and ambition of this engagement.
This activism represents both an opportunity and a danger. The Gulf states and Turkey now have a far greater role in shaping the future of the Horn of Africa. Their investment, capital, infrastructure capacity and political influence can help transform the region. But if engagement is guided only by short-term advantage, competition for resources or relationships with narrow elites, the consequences will be destabilising.
Lessons learned through error in this region are rarely inexpensive. They are paid for in human lives, as the April 2023 war in Sudan and the Tigray war in Ethiopia have already demonstrated.
The decisions being made today will shape countries whose demographic future will transform their politics. A young African generation is emerging with expectations of opportunity, dignity and participation. That generation will not accept that its future has been mortgaged through opaque agreements made by self-appointed elites acting in the name of entire nations. Without a broader social contract, they will have limited durability. The future will depend on whether their leaders and external partners create investments that strengthen societies rather than simply extract value from them.
The alternative is fragmentation, resistance and revolt.
All of this is happening precisely when the international guardrails designed to manage instability have weakened. Commitments are uncertain. Domestic politics everywhere are more volatile. Regional relationships no longer guarantee security. Even the wealthiest states face limits on their ability to absorb costs and guarantee outcomes.
This makes understanding the emerging dynamics more important, not less.
Essays in this volume offer an opportunity to understand the forces now reshaping relations across the Red Sea: the motivations, fears and ambitions of the actors involved. They provide the knowledge necessary to identify where genuine common interests exist and where misunderstanding could lead to fatal miscalculation.
https://atrocitieswatch.org/publications/compendium-the-horn-and-the-middle-powers/
