Italian Colonialism: Eritrean Muslims the Khatmiya and Mirgani Family

 

Italian Colonialism: Eritrean Muslims, the Khatmiya and Mirgani Family

الاستعمار الإيطالي: المسلمين الارتريين و الختمية وٱسرة الميرغني

Sitt Sharifa Al Alawiya

The Italian colonial history of Eritrea regarding Muslims can be divided into three distinct periods:

1. First Colonial Period (1885-1910): This phase focused on territorial conquest, responding to the Sudanese Mahdist threat, and implementing Governor Martini's "Muslim policies." The Italian colonial authorities aimed to pacify the region and secure control over the unstable Eritrean-Sudanese border. During this time, they established relations with the Mirgani family—a prominent Muslim family respected for its religious authority in both Eritrea and Sudan. The Italian authorities saw cooperation with the Mirgani family as essential for maintaining public order and unifying the colony.
2. Second Colonial Period (1910-1920): Following the conquest of Libya, Italy sought to refine its approach to Muslim communities by studying Islamic law and institutions. This understanding helped strengthen colonial rule by incorporating the Islamic legal system into colonial administration, consolidating control over Muslim populations.
3. Third Colonial Period (1920s-1941, Fascist Era): Italy adopted an openly pro-Muslim stance, projecting itself as the "Sword of Islam" and positioning itself as a protector of Islamic communities. During this period, the colonial authorities promoted a specific form of hierarchical and urban-centered Islam represented by the Mirgani family.

Role of the Mirgani Family

The Mirgani family, tracing its lineage to ‘Ali b. Abi Talib and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, had significant religious influence in Sudan and Eritrea through the Khatmiya tariqa (Sufi order). The Italian colonial authorities first engaged with Sayyid Hashim al-Mirgani, who had relocated to Massawa after the Mahdist movement's rise in Sudan. Following his death in 1902, the Italians sought another prominent figure from the family to maintain their influence and settled on Sayyid Ga'far b. Bakrī al-Mirgani, who moved to Keren.

Sayyid Ga'far’s Role and Influence

Sayyid Ga'far’s presence in Keren, facilitated by the Italian authorities, helped establish an Islamic sphere of influence within colonial Eritrea, drawing many Muslim faithful to his leadership. His collaboration with the colonial authorities was crucial in maintaining public order and fulfilling the Italians' administrative goals. However, his growing influence led to internal disputes within the Khatmiya order, particularly with his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, daughter of Sayyid Hashim, who resided in Massawa.

Eritrea’s Complex Ethnic and Religious Landscape

Eritrea's strategic position as a trade hub between the East, Africa, and the Mediterranean resulted in a complex ethnic, linguistic, and cultural makeup. Religious affiliation was only one of the many factors contributing to this diversity, and colonial authorities leveraged these dynamics to maintain control over the region.

The Italian authorities formalized agreements with the Mirgani family to ensure their influence over local Muslim communities, particularly in the Barka region, to counterbalance other Islamic powers outside the colonial borders. This relationship allowed Sayyid Ga'far to become a central figure in organizing the socio-religious life of the area, solidifying Italian colonial objectives.

In an attempt to resolve the disputes between Sayyid Ga'far al-Mirgani and his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, the Italian colonial authorities brokered an agreement with Sayyid Ga'far in which:

1. Sayyid Ga'far agreed to provide a list of eight to ten of his Khulafa in Eritrea, from which the government would select two to reside in Keren as his advisors.
2. Two of his Sudanese advisors, Mūsā Muhammad, and Muhammad 'Utmān, would be removed from Keren, with Mūsā Muhammad being reassigned to Barentu and Muhammad 'Utmān to Nakfa to counteract rival influences.
3. The role of scribe, previously held by Mūsā Muhammad, would be taken over by Khalifa Ga'far, someone preferred by the colonial authorities.

The conflict was fuelled by the competition between Sayyid Ga'far and Sharifa Al Alawiya over religious influence and collecting donations from the local Muslim community. Sharifa’s authority was limited by gender, and she could not appoint a new Khulafa. Despite her claim to the mosque where her father was buried, her intervention in religious affairs was not well received by the local population, who viewed such matters as traditionally male responsibilities.

To ease tensions, the colonial authorities recommended that Sharifa use Keren as a summer residence rather than a permanent home. A reconciliation was reached in December 1910 through the mediation of qāḍī Muhammad al-'Arabī, where Sharifa agreed to recognize her nephew as the head of the Khatmiya in Eritrea and refrained from interfering in his religious affairs.

However, despite the reconciliation, many followers stopped paying donations and began turning to the Khatmiya of Kassala in Sudan. This strained relationship between the Sudanese and Eritrean branches continued to create challenges for both leaders.

Despite these internal conflicts, Sayyid Ga'far remained supportive of Italian colonial policy. During the conquest of Libya, he urged Eritrean soldiers to fight against the Turks, whom he criticized as illegitimate heirs of the caliphate and "false Muslims." His support for the Italians reinforced colonial propaganda that distinguished his legitimate religious authority from the Turkish claim to Islamic leadership.

The dispute between Sayyid Ga'far al-Mirgani and his aunt, Sharifa Al Alawiya, centered around the appointment of Khulafa (representatives) within the Kshatriya order. The Khatmiya had a tradition of appointing representatives in a three-tiered hierarchy: the Kḫalīfat al-Khulafa, the Kḫalīfa muqaddam al-ḥadra, and ordinary Khulafa. Sayyid Ga'far's authority to appoint these representatives was challenged by Sharifa, who sought to influence decisions concerning the mosque where her father was buried.

The conflict intensified when some of the Khulafa, feeling marginalized by the new appointments, sought Sharifa’s intervention. Colonial authorities feared a split within the Khatmiya and stressed that male members traditionally handled appointments. Despite recognizing her nephew’s position as head of the Khatmiya in Eritrea, Sharifa asserted her control over the mosque and its religious activities.

The competition was primarily driven by their followers’ desire to control donations from the faithful. The relocation of Sharifa’s residence to Keren was perceived as an attempt to regain influence over donations that had been redirected to Keren by Sayyid Ga'far’s appointments.

To resolve the matter, the Governor of Eritrea arranged a meeting between Sayyid Ga'far and Sharifa in January 1911, with the presence of Italian authorities. During the meeting, Sayyid Ga'far agreed to share management of the donations with his aunt, while Sharifa agreed not to establish Keren as her permanent residence and returned to Massawa. This compromise helped to ease tensions and solidified the Italian strategy of maintaining religious influence within colonial borders.

Following the conquest of Libya in 1911, the Italian colonial authorities developed a more structured approach towards Islam in their colonies. Recognizing Islam as the majority faith and understanding the need to maintain colonial order, the administration began to show greater interest in studying and accommodating Islamic practices to prevent any religious unrest.

The Italian School of Arts and Crafts opened in 1911 in Keren, was reserved for the sons of Muslim notables. Initially, the local Muslim community was wary, suspecting attempts at Catholic proselytization. To alleviate these fears, Sayyid Ga'far enrolled his son, Sayyid Bakri, in the school, reassuring the community and leading to broader acceptance of the institution.

Sayyid Ga'far was pivotal in promoting the region's Islamic education and religious practices. He invited many Muslim scholars to Keren and utilized his hierarchical network of Khulafa’(deputies) to centralize the socio-religious organization of the area. These deputies conducted religious ceremonies such as marriages and burials, which previously varied among individual communities.

Sharifa Alawiya and Fascist Italy

During the fascist era, Italy adopted an explicitly pro-Islamic policy in its colonies, particularly in Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, to gain support and counterbalance the influence of the Orthodox Church and other local religious authorities. This policy sought to project Italy as a protector of Islam and a champion of Muslim interests.

A key figure in this strategy was Sharifa Al Alawiya, a respected Islamic authority and descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who actively supported the fascist pro-Islamic policy. After returning to Eritrea in 1923, Sharifa played an influential role in promoting Islam in the region, acting as an intermediary between the Italian colonial authorities and local Muslim communities. Her support was utilized in propaganda campaigns, particularly during the conquest of Ethiopia, where her influence was overemphasized to gain legitimacy among Muslims.

The fascist regime's pro-Islamic stance included promoting the Arabic language, constructing and restoring mosques and Quranic schools, and facilitating Muslims' travel to the Middle East for religious studies. One notable achievement was the construction of the Sitti 'Alawiyya Mosque in Harar, Ethiopia, which was built in 1937 in honor of the Sharifa and symbolized the regime's commitment to supporting Islamic communities.

Although Sharifa's role was heavily highlighted in Italian propaganda, her influence in Ethiopia was limited. Nonetheless, her collaboration helped solidify Italy's image as a patron of Islam in the colonies, strengthening its presence and gaining support from neighboring Muslim communities.

Sharifa Al Alawiya was a key contact for the Italian colonial authorities, particularly during the fascist period, as part of a strategy to establish relationships with prominent Islamic figures. In May 1938, she travelled to Rome and was received by Mussolini at Palazzo Venezia and other Islamic dignitaries. The Italian press emphasized her role, presenting her as a descendant of the Prophet and a supporter of fascist Italy.

Her loyalty to the fascist regime was reciprocated with favorable treatment from the colonial authorities. In 1939, a book titled La Sceriffa di Massawa (The Sharifa of Massawa) was published in Italy, highlighting her support for the regime and her opposition to Mahdism, which she described as a "fanatical" movement. The sharifa’s influence and loyalty to Italy were reinforced through colonial propaganda, portraying her as a "queen without a crown."

Oral traditions among members of the Khatmiya reflect a similar admiration for Sharifa Al Alawiya and her close ties to the Italian regime. Her death in 1941 in Keren coincided with the British occupation of the city and the defeat of the Italians. According to these traditions, the sharifa’s heart stopped from the pain of Italy’s defeat, illustrating her unwavering loyalty to the fascist regime until her death.

In her own words, Sharifa Al Alawiya praised Mussolini as the "Sword of Islam," recalling her visit to Rome as a moment of deep honor and expressing her gratitude for Italy's support to Muslims, particularly Eritreans.

 During the British Administration

Later in life, Sayyid Ga'far expressed a wish to be buried in Kassala, Sudan. He moved from Keren to Agordat and then to Tessenei, where he passed away in 1944. His burial in Kassala, now the main center of the Kshatriya order, symbolized the cross-border solid influence of the Mirgani family.

After his death, his son, Sayyid Bakri, took over the administration in Keren, continuing the established system of khulafa’. The family's socio-political influence in the region was further solidified in 1946 when Sayyid Bakri was elected president of the Muslim League.

Sayyid Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Mirgani, despite his prestigious position in the Khatmiya Sufi Brotherhood, was often criticized for his lack of engagement in local affairs. He only became more active after receiving strong encouragement from Major R. Signals. Al-Mirani's shift to support the unionist cause was primarily influenced by Massawa-born merchant and lawyer Muhammad Umar Kadi, who advocated for a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Kadi toured several cities to garner support for reforms within the League and reduce hostility towards unionists for economic reasons. Faced with losing influence within the League or seeing it align with the Pro-Italy Party, al-Mirgani chose to support the unionists to preserve his own status and power in 1948

Openly derided by Sultan as an “opportunist and egoist,” al-Mirgani thus built support for the union after having served nearly two years as the President of Eritrea’s largest nationalist organization. In theory, al-Mirgani’s shift to the unionist camp should have placed the League’s mission in greater jeopardy.392 As the spiritual head of Eritrea's largest and most influential Sufi brotherhood, al-Mirgani and his inner circle still carried influence in many Muslim communities as khalifas and former League officials. For some BMA observers, the rebellion against the “religious chief” (al-Mirghani) left most League supporters “without a clear and capable guide” to carry on their objectives as a united nationalist force.

As the spiritual head of Eritrea's most prominent Sufi brotherhood, his switch to the Unionist Party initially threatened the League’s cohesion. However, his defection ultimately reinforced the League's claims that confident Muslim leaders supported the union with Ethiopia to protect their economic and political interests. Al-Mirghani’s political reputation suffered greatly, especially when he switched his allegiance back to the Muslim League-dominated Independence Bloc in mid-1949. His inconsistent stance eroded his credibility, making him less influential in Eritrean politics.

Despite al-Mirghani’s defection and the complications it caused, the League continued to pursue its goals, including the first steps toward Tigre emancipation by establishing new autonomous clan structures in the Western Province in 1948. Al-Mirghani's wavering loyalty and diminished reputation illustrated the League’s resilience in advancing its agenda even when prominent Muslim leaders withdrew their support.

Kennedy Travaskis, the British officer in charge of Keren at the time, recalled an incident when a Muslim dignitaries, led by the Islamic Judge (Qadi) of Keren, visited his office one morning. The Qadi stated that they were there to protest, on behalf of the Muslim community, the mistreatment of their revered leader, Seyid Babiker Al-Mirgani, by a Christian police constable. A call to the police clarified the situation: Seyid Babiker had been caught drunk driving after crashing his car into a wall and vomiting whiskey on the officer.

When Travaskis sought guidance on enforcing the law or showing leniency, the Qadi suggested a discreet approach. Publicly fining Seyid Babiker could incite unrest and diminish the community’s respect for the Mirgani family, which would be disastrous. Instead, he advised handling the matter privately by revoking Seyid’s driver’s license and imposing a hefty fine without public exposure. Travaskis accepted this recommendation and resolved the issue quietly.

 Sources:

1.     S. Bruzzi, “Il Colonialismo Italiano e la Khatmiyya in Eritrea (1890-1941)”, Africa, Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO), Rome, 2006.

2.     Joseph L. Venosa. Paths toward the Nation: Islam, Community, and Early Nationalist Mobilization in Eritrea, 1941–1961. (Ohio University Research in International Studies, no. 92.) Athens:  Ohio University Press,  2014. Pp. xix, 283

3.     Kennedy Travaskis's The Deluge: A Personal View of the End of Empire in the Middle East