The Great Red Sea War: Conflicts, Chokepoints and New Strategic Corridors by MedOr Italian Foundation 11 November 2026
DEVELOPMENTS
Today for the first time, both maritime gateways of the Arabian Peninsula are disrupted at once: at the time of writing, Iran has closed Hormuz, and the Houthi are contesting the Bab el-Mandeb. The Houthi are often seen as Iran’s proxy, but the Bab el-Mandeb crisis is not just an extension of the confrontation with Iran. Their July embargo on Saudi-linked shipping, their strikes on Saudi refineries, and their advance to within 80 km of Aden serve their own goals in Yemen’s war. They are also helped by a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, once allies against them, which has left the anti-Houthi forces divided. On the African shore, Somalia is splintering into foreign spheres of influence, with a political crisis and advances by al-Shabaab just as the country’s international security umbrella folds. Sudan’s war is in its fourth year: the army holds Khartoum and the Red Sea coast, the RSF is entrenched in Darfur, and an end to the conflict is not in sight. Ethiopia crushed a Tigrayan offensive in under two weeks, but victory has not ended the guerrilla war. To make matters worse, Addis Ababa and Asmara severed relations on 1 October, and an Ethiopia–Eritrea war is now widely seen as the region’s most likely next conflict. All this unfolds amid an El Niño-driven climate shock, deepening hunger, and a new Democratic Congress in Washington that may have lowered, though not removed, the risk of fresh US strikes on Iran. Yet the conflict itself remains unresolved, with no clear settlement in sight, and could last for the remainder of President Trump’s term.
