Saturday 23 December 2023

برقيد نحمدو ظلال التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع: نظرة تحليلية بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

 برقيد نحمدو ظلال  التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع

بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

:المقدمة

إن الحراك الذي ينتظم الكثير من مدن المهجر تحت مظلة (برقيد نحمدو) أو لواء الأرض وفق الترجمة الشائعة، وإن كان حراكاً في الخارج لكن يمكن وصفه بأنه ضمن الحالات النادرة التي حدث فيها تحدي حقيقي لسلطة النظام مما أفقده البوصلة، وبدأ في توجيه الاتهام الى الموساد الاسرائيلي والمخابرات الغربية، وكأنه يريد أن يقول أن عمل منظم بهذا الشكل هو فوق قدرات الجاليات الإرترية المعارضة في الخارج، وهو أكبر من قدرات الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير تغراي والتي إلى وقت قريب كانت متهمة من قبل أذرع النظام الظاهرة والخفية بأنها من تقف خلف هذا الحراك بسبب هزيمتها العسكرية في الحرب الأخيرة في إثيوبيا.

بيد أن المعارضة الارترية بشكل عام وفي شقها المنظم على وجه الخصوص ليست أفضل حظاً في فقدان البوصلة تجاه هذه الحراك من النظام، حيث نشهد انقسام واضح تجاه (برقيد نحمدو) هو ما ستحاول هذه المقالة الاجتهاد في مناقشته، لعلها قد تفتح الباب لنقاش موضوعي بناء حول هذا الحراك أسبابه ومآلاته وكيفية التعاطي معه.

الخاتمة:

إن حراك برقيد نحمدو هو في جوهره تمظهر لغضب متراكم جراء سياسات النظام، وقد ساهمت عوامل اجتماعية وسياسية داخلية واقليمية في ظهوره في هذا التوقيت وبهذا الشكل، وهو واحد من الظواهر المعدودة التي أربكت النظام الإرتري، وبالتالي ليس من الحكمة التماهي مع توصيفات النظام أو سياساته في شيطنة الحراك، ولكن في نفس الوقت ليس من الحكمة أيضاً التغافل عن أوجه القصور التي تتعلق بطرحه ومنهجه. واضعين في الاعتبار القواعد التي أرستها المقالة في الفقرة السابقة، فإن المطلوب تعاطي إيجابي بناء مع هذا الحراك وليس التماهي الأعمى معه. إن القوى السياسية والمدنية والناشطين والباحثين عليهم مسؤولية أكبر في صياغة خط يراعي الظروف الاجتماعية والسياسية التي أدت الى ظهور الحراك بشكله الحالي، وفي ذات الوقت تنتبه لطبيعة الحلول التي يقترحها قادة الحراك سواء ذات الرافعة الاجتماعية المحدودة، أو الهويات العابرة للحدود القومية للدول، ولا يتم هذا إلا من خلال مد خطوط التواصل وبناء جسور الثقة مع الحراك وقادته وقواعده، ودعمه في الأهداف المشتركة المتمثلة في التصدي للنظام القمعي وسياساته، في ذات الوقت الاشارة الى كل أوجه القصور التي تعتري الحراك، والمساهمة الفاعلة والمباشرة أو غير المباشرة في معالجة أوجه القصور إذا كان ذلك متأتياً، فحراك بهذه الأهمية ليس من الحكمة تجاهل وجوده أو تأثيره على الحاضر والمستقبل الإرتري

يتناول الكاتب

المقدمة:

البدايات:

الرافعة الاجتماعية:

التمظهر السياسي لإعادة التأسيس النفسي والاجتماعي:

استدعاء التاريخ في فهم الظاهرة:

حراك برقيد نحمدو من منظور محلي: 

حراك برقيد نحمدو والحلول التجزيئية لمشكل يتطلب حلول شاملة:

كيفية التعاطي معه:

الخاتمة:

للمزيد:

https://www.mediafire.com/file/n5semyjd94aymwx/برقيد+نحمدو-+ظلال+التاريخ،+مخاض+الانتماء+وحقائق+الواقع.pdf/file

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea November 2023

 

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea, reviewed and updated on November 17, 2023,



Unlike the 2022 US strategy, which described Eritrea as
one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States; the new 2023 strategy commends Eritrea on some sectors and intends to engage with Eritrea. It has also watered down its criticism of the country's human rights record. While the 2022 strategy called, "Prepare for the post-Isaias era: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for better relations in the post-Isaias era by building ties with the Eritrean people. The president is in his late seventies. He will not rule forever. Our public diplomacy programs, including the American Center, which attracts 100-250 visitors per day, are designed to cultivate close relations with students, educators, artists, intellectuals, businesspeople, religious leaders, technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civil society contacts. We also coordinate closely with local diplomatic counterparts who share our values and vision for a more democratic Eritrea." 

The current strategy aims to  "Sharing American values and fostering relations with Eritreans: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for building ties with the Eritrean people."


Can be downloaded at the link below:

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

 Chief of Mission Priorities 

The November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement brought an end to a two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia and precipitated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the Tigray region. The peace process and Eritrea’s de-escalation of military presence provides an opportunity to reshape bilateral relations with Eritrea to a more productive end, including peace and development in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Eritrea, strives to build on this positive change and increase the understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Eritrea. Eritrea’s return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also presents an opportunity to encourage positive and constructive relations between Eritrea, its neighbors, and regional organizations, and to promote resolution of Horn of Africa matters with a focus on sustainable regionally led solutions. 

The Embassy’s ability to capitalize on such initiatives to promote democracy and good government, however, is constrained by the absence of the usual foreign assistance and constructive policy tools. In 2005, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) ordered USAID, other bilateral donors, and international NGOs to depart the country. In 2022, the GSE ordered the Embassy to close the American Center indefinitely, restricting the Embassy’s ability to engage with the citizens of Eritrea. Further, the U.S. government implemented sanctions against Eritrean individuals and entities for their involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, in addition to human rights abuses committed by Eritrean troops. An atrocities determination also was issued against all parties in the conflict, including Eritrea’s military. Eritrea’s tier 3 rating for Trafficking in Persons, and designation as a Country of Particular Concern with regard to religious freedom, further impede use of funds for targeted programs.

While sanctions remain in place, the embassy will endeavour to open communication lines to establish commonalities that serve the interests of the people of both countries. To accomplish these goals, the embassy will share information on American values and interests, seek opportunities to increase cultural and professional exchange programs between Americans and Eritreans, listen to Eritrean perspectives on regional and international issues, and promote the positive inclusion of Eritreans in regional initiatives

As a priority, the Embassy will continue to encourage Eritrea to become a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including continued pursuit of improved relations with neighbouring countries, and within the region. 

Compare it with the 2022 strategy:

1. Chief of Mission Priorities 

Eritrea’s destabilizing military involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia that began in November 2020 destroyed any hope that the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement would usher in a new era of stability and development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean forces committed widespread and serious human rights abuses in Tigray. In August 2021, the United States imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on the head of the Eritrean Defense Forces and in November, under Executive Order 14046, sanctioned several Eritrean entities and individuals. Since September 2021, the Embassy has maintained an NSC-endorsed policy of “disciplined confrontation” with the Eritrean government under which it rigorously challenges government mis/disinformation, seeks to isolate Eritrea’s toxic regional influence, and limits its engagement with political-level regime officials. The policy supports the Administration’s goal to defend and advance American values abroad, including by combatting threats to free societies by limiting Eritrea’s anti-democratic and destabilizing influence in the Horn of Africa. Our primary strategic policy goal is to cultivate Eritrea’s next generation and prepare for a post-Isaias era. 

Embassy Asmara’s team consists of 12 USDHs, six EFM/EPAP hires, and 237 LE staff, led since 2010 by a Chargé d’Affaires because the Eritrean government will not accept the credentials of an American ambassador. In addition to the Chargé, the current USDH staffing pattern includes a Deputy Chief of Mission, Management Officer, Pol/Econ/Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, Security Technical Specialist (currently staffed with a one-year TDYer, will be vacant again starting in late 2022), Consular Officer, Information Management Officer, entrylevel Information Management Specialist, Office Management Specialist, an EFM RSO Office Management Assistant (currently vacant), a part-time EFM Community Liaison Officer, an EFM General Services Assistant, and an EPAP Assistant PAO. In 2022, we expect to add PAO and GSO positions. This ICS aligns the Embassy’s ends with its modest means, i.e., our mission goals and objectives are realistic for a small post with a limited budget operating in one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States. 

Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our ACS “customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during 

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

Wednesday 20 December 2023

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni

 

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni




The situation in Sudan is becoming increasingly complex with the recent advances of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Their capture of Wad Medeni, the capital of Gezira State, marks a significant strategic gain. Gezira, a key agricultural region and a symbolic heartland for the northern and central elites, is now under RSF control. This move not only provides the RSF with critical access points to other states but also represents a psychological blow to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), historically plagued by poor equipment and limited combat experience.

The rapid fall of Wad Medeni has led to internal questioning within the SAF's supporters, especially regarding the leadership of Al Burhan. This event is likely to exacerbate existing tensions between Islamist factions and other groups within the army. Furthermore, the RSF's control over this region could alter the regional dynamics, particularly in terms of regional support for both SAF and RSF. The proximity of RSF to the Ethiopian border is notable, as Ethiopia's alliance with the UAE could facilitate logistical support for the RSF. Similarly, Eritrea, bordering eastern Sudan, might perceive a threat from RSF dominance in the area and consequently enhance its support for the SAF. Egypt, distracted by election issues, and Gaza conflict might now redirect attention and support towards the SAF.

The geopolitical landscape is further complicated by Iran's interests in Sudan, considering its conflict with the US and the strategic position of its allies in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in its rivalry with the UAE, might also choose to back the SAF. However, the outcome of this conflict remains uncertain, as history has shown that initial defeats in battle do not necessarily predict the final result of a war. The RSF currently seems to have the upper hand, but significant support from Egypt, Eritrea, and Iran to the SAF could shift the balance.

Ultimately, the prolongation of this conflict is likely to exacerbate the suffering of the Sudanese people, many of whom have already faced multiple displacements in recent months. The situation remains fluid, and the impacts of these developments on both the regional and international stages are yet to be fully understood.

Wednesday 13 December 2023

Testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s

 


Recent testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s


Irwa to the right of Meles: Mekelle 1991

In six episodes of YouTube videos Al Fateh Irwa, has documented his testimonials on his role in the Horn of Africa. He is a seasoned intelligence professional from Sudan, who claims to have played a pivotal role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. His career spanned various regimes in Sudan, starting with President Numeri’s rule (1969-1985) and extending into President Omer Al Bashir's era (1989-2005). Initially part of the Sudanese army, Irwa transitioned to the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Sudan National Security Agency in 1976. His focus was primarily on Ethiopia, but his expertise also took him to Moscow for a year (1977-1978), where he engaged in intelligence operations, including recruiting Ethiopian officers.

Irwa's tenure included a significant diplomatic assignment as a security officer at the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa from 1980 to 1984. Following the dissolution of Sudan's National Security after Numeri’s overthrow in 1985 and a brief imprisonment, he worked in Saudi Arabia, advising on Horn of Africa affairs and advocating for support of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). He says the TPLF had an office in Saudi Arabia but he helped promote their presence there. , Irwa advised Saudi Arabia against supporting ELF factions, asserting their nationalist and Arabist stance would not lead to Eritrea's liberation. He argued that their efforts would be futile, even over a span of 600 years.

Recalled by Al Bashir in 1989, Irwa resumed his intelligence role, later ascending to state minister in the president's office and special advisor on intelligence. Despite challenges, including conflicts with Islamist leaders over their support for Eritrean and Ethiopian Islamist groups, he maintained influential connections, facilitating discussions between leaders like Isaias, Meles, and Islamist ideologue Hassen Al Turabi.

Irwa's strategic vision for the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, culminated in a policy formulated in 1990 that aimed at regime change and the establishment of a decentralized Ethiopian state. Their aim was to weaken Ethiopia contrary to the Egyptians who wanted Ethiopia’s disintegration. His illustrious career also saw him serve as State Minister at the Ministry of Defence in 1995 and as Sudan's delegate to the United Nations from 1996 to 2005, navigating complex international dynamics including sanctions and legal challenges.

Connections to Eritrean and Ethiopian oppositions organizations

Al Fateh Irwa recounts his early  interactions with Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition organizations. He described  the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), as a leftist group with connections to the Soviet Union, comprising nationalist and Arab-oriented factions like those led by Osman Sabbe. According to Irwa, while most Arab countries favoured the ELF, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) aligned more with Chinese leftist ideologies, finding limited Arab world support, primarily in Kuwait. As a personal note,  when the ELF observed that Khalifa Kerar of Sudan's General Security Agency, favoured and promoted  the EPLF, the ELF leadership  tried to gain Kerar's favour with ordinary unexpensive gifts, he pointedly showed them a new Land Cruiser, indicating it was a gift from the EPLF, highlighting the competitive dynamics between these groups.

Irwa's connections extended to Ethiopia, until 1984 when he was declared persona non grata in retaliation for Sudan's expulsion of an Ethiopian security officer. During his period in Ethiopia he recruited numerous Ethiopian military officers and developed strong ties with Ethiopian armed opposition, especially the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Convinced of Ethiopia's threat to Sudan, particularly due to its support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Irwa advocated for weakening Ethiopia to induce regime change favourable to Sudan. He sought a decentralized Ethiopia with autonomous nationalities, countering Amhara dominance, rather than Ethiopia's disintegration. He believed the TPLF and EPLF were key to achieving this regime change in Ethiopia.

On Isaias Afwerki

Al Fateh Irwa's depiction of Isaias Afwerki paints a picture of a fearsome and uncompromising leader. According to Irwa, Afwerki's reputation as a brutal dictator was well-known, and he commanded fear even among his closest associates, unhesitatingly quashing any opposition to his ambitions.

Irwa recounts a visit to EPLF-controlled areas in 1990, where he experienced Afwerki's intimidating presence first-hand. During a dinner at an underground guest house in Amberbeb, a disagreement between Ali Seid Abdella and Mohamed Ali Omaro was abruptly silenced by Afwerki's stern command, ‘Shut Up’ demonstrating his authoritative control over his colleagues. Irwa notes that even in the presence of a guest, Afwerki's scolding was fierce, leaving no room for apology.

The narrative continues with the 'Peace and Democracy conference' in Addis Ababa in July 1991. Irwa recalls a conversation with Afwerki at the State Guest house, where Afwerki, in a reflective and intoxicated state, lamented inheriting a barren Eritrea in contrast to the TPLF's lush and green Ethiopia. Afwerki expressed regret for not heeding Paul Hentz's early advice to aim for control over all of Ethiopia rather than just Eritrea, revealing his broader ambitions.

Irwa also shares an incident where Afwerki publicly humiliated Haile Menkerios, a Harvard-educated colleague, during a meeting, dismissing the value of his education compared to the 'real Harvard' of field experience. Afwerki's complex relationship with the TPLF, as described by Irwa, was marked by a sense of paternalism and rivalry, contributing to his eventual decision to go to war with them. His animosity towards the Amhara was also notable during this period.

Irwa recalls the events surrounding Eritrea's independence in 1993, highlighting Afwerki's refusal to allow Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia to attend the celebrations, despite Sudanese presidential intervention. Afwerki's dismissive stance towards international diplomacy, preferring to engage with 'masters' in the USA or Israel rather than intermediaries, further underscores his assertive and often confrontational approach to foreign relations.

On Meles Zenawi

Al Fateh Irwa offers a highly favourable assessment of Meles Zenawi, depicting him as an exceptional leader. He praises Meles for his intelligence, strategic thinking, and dedication to his cause, describing him as far-sighted, humble, and friendly. Irwa notes the strong relationship that developed between Meles, Sudanese President Al Bashir, and himself, highlighting their close friendship. He recalls participating in preliminary meetings in Mekelle with both Isaias and Meles, planning the 'Peace and Democracy' Conference that was later held in Addis Ababa, which he also attended.

On The Sudanese role in arming and advising the EPLF and TPLF

Regarding the Sudanese role in supporting the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements, Irwa shares his initial involvement with the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) led by Ras Mengesha. However, he quickly shifted his support to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), seeing it as the most viable force against Mengistu's regime. He asserts that Sudan sourced weapons from China to arm both the EPLF and TPLF and provided military advice for their offensives.

As the geopolitical landscape shifted with the Soviet Union's support moving from Somalia to Ethiopia, Irwa describes Ethiopia becoming a significant threat to Sudan, which was allied with the West. This situation was compounded by interventions from southern Yemen and Libya, which supplied arms to Ethiopia and the SPLM, destabilizing the region further. He details a covert operation in 1984 where Sudanese intelligence, posing as opponents of the Numeiri regime, duped Libya into supplying weapons that were then used by the Sudanese military.

The rivalry between the EPLF and TPLF posed a challenge to Sudan's objectives, leading to efforts to reconcile the two groups. Irwa underscores the mutual assistance between these organizations and Sudan in countering the SPLM, heavily supported by Ethiopia. He recalls the deployment of two EPLF divisions to Sudan to combat SPLA fighters in Kurmuk  and drive them back To Beni Shangul in 1990.

Under the civilian government of the Umma Party led by Al Sadig Al Mahdi in 1986, Sudan's policy shifted. The Umma Party's historical ties with Ethiopia and animosity towards Eritreans led to a decline in support for the liberation movements and increased Ethiopian aid to the SPLM. Irwa mentions a plan by the Interior Minister, Mubarek Al Fadel, to arrest Isaias Afwerki and extradite him to Ethiopia, reflecting the changing dynamics during the civilian government's rule.

Irwa also discusses the TPLF's strategic shift from advocating Tigray's self-determination to seeking control over the Ethiopian state. He recalls a critical moment during the TPLF's final offensive on Addis Ababa, facing a severe shortage of tank ammunition. Persuading President Omer Al Bashir to supply the TPLF from Sudan's border reserves, despite military reservations, significantly aided their advance. Omer Al Bashir later convinced them saying, “ We have all the tanks on the border to fight against the Habesh and the TPLF are now doing  this job for us.” Sudan's swift recognition of the TPLF regime in Ethiopia following their victory underlined the depth of their support.

He recalled that Eritrean forces entered Addis with the Tigrayan forces and played an important role to secure Addis, he added that the Eritrean community in Addis was bigger and well organised than its Tigrayan counterpart. Thus, Eritreans knew Addis very well. He travelled to the London conference together with Isaias and Meles. He said the aim of the negotiation with the Derg government was meant to keep the negotiations until there was nothing to negotiate about. This was later what happened when EPLF took Asmara and TPLF Addis.

He came back from the London Conference with Meles in a charter plane. As Meles was keen to go to Addis quickly to assert his TPLF’s rule. He piloted a Sudanese Cessna plane with five seats to take Meles, Sium Mesfin, Fessaha Afwerki, AliMireh Hanfare and an Amhara dignitary to Addis.  When they landed at Addis Ababa airport they were received by Kinfe Gebremedhin, TPLF’s Security Chief. later took Meles in a plane to Mekelle and Isaias arrived from Asmara and the three planned the preparations for ‘Peace and Democracy Conference’. He later took Isaias to Axum where they visited the main church there and later took Isaias to back to Asmara and came back to Mekelle to take Meles back to Addis. He attended the deliberations of the conference in Addis. He also had strategic discussions with Meles and Isaias.

On the US relations with the EPLF and the TPLF

Al Fateh Irwa recounts that initially, the United States showed little interest in establishing relations with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), viewing them as leftist organizations. Despite his advisories, the U.S. continued to support the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), even after he warned them of EDU's infiltration by Mengistu's regime. This oversight led to a significant setback for the U.S. when Ethiopian forces exposed and expelled the EDU.

Irwa notes that the EPLF had earlier begun cultivating ties with American entities, possibly aided by American and Israeli lobbying efforts. However, the U.S. only expressed significant interest in the TPLF as they were advancing towards Asmara and Addis Ababa. Herman Cohen from the U.S. approached Sudan to facilitate meetings with the leadership of both organizations. These leaders agreed to meet but insisted the meetings occur in Khartoum under the observation of Sudanese security, to demonstrate their transparency and respect for Sudan.

On The Oromo

Regarding the Oromo people, Irwa states that the Sudanese security saw them as the largest but most oppressed ethnic group in Ethiopia, unable to independently effect regime change due to divisions along religious, geographical, and cultural lines. Despite this, Sudanese security was keen on assisting the Oromo in their resistance against the regime. The tensions between the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were notable, especially after the TPLF formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), created from Derg soldiers captured by the TPLF. Although the OLF historically had more Oromo support, the OPDO proved more effective, leading Sudan to work towards reconciling these groups to contribute to the downfall of Mengistu's regime.

Relations of TPLF and the Islamist regime after 1991

According to Irwa the relations between Meles and Al Bashir were excellent. They consulted on important regional issues and the TPLF opened their depots of weapons to the regime in Sudan to help them fight the SPLM. The Sudan also brought army boots and uniform from Sudan sometime for money but most of the time free. He also recalls an incident in 1992 where a unit of the TPLF stationed in Gambella and led by Tadesse Werede, current leader of the Tigray defence Forces, helped them to control an important SPLM outpost inside South Sudan.

Sudan’s  Islamic regime links to the apartheid regime of South Africa

In one of the episodes Irwa narrated that Sudan under Numeri had relations to the security services in Apartheid South Africa, where both exchanged information. This relationship extended to close relations as South African regime helped Sudan to repair and maintain its aircraft, after the relationship deteriorated with the US.  Irwa was the link where he travelled to South Africa from time to time and even met the president, de Klerk in one of those meetings.

 

 


Friday 1 December 2023

The Ona and Besikdira massacres November 30 - December 1, 1970

This day in 1970: The Ona and Besikdira massacres by by Ahmed Raji 

 1 December 2015, source https://www.facebook.com/ahmed.raj

 This day in 1970: The Ona and Besikdira massacres

On the morning of November 30, 1970 (which also happened to be the Muslim holiday of Eid-al-Adha), Ethiopian troops entered the village of Besikdira, 15km north-east of Keren, rounded up the population and crammed them into a mosque. The soldiers were on a mission of revenge following the killing of an Ethiopian army general by Eritrean Liberation fighters the week before, and had already burned several villages in the area in the preceding days. The soldiers positioned their machine guns at the entrance to the mosque and on windows. They opened fire indiscriminately, killing 118 innocent civilians, including women and children.

(Despite the Ethiopian officers' attempts to separate the population by faith, people stuck together. After all, they were family. Hence, the victims included Muslims as well as Christians). However, Besikdira was only a prelude to a bigger massacre. On the morning of the following day, December 1, 1970, soldiers stationed in Keren descended on the nearby village of Ona and proceeded on a killing spree never seen before in Eritrea. Soon the the entire village was in flames. Those who were not burned in their huts, were gunned down as they attempted to flee. An estimated 700 villagers and their guests (there was a funeral in progress) died. My own memory of that day (I was in 2nd grade) is one of utter terror hearing the seemingly interminable sound of machine guns and of the slow-moving shower of soot and little pieces of charred straw that were scattered by winds over parts of Keren.

[The picture shows the ruins of the mosque in Besikdira, which still remains in the same state of ruin as a reminder of that terrible day. Photo is courtesy of Dr. Kiflemariam Hamde]

A Book Review. Paulos Tesfaldet (2013). በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ. Besikdira and Its Children.

Författares Bokmaskin, Stockholm, 102pp. Written by By Kiflemariam Hamde, Umeå, Sweden

Besikdira and its children, በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ is the latest Blin literary work, in the fiction genre, mainly based on historical, real events in Eritrea since 1960s. The book consists of 21 chapters opening up with a Preface and Acknowledgement. In this review, I find only point out the main story lines. The narrative is centred around, but not limited to, the massacre in the village of Besikdira, 15km east of Keren town. After burning seven villages the previous days, the uninvited Ethiopian army visited Besikdira in November 30, 1970 only to destroy it. The officer (ሻምበል) Teshome, and his Amharic-speaking troops, also including Eritrean-born Kumandos, posed two immediate questions to the people in Tigrigna (only 5 adults could speak it) as the people did not understand Amharic: (1) if the village is free from bandits (ሽፍታ, shifta)[i], in his own words bedbugs and fleas), and (2) if they were either Muslims or Christians. Mr Mender Beimnet, the village chief, and Mr Tesfu Almedom responded that they did not know of any bandits and that the people belonged to both Christianity and Islam. Upon learning that the people did not want to get separated along religious lines, the troops forced the inhabitants into the village Mosque and shot them down indiscriminately, killing 118[ii] civilians 11 of whom were pregnant mothers, 20 were children, and the rest were youngsters and adults[iii]. The author narrates in his fictional work about the details in the killing.

The next day, December 1, 1970 was the turn of Ona village, only 4-5 Kms north east of Keren, when the military forces headed by Colonel Welana massacred almost 800 civilians indiscriminately, and without any notice. There was no question that the people supported the liberation movement since 1962. The story starts off with the general political instability since the 1960s when the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) confronted Ethiopia’s domination after the latter had annexed Eritrea as its 14th Province, revoking the UN arranged Federation (1952-1961). As the ELF was active in the Western lowlands, Ethiopian atrocities increased heavily and the apex of that came in the fall of 1970 when the ELF ambushed and killed General Teshome Ergetu, head of the Second Military Division in October 1970. He was heading toward his new headquarters in Keren town to crash the ELF and the people, to ‘dry the sea in order to catch up the fish’, i.e., to target the civilians in order to weaken and consequently destroy the ELF. Those massacres are put in this context, and one man’s life was to be compensated for by around 1000 within less than 24 hours in Besikdira and Ona. Interestingly enough, the author accounts for how the atrocities became catalyst and intensified struggle for independence.

 In his fictional description, the author exemplifies the events in a life of a nuclear[1]and extended family members, the inhabitants of Besikdira, its environs, the Sekwina district, the Senhit Province, events all over Eritrea, the fate of youngsters in their yearning for freedom, justice and equality, and finally, the inflicting cruelty of Ethiopian soldiers. The centre stage actor becomes the family of Fickak and his wife Afiet, their only son Terexbe[iv] who got married to the beautiful Melika and begot two sons, Aybu and Abbe. Unfortunately, on the bloody Monday massacre at Besikdira where the people were forced into a small mosque only to be shot down, ((እልላ, ኣጣቅዕዳ, p. 57-60) the young wife of Terexbe, and the mother of the two, Malika, fell dead alongside the other 117 victims in the mosque. Survivors discovered that it was her bold that they were covered by, and that her younger son suckled her dry breasts for milk.

On the one hand, Paulos beautifully crafts the Blin language to narrate how the family not only suffered physically the painful events of the period such as imprisonment (when Terexbe was imprisoned, (ንሽዋ p. 32-37), continued house burning (48-49), sexual harassment and abuse but also in terms of psychological inhumation. He also describes in detail some more events, such as forced displacement (ገዓዳ, p. 49) etc., On the other hand, Paulos depicts how the Fickak family enjoyed the good sides of life, often highlighting underlying cultural values and societal norms, entertaining daily communal routines such as coffee break, child rearing and development, engagement, initiation rite, Blin-style brethren hood, story-telling (dannar–jigna, p. 12-13), neighbourly life (gor-dannar, 14-17), wedding festivities (ferwenter, p. 24-28), youth love, socialization and friendship (wrznet, p. 12-15), pastoral life, initiation rite ceremonies (Hiche, shngalle, kxan, p. 18-23), wealth-sharing, development, dreaming for peace, avoiding hatred or disagreement, war and conflict.

 family exemplified the fate of Eritreans at that time. Terexbe was imprisoned (p. 32) because a certain informant (ሺኩት) spied to the Amhara[v] that Terexbe was a member of the village lajnet, with the responsibility for collecting the monthly dollar per family, qesem, which every Eritrean adult had to contribute for the liberation movement, i.e., ELF. Malika was shot dead in the Mosque, and Terexbe’s parents were also dead because they could not bear the pain. Eventually, once on age, the two brothers joined ELF and the EPLF, respectively, in order to revenge their mother’s loss in the Mosque, leaving Terexbe alone in the house (pp 77-80).

The reader also finds a lot of Blin liberation songs, praising the independence and rebuking the enemy, such as –“Na Shugutl: Shebab Axnima genjew DeAritl”, literally, aren’t the youth reside in Deari in such a tender age” (p. 34). +A recurring worry of the author, however, lies in the never-ending disagreement between the two ‘siblings’, ELF and EPLF, that “resulted in unnecessary loss of Eritrean lives and consequently, prolonged the independence day to 1991” (interspersed in the overall text). Paulos also notes the series of Ethiopian war crimes and major massacres and since 1961 in Eritrea, narrating the events not only as they occurred but also rhetorically in their connection to the dreams of people to live together in good or bad times, peacefully.

Finally, in 1980, the ELF and EPLF clashed in Halhal, the worst event which occurred to many Eritrean families who sided with the wrong side (p. 99-100), and Aybu shot down his own brother Abbe ‘simply assuming that he was the foe. Aybu was not alone in that incident as many other Eritreans also shared that fate’, narrates the author. The story culminates in an eventual meeting of the EPLF fighter Aybu and his father Terexbe after the latter wanted to meet his son, Abbe. Unfortunately, Aybu was forced to reveal the truth, and finally exclaimed, “Daddy, I will tell you a taboo, (ኤበ, ዲደትድውየከ ግን), I killed my own brother even I if rejoiced at first when I thought I won over the enemy in that civil war” (p. 99). “That is the fruit of disagreement among brothers and sisters”, laments the author (p. 99-100).

Disappointed, sad and frustrated, Terexbe returns home and continued living alone. Terexbe had only one hope, supporting the even much more independence movement for which he was imprisoned and waiting for the return of his only remaining family member alive, Aybu – “as did many Eritrean parents”, notes Paulos.

The concluding chapter (p. 102) is in fact a methodological note on the writing process. The author advises potential authors to follow standard referring system, interview the living witnesses of events in Eritrea, and coming up with a quality research work: “My advice to potential authors is that we have to write different kinds of literature because there lies our cultural capital. We praise those who have already written something, and at the same time we criticize those who did not write anything (yet). Future generations need to benefit from our literature as their heritage. Thus, I encourage you all to write about something” … so that one can improve the style and content in the literature, to sustain existing knowledge and create new knowledge – for the sake of future generations” (p. 102).

 This unique work in narrative genre is a welcome contribution to the literature in Blin with its rich documentation of knowledge of values, norms and daily lives, with substantial contents as well as presentation. በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ[vi], ‘Besikdira and its Children’ fills a badly needed gap about historical events delving into Eritrean/Blin mentality in coping with problems and bad situation. I only commend Paulos work as one the boldest contribution so far on the emerging Blin (and other Eritrean) literature with its deep narration of events that will live for many generations to come.

 As a reader, I enjoyed reading በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ and I hope that this work will only be the beginning. ኣጃሀብሪዅይዳን. Well-done a young author!  I recommend this book to anybody who is interested to know more closely the situation in Eritrea during (and shortly after) the war for independence from a local point of view. Those who want to develop literacy work in the Blin language are also ecommended to read this book as well as those who want to write and learn in Blin script. A father of two, Paulos Tesfaldet lives in Oslo, Norway. For any contacts about the book, mail Paulos at: ptesfldet@gmail.no

[i] When the Ethiopians referred to the liberation fronts as shifta (ሽፍታ) as bandits, Eritreans in general (excluding the shikut, jasus, and some of the wedo-geba) reacted that ‘they did know anything about shifta”, implicitly protesting that the ELF and later on the EPLF were not bandits but liberation fighters. Yn shifta aerini, runs in Blin.

[ii] There were more than 50 survivors, including this reviewer’s close relatives, who still narrate the sad events vividly. The victims, however were not only from Besikdira village but also from adjacent villages who were forced to settle in Besikdira in May 1970, including Sanqa, Hangol, Feledarb and Fissoruxw, victims from the latter two were passersby. The author mentions other displaced villages in the former Senhit District (p. 48-56).

[iii]There are a couple of historical work on Ethiopian War Crimes (massacres) in Eritrea, including (1) Abba Teweldebrhan Geberemedhin and Abba Zerayakob Okbamikael, Capuchin friars (2001): መሪርግፍዒኣብበስክዲራንከባቢኣን (A Painful Massacre at Besikdira and its Environs), ትምጻእመንግስትከ (Adveniat Regnum TUUM), 44th Year, Nrs 73/74, 2000-2001, page 1-14; (2) Amina Habte (2001), Ethiopian war Crimes in

Eritrea: A Case Study of the Massacres of Besik-dira and Ona in 1970. BA thesis, Asmara University; Kiflemariam Hamde (2004)

“The Impact of war and climatic changes on the environment in Eritrea: The Case in Senhit Villages”

(www.daberi.org); (3) Downey, Marty & Hugh (1996), On Heart’s Edge. Arvada, CO: Mikeren Publications, and (4) (Habtu (Fr. Athanasius) Ghebre-Ab (2013), “The

Massacre at Wekidiba: The Tragic Story of a Village in Eritrea”, RSP, and (5) “List of massacres committed during the Eritrean War of Independence”, in Wikipedia.

[iv] In Besikdira and Its Children,በስግዲረዲንርቍርዲ, the main actor Terexbe sharply contrasts with Salih “Gadi” Johar’s actor, Ghebrebbi in his 2010 book, Of Kings and Bandits. However, if one looks closely both fiction works, they complement each other, in many, many respects, in spite of the common geographical location and the suffering incurred to them by the Ethiopian army (and their collaborators), illustrating social life in the then Senhit area, rich in diversity of values, norms and languages. Issues of religion come close in both readings, Gebrebbi being from a Muslim family, while Terexbe is from a Christian family. These are shown in the rites of passage, child development, training, and other issues. It seems to me that the authors communicated with each ‘in spirit’, without clashing, and thus made their point jointly that people can live together peacefully only if they accept and respect each other’s difference, the same way as the Besikdira residents refusing to get separated in terms their religion (to heaven or hell we got together’, expressed the late Mr. Meibetot Berih, a survivor in an oral communication with the reviewer, Besikdira, January 9th, 2007.

[v] Amharu or Amhara in the text is used synonymously with Ethiopians and Ethiopia, connoting the Ethiopian Military Army.

[vi] The reviewed work is in fact preceded by a dozen literary works in Blin, for example, the recent books by Medhanie Habtezghi (2008), Lexen (lekhen) axramewedi, “The Ring which became a sore”, and (2010) Enkie, (እንከኤ) translated into Tigrigna as lekas. I hope to review these works also so that readers who do not understand Blin may be able to get more information on such literary work. For further works in Blin and on Blin, visit the Blin Language Forum, www.daberi.org In a review of a literary book in Blin that is mainly based on the events of Besikdira, Kiflemariam Hamde gives the following list of related works (under footnote iii):

1) Abba Teweldebrhan Geberemedhin and Abba Zerayakob Okbamikael, Capuchin friars (2001): መሪርግፍዒኣብበስክዲራንከባቢኣን (A Painful Massacre at Besikdira and its Environs), ትምጻእመንግስትከ (Adveniat Regnum TUUM), 44th Year, Nrs 73/74, 2000-2001, page 1-14;

(2) Amina Habte (2001), Ethiopian war Crimes in Eritrea: A Case Study of the Massacres of Besik-dira and Ona in 1970. BA thesis, Asmara University; Kiflemariam Hamde (2004) “The Impact of war and climatic changes on the environment in Eritrea: The Case in Senhit Villages” (www_daberi_org);

(3) Downey, Marty & Hugh (1996), On Heart’s Edge. Arvada, CO: Mikeren Publications,