Saturday 28 September 2024

Testimonies from members of so-called Menkae Movement: Woldemariam Abraham

 

Weldemariam Abraham on ‘Menkae’: Interview with Aida Kidane Sweden 2004

 Introductory Note:

When the Isaias group (Selfi Nezanet/Alla group) split from the ELF in 1970, alongside two other factions, and later established the EPLF in 1972, presenting themselves as a democratic alternative to the ELF, they faced a significant internal challenge from a reform movement that called for democratic changes within the organization, 51 years ago, September 1973.  According to its members, this movement sought to democratize the EPLF’s leadership structure. The EPLF leadership, however, labelled it as an "ultra-leftist" group and referred to it as "Menkae." The conflict between the EPLF leadership and the Menkae faction has since played a defining role in shaping the EPLF's security policies. The language was edited for fluency.

Mohamed Kheir Omer

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Highlights:

We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters in the surroundings encouraging them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.

Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians, and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious differences.

The leadership, however, declared that these articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF) for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and reading the Quran.”

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Aida, I extend my deepest gratitude to Weldemariam Abraham for taking the time to share his experiences with me. Although he was initially reluctant to discuss his life before joining the front, I insisted, and he agreed.”

Personal History (2004)

As a student, I was involved in the revolts and was subsequently imprisoned at Sembel. At the time, I was attending the technical school, known as Point 4. I was among the last to be released because I had claimed that my parents were deceased. After my release, I started working in Wenji but was dismissed under the pretence of having Bilharzia. I then moved to Jima, and later to Assab, where I worked at the refinery before enrolling in a technical school. Despite being accepted for 3-4 scholarships, I was denied access. I believe this was due to my Eritrean identity, as I had passed the examinations at the top of my class but was still denied the opportunity.

During my time in Assab, I met four Eritrean men under house arrest who were required to sign in four times daily to prevent them from fleeing. They were accused of collaborating with the front. It was through them that I learned about the front, which led me to leave my job and move to Addis Ababa, where we formed the Tihisha secret group, keeping it hidden even from close friends.

While in Alem Bekagn (I have had enough of life) prison in Addis, (It was a prison for those served life sentences or where in a death raw.) I encountered Eritrean fighter prisoners who informed us that the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) was splitting, and a new front, Shabia (EPLF), was emerging. Along with Mesih, I established contact with Rustom. When Rustom was captured in Asmara, I took advantage of having a passport and fled to Italy, then to Austria, and eventually to Czechoslovakia and Germany. This long route was taken due to a lack of information. We only knew a little about Italy because of our familiarity with Catholicism. I did not realize at the time that I did not need a visa to enter Germany. I went to Czechoslovakia because many students were there, and a General Congress was to be held in Munich. It was there that the path to meda (the field) opened up to me, and after an eight-month stay in Germany, I joined the front. Even in meda, I opposed the leadership, which remains unchanged to this day.

On the Battle of Gereger

We entered meda (the field) through Yemen at the end of 1972. We had captured arms from the ELF and transported them using camels. Habte Selassie and I led the camels on foot, dressed in military attire. As we attempted to enter Eritrea, the Sudanese ordered us back and escorted us to avoid being ambushed by the ELF or being denied water access. Many ELF fighters under Abdella Idris’s command were killed, and the corpses were left to decay until the Sudanese buried them with bulldozers.

I was new to meda when the Battle of Gereger in Sudan began. Initially, we were at the temporary base of the EPLF, Selfi Nezanet, and Obel. We had come through the Red Sea from Aden under the leadership of Solomon Weldemariam and others, evading capture by the ELF. As we neared Gereger, we received a radio message informing us that the battle had begun. If not for this message, we might have been forced to flee further into Sudan or been captured by the ELF.

The battle intensified as we were few in number, carrying arms, and navigating rough terrain in the dark. I lost my way and unintentionally led the camel carrying weapons toward the Sudanese side. Fortunately, I was able to reunite with my comrades, and we avoided being caught by the ELF.

At the time, it was widely believed that no force could defeat the ELF. Their fighters were known as "Aremrem" (resilient), being numerous and strong, often finding ways to escape difficult situations. The Gereger battle occurred within Sudanese territory, and the ELF pursued us to that point. They outnumbered us and were better equipped. However, their lack of strategic planning prevented them from wiping us out. We had just acquired Kalashnikovs with 30 bullets each, while the ELF had Simonov’s with only 10 bullets, which could have given them an advantage.

After this, we entered Eritrean territory on March 4, 1973, passing through Arag to Gereger Asmara, which we held as a stronghold for an extended period. There were two Geregers: one in Sudan (Gereger Sudan) and another on the Eritrean side (Gereger Asmara). From there, we moved to Beiqat. I don’t recall much of the journey as I was wounded in battle with the ELF at Deqsem village near Zager on October 13, 1974. Bleqat and Fah became strongholds until the liberation.

During one encounter, Abdella led an attack, targeting a weapons depot held by a few Medada (Arabic for counter revolutionaries) reactionaries and bringing in many fighters. We fortified our position by building stonewall chains, 2-3 kilometres long and about one and a half meters high, to shield ourselves from enemy fire and the harsh winds. Despite this, the situation remained tense due to the ELF snipers. In one skirmish, we surrounded a group of 20 ELF fighters and asked them to surrender. While most complied, one defiant fighter opened fire, leading to a shootout that left all 20 dead.

The bodies of the ELF fighters began to decompose, and we could not bury them as the ELF still surrounded us, maintaining pressure. After our departure, the Sudanese buried them in mass graves. This was my first experience of the brutality and inhumanity of fratricidal warfare.

Our defense area spanned 2-3 kilometres in diameter. The Sudanese grew concerned when we began using artillery, such as the "Haun" bombs, which disrupted their security. They were surprised by our extensive use of weapons and ordered us to leave their territory.

Entering Eritrean Territory Again

The initial Battle of Gereger lasted only a morning, but sporadic skirmishes and tension persisted for about a week. Precise dates and details are difficult to recall as all our writings were confiscated, and the trauma of beatings, imprisonment, and time took their toll.

After regrouping, we devised a plan to send a signal indicating our movement and direction. We joined our group at night and participated in ongoing skirmishes. Eventually, the Sudanese ordered both organizations to leave Sudanese territory and cross into Eritrea, which took us two days, with the Sudanese army patrolling us throughout the journey.

As all sides were in combat positions, they were easily targeted and hit by machine-gun fire. Tragically, 20 of our brothers from the ELF were killed in a senseless manner. On our side, from the Selfi Nasnet group, we lost only one fighter, Gebretsadik Guangul, who was also known as "Cuba" because he had spent time there. He was peering through a small opening in the wall when a bullet struck him in the forehead, killing him instantly. Tewelde Eyob was wounded as a bullet passed through both his thighs. I cannot recall if there were any other injuries on our side.

At that time, we had not yet united with Shabia (PLF 1), and 6 or 7 fighters (the exact number is uncertain) were killed, but I did not know their names. Although we were fighting in the same area, our leaderships and administrations remained separate. We had only a coordinating committee to manage the distribution of arms and food according to the number of fighters.

In late May 1973, the ELF came to Gereger Asmara and captured a fighter who was guarding a mountain while others fought their way out. He was taken to the ELF stronghold in Barka but later fled to Kenya, as I heard. I believe his surname was Gebre Mikel.

Hilal, a brave and well-educated man from Dankalia, was killed in the battle of Qebir Wu'ut. He had ongoing disagreements with Isayas and Omaro. Another fighter, Solomon Mengesha, originally from Tigray and raised in Massawa, joined the struggle after coming from Germany. He had exhausted all his ammunition and was killed. Solomon had come with me from Germany and, in my presence, asked Isayas if he could fight for Eritrea, despite having only an Eritrean mother and no other demands. He was granted permission, but only two months later, he was martyred—an innocent and courageous man.

The Bleqat area had been under my unit’s control for a long time before the leadership moved there to ensure it was secure from the ELF. When fighting intensified in Kebessa, my unit relocated there. In September 1974, fighters like Wedi Fenkil were killed in the battle in Filfil.

The Bleqat-Fah area had previously been an ELF front. We were stationed about two kilometres apart, separated by mountains and valleys, making it challenging to distinguish our positions from theirs. The ELF fighters monitored our movements from the high ground using binoculars.

On the beginnings of the so-called Menkae Movement

We used to distribute leaflets to ELF fighters encouraging them to join us and focus on fighting against Ethiopia, not each other. On one occasion, we even used loudspeakers as they were nearby. At one point, we had about 10 of their fighters cornered in an old Italian fortified structure. We could have easily surrounded and eliminated them, but that was not our goal. We argued that we should all unite against our common enemy.

Shortly afterward, there was a skirmish with Ethiopian soldiers, and Isayas, Mehari Debesai, and Omaro collected the loudspeakers and our written articles from the news section, Zena. We had written about what democracy should mean between fighters, with civilians, and in the relationship between fighters and the leadership. We also composed a national anthem and songs that promoted discarding regional and religious differences.

The leadership, however, declared that these articles should be buried. But as we were digging, the reddish under-soil became visible, and the Ethiopian soldiers discovered our documents. Isayas and Omaro spread propaganda, blaming the Menkae (a faction within the EPLF) for allowing the Ethiopians to seize our materials. They even told Muslim fighters that we were communists who would prevent them from praying and reading the Quran.

We, the new and inexperienced fighters, were caught in the traps set by both Isayas’s EPLF and Abdella’s ELF. I consider myself fortunate to have survived, as I often protested against Isayas. In fact, I once openly stated—and even wrote down—that we should kill him.

The Rise of the Menkae Situation

When Isayas realized that the situation was not working in his favour and he feared losing in the internal elections, he sought to manipulate the circumstances. He relied on the support of Asmerom Gerezghier, Tewelde Eyob, and Tsegai Keshi. (Keshi later died from DDT poisoning—he had washed his clothes with DDT to kill lice, but when he wore them again, the poison slowly absorbed into his body and killed him.)

At the time, Adhanom Gebremariam and Wedi Fenkil were also part of Isayas’s group, which soon expanded to a meeting of 11 individuals. Their plan was to eliminate Solomon, but they knew that if he were killed, it would be obvious that the leadership was behind it. To cover up their actions, they aimed to involve all the leadership and veteran fighters. They initially accused him of regionalism and other charges but failed to carry out their plan. Solomon sensing danger, confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, shedding tears on his shoulder.

The root cause of the conflict was purely a struggle for power. When the veterans realized that the situation was spiralling out of control and that many fighters were becoming aware of it, they agreed to resolve their differences internally. Otherwise, they feared that the more educated fighters would gain an upper hand. The conflict escalated to a meeting of 65 fighters and eventually became known to the common fighters. Isayas, Solomon and Omaro made an oath to never oppose each other, marking the beginning of what would be called the Menkae situation.

I’ve previously explained the meaning of "Menkae." The term was originally used in 1970 by Naizgi Kiflu to describe the ELF. Having come from the United States, Naizgi was working with the Selfi Natznet to reconcile them with the ELF at Wina. When asked about his opinion on the ELF, he responded that the front was like "Menkae"—a bat. This term later stuck, and when he joined the front as a fighter, we travelled together through Aden. Naizgi, whose character was questionable, had studied at Lumumba University in the USSR and supposedly had contacts with Soviet security apparatus.

We had three haili units in Sahel, and two were dispatched to Kebessa to receive new recruits. Unfortunately, they missed their destination and ended up deeper in Kebessa, where they encountered fierce battles. Naizgi, wanting to avoid death, was seen firing into the sky while hiding—a behaviour noticed by his comrade, Abraha Chaalo. Fighters like Yohannes Sebhatu, Dehab, and Werku disliked Naizgi. Werku once even questioned how Naizgi had earned his MA degree, as he was often seen making foolish and ignorant statements.

The educated fighters were against Isayas, but Naizgi sided with him. When asked about this movement, Naizgi labelled it the "Menkae" movement, the same way he had described the ELF. The name stuck, but some of us tried to reframe it, saying that "Menkae" represented leftists or progressives, encouraging people not to be deterred by the label.

The female fighters also faced derogatory remarks. They were accused of coming to Sahel for men and were labelled as prostitutes. They were criticized for visiting beauty salons and were shamed for washing their hair. In reality, after cutting their hair short and enduring muddy conditions, they simply needed to maintain basic hygiene. Such unfounded accusations were used to demean them. While they weren’t beaten while free, anything could happen in prison. When men asked to marry them, the women declined, stating they were there to fight for liberation. They argued that if they wanted men, there were plenty in the towns.

There are individuals today who remember the precise timing of the executions during the Menkae purges. One person, now part of a civic society in Frankfurt, was a former prisoner. Two others are here with me, and another served as a prison guard.

One such prisoner was Abraham Antonio, whom we captured from the ELF in a battle near the Dekemhare-Keren road. He was an ELF political cadre covering the Senhit to Asmara area. We brought him to Sahel, where Mesih and I intervened to stop his execution. He had been a schoolmate of Isayas, Musie, and others, and he was imprisoned on the day the Menkae members were executed.

The "correction centre" served multiple purposes. One was to prevent fighters from spreading information about their prison experiences. When a prisoner was released, they were kept at the centre until they recovered from their wounds. During this time, they were threatened not to disclose how they were treated or name other prisoners. In the early 1970s, we had such centres in Sahel, and as our controlled areas expanded, more centres were established in various locations. Dr. Bereket was put in one of these centres after we captured him.

One of my friends, Mesih Rusom (also known as Mesih Berhe), and I were together in the Tihisha movement. He was the head of a department at the Commercial Bank of Addis and had studied at the Commercial School.

The Menkae movement was not an attempt to oust Isayas. Initially, there were five people involved: Tsegai Keshi, Wedi Fenkil, Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, and Asmerom Gerezghier, who met to discuss how to defend themselves from the growing opposition. Later, Adhanom Gebremariam joined them, increasing their number to 11.

The leadership of Selfi Nasnet (PLF 2) consisted of five key figures: Isayas Afwerki, Tewelde Eyob, Asmerom Gerezghier, Mesfin Hagos, and Solomon Weldemariam. When it came to decision-making, the first three (Isayas, Tewelde, and Asmerom) had the majority vote, often leaving Solomon and Mesfin in the minority. Isayas saw Solomon as a threat because they frequently clashed. However, he couldn’t easily remove or kill Solomon without a legitimate reason, given that they were both in leadership positions.

Isayas’s group grew from 11 to 35 fighters and convened a meeting where they accused Solomon of regionalism. This tactic was used to rally support against him. At this point, Isayas had begun seeking alliances in all hailis, telling them that Solomon’s closeness with Shabia leadership was concerning.

During one of these meetings, Tsegai Keshi hit Musie Tesfa Mikel with his rifle butt after Musie told Isayas, "Can you silence your dogs? We can’t understand each other." Tsegai, frustrated, retorted, "Didn’t we say before that we should get rid of these students before fighting the ELF?"

The accusations of regionalism against Solomon made him fear for his life. He confided in Mebrahtu Weldu, saying they would kill him. Mebrahtu tried to reassure him, saying, "They cannot even demote you from leadership, let alone kill you." But that’s when the Menkae situation truly emerged.

During the meetings, Musie pointed out that if they were to accuse someone of regionalism, they should also consider which region the accusers were inclined to. He noted that Isayas was from Hamasien, Tewelde from Akele Guzai, and Asmerom from Serae, suggesting that their regional affiliations were no less evident than those of others. This enraged Tsegai, who couldn’t control himself and struck Musie.

After this incident, Musie came to the sickbay where I was stationed and spoke to Afwerki Amharai and me. I advised him to remain calm and consider it a comrade’s mistake, but he insisted, “Weldemariam, this is not the case,” and he narrated the whole ordeal.

I told him, “There are only three civilian families in this large area. You won’t win by spreading this message here. The leadership might crush you in the meantime. Wait until we move to Kebessa and then spread the word quietly to our people.” He agreed, saying he hadn’t thought of it that way before.

The Menkae movement did not rise against the leadership or the front but sought to expose the truth behind Isayas and Solomon’s longstanding animosity. However, when the veterans realized that the tide was turning against them, Isayas, Solomon and Omaro made a pact, vowing never to rise against each other or reveal secrets about one another. This blood oath marked the beginning of the purge against the Menkae.

In response to the growing influence of the Menkae, Isayas used the phrase, "Better to have 10 cheguar dangas (simple peasants) than 100 pens." The cheguar dangas were loyal and unquestioning fighters who followed orders without asking about their rights. In contrast, educated fighters knew their rights and often challenged the leadership, making them a thorn in Isayas’s side.

The Female Fighters in the Menkae Crisis

The female Menkae fighters were beaten just like the men. Werku, still alive, has remained silent until the right time comes. I do not believe she ever turned against her comrades. There was a situation where her menstrual bleeding would not stop. Fearing for her life, she was sent to Aden for treatment. Since her passport was held by the leadership, she had nowhere else to go. The others were executed while she was in Aden, and the matter was left unresolved.

In Kuwait, Ramadan once held a meeting for all women workers. Ghirmai Bahre openly challenged him in front of everyone. On his return to Eritrea by boat, Berhane Gherezghiher, who is now imprisoned, and others killed him and cast his body into the Red Sea.

From Beirut, two wounded fighters, Habte Gorilla and Habte Ab Seyum, were taken away to Sahel and killed. We wanted to escape the field and expose these actions to our people.

The Executions

The first Menkae members executed were six: Musie, Yohannes, Afwerki, Tareke, Habte Selassie, and Rusom. A former head guard stationed at the execution, now residing in Germany, has agreed to share his account of what happened, as did two others present at the execution. During the National Congress, Isayas pulled out a small and dirty piece of paper from his pocket and stated that the proper measures had been taken against these individuals. This was understood as code for their execution.

In preparation for the Congress, which took place three months prior, participants were required to have been involved in the struggle for at least 2-4 years. They also had to be free from any association with the Menkae, Yemin (right-wing), or Hub-aan (unknown opposition), or any form of dissent. Those suspected of being potential challengers were sent away for training courses in meda. Haili units would send delegates, but those already in courses were ineligible. During the Congress, these individuals were left without instructors and given books to read in the meantime, ensuring they could not be nominated for ranks.

One person, Alem Abraha, somehow managed to slip through this filter, but you can read about how Mesfin Hagos ensured his return to the field.

 

Final Thoughts

The Menkae uprising was not an attempt to overthrow the leadership but rather a struggle to defend the truth from Isayas’s manipulations and accusations against Solomon. We did not rise against the leadership or initiate the movement.

The following individuals were notable members of the Menkae movement:

  1. Musie Tesfamikael
  2. Mebrahtu Weldu
  3. Yohannes Sebhatu
  4. Weldemariam Abraham
  5. Afworki Tekhlu
  6. Gebresadik Isaak
  7. Habte Kidane (Gorilla)
  8. Habte Selassie
  9. Tareke Yihdego
  10. Dehab Tesfatsion
  11. Aberash Melke

 

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