لم يكن لمملكة أكسوم منفذ بحري خاص بها ولم تمتلك سفنًا

 

لم يكن لمملكة أكسوم منفذ بحري خاص بها ولم تمتلك سفنًا

رئيس الوزراء الإثيوبي ,آبي في خطابه المسجل للبرلمان الذي بُث في 13 أكتوبر من العام الماضي ادعى أن 'إثيوبيا' (لم تكن هناك دولة أو كيان يُدعى إثيوبيا آنذاك) كانت تمتلك تاريخيًا ميناءً على البحر الأحمر. مملكة أكسوم، التي كانت واحدة من أقوى الممالك في أفريقيا في ذلك الوقت، كانت تقع في تيقراي الحالية وجنوب إريتريا. ميناء أدوليس اي ميناء عزولي نفسه يقع في إريتريا الحالية. تم اكتشاف حضارة ما قبل أكسوم في إريتريا .الابحاث في حوض أسمرا، عاصمة اريتريا، يشير إلى إمكانية كبيرة لكشف أصول الحياة المستقرة في المرتفعات وتطور المجتمعات الحضرية المبكرة في القرن الأفريقي.[1] إذا كانت إثيوبيا الحالية تعتبران لها احقية تأريخية بمملكة أكسوم، فإن إريتريا واقليم تيقراي، لهما احقية أكبر. ميناء أدوليس نفسه يقع في إريتريا الحالية.

في عام 1994، أجرى المتحف الوطني الإريتري حفريات في جبل كوكن أظهرت نتائج مهمة حول الدور التاريخي لمدينة أغردات في غرب اريتريا. يعود تاريخ أغردات[2] إلى حوالي 2300 قبل الميلاد، وكانت مركزًا محوريًا في شبكات التجارة الإقليمية، تربط وادي النيل بالمرتفعات الإريترية والإثيوبية، حتى "الفترة ما قبل أكسوم" حوالي 400 قبل الميلاد.

تم إنشاء ميناء أدوليس من قبل الأسرة البطلمية التي حكمت مصر لما يقرب من ثلاثة قرون (305-30 ق.م)، وفي النهاية سقطت تحت سيطرة الرومان. استخدمت مملكة أكسوم، وكذلك السودان الحالي، الميناء لأغراض تجارية، لكنها لم تمتلكه. أقدم تاريخ مسجل عن أدوليس يُوجد في "بريبلوس البحر الإريتري: السفر والتجارة في المحيط الهندي" ويُعتقد أنه كُتب في عام 60 ميلاديًا بواسطة مؤرخ ومسافر يوناني،

وتم ترجمة الكتاب إلى الإنجليزية ونُشر بواسطة ‘ويلفريد هارفي شوف[3]’ في عام 1912. يُذكر الكتاب اسم أدوليس 31 مرة.

وقامت مملكة أكسوم بغزو اليمن في القرن السادس بدعم من قيصر روما، الذي وفر للأكسوميين أسطولاً من السفن لنقل الجنود الأحباش إلى الساحل الغربي لليمن. كمملكة برية، لم تمتلك أكسوم سفنًا[4] ، ولكن كانت تتاجر عبر ميناء أدوليس. كان الجيش الأكسومي بقيادة أبرهة، نائب الملك الأكسومي في القرن السادس كاليب، الذي حكم اليمن أيضًا (هو وابنه) لمدة حوالي سبعين عامًا.

كان الغزو دعماً للمسيحيين الحميريين المضطهدين في نجران باليمن (والتي تعتبر حاليًا جزءًا من المملكة العربية السعودية)، الذين اعتبرهم الملك الحبشي ،كاليب، من المؤمنين بدينه. عندما أرسل الإمبراطور الروماني جستن الأول سفارة بقيادة نونوس إلى أكسوم لدعوة المشاركة في الحرب ضد الفرس، كانت المملكة لا تزال قوية وحربية، على الرغم من أن الملك، أسبها، توسل بأنه لا يمتلك سفنًا واقترض ستين سفينة من جستن[5]. ذو نواس، آخر ملوك الحميريين في اليمن، كان لديه تعاطف مع اليهود وكان مضطهدًا بارزًا للمسيحيين. أسبها من أكسوم، الذي ادعي لاحقًا أنه أصبح راهبًا، كان مسيحيًا متعصب، وغزي اليمن لنصرة المسيحيين هناك: والحملة التي جهزها لتخفيف معاناة أبناء دينه كانت ناجحة. تم قتل ذو نواس، وأصبح اليمن تابعًا لأكسوم مع تعيين حاكم من قبل الملك

مسيرة أبرهة مثيرة للاهتمام بشكل خاص بسبب حملته على مكة[6] في عام 570، والتي ذكرت في القرآن في "صورة الفيل". كانت مدينة سفار مقراً لكنيسة تم تدنيسها من قبل عرب قريش، وانتقاماً لذلك، توجه أبرهة إلى مكة، موقع حجر مقدس عرف فيما بعد باسم "الكعبة"، بثلاثة عشر فيلاً وجيش كبير. لكنه فشل حيث أصيب جيشه بالجدري.

 

يمكنك قراءة الكتاب، "البريبلوس للبحر الأريثري" على هذا الرابط

https://hedgait.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-periplus-of-erythrean-sea.html

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] Schmidt, P. R., M. C. Curtis and Z. Teka (2008). The archaeology of ancient Eritrea. Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press

[2] Brandt, S. A. M., A.; Perlingieri, C. (2008). Linking the Highlands and Lowlands: Implications of a Test Excavation at Kokan Rockshelter, Agordat, Eritrea. The Archaeology of Ancient Eritrea. P. R. Schmidt, Curtis, Matthew, Zelalem Teka. Trenton (NJ), Red Sea Press. : 33-47.

[3]. Wilfred Harvey Schoff, The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea: Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), 60.

[4] Al-Shami, Al-Manhal Fi Tarikh Wa Akhbar al-Afar (Al-Danakil), 124–32.

[5] Paul A. History of the Beja, p. 48-49

[6] Paul A. History of the Beja, p. 49

The Axumite Kingdom was a landlocked Kingdom and had no ships

 

The Axumite Kingdom was a landlocked Kingdom and had no ships

PM Abiy in his recorded speech to the Ethiopian Parliament aired on 13 October, last year claimed, ‘Ethiopia’ (there was no country or state called Ethiopia. then) had historically had a port on the Red Sea. The Axumite which was one of the strongest kingdoms in Africa at that time was  in current Tigray and Southern Eritrea. The port of Adulis itself lies  in current Eritrea. Pre-Axumite civilization has been uncovered in Eritrea. Research in the Asmara Basin suggests significant potential for uncovering the origins of settled life in the highlands and the development of early urban-like communities in the Horn of Africa. In research in the Asmara Basin suggests significant potential for uncovering the origins of settled life in the highlands and the development of early urban-like communities in the Horn of Africa[1].

In 1994, excavations conducted by the National Eritrean Museum in Kokan revealed significant findings about Agordat's historical role. Dating back to around 2300 BCE, Agordat was a pivotal centre in the regional trade networks, linking the Nile valley with the Eritrean and Ethiopian highlands[2], up until the "Pre-Axumite period" around 400 BCE.

The port of Adulis was established by Ptolemaic Dynasty that controlled Egypt for almost three centuries (305-30 BCE), eventually falling to the Romans. The Axumite Kingdom, as well as current Sudan used the port for commercial purposes, but did not own it. The earliest recorded history about Adulis is found in “The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea: Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean” believed to written in 60 CE  by a Greek historian and traveller and the book was translated to English and published by Wilfred Harvey Schoff in 1912. Adulis is mentioned 31 times in the book. Some excerpts from the book:

“Adulis.—The present port is Massawa, centre of the Italian colony of Eritrea, which lies near the mouth of the bay of Adulis. The ancient name is preserved in the modern village of Zula. The location has been described by J. Theodore Bent, (&-cred City of the Ethiopians, London, 1896: pp. 228-230). It is on the west side of Annesley Bay, and numerous black basalt ruins are still visible there. Adulis was one of the colonies of Ptolemy Philadelphus and was always of commercial importance because it was the natural port for Abyssinia and the Sudan[3]. It seems to have been built by Syrian Greeks.” Some excerpts from the book:

“Below Ptolemais of the Hunts, at a distance of about three thousand stadia, there is Adulis, a port established by law, situated at the inner end of a bay that runs in toward the south. Before the harbour is the so-called Mountain Island, about two hundred stadia seaward from the very head of the bay, with the shores of the mainland close on both sides. Ships bound for this port now anchor here because of attacks from the land. They anchored at the very head of the bay by an island called Diodorus, which was close to the shore, but could be reached on foot from the land and by which means the barbarous natives attacked the island. Opposite Mountain Island, on the mainland twenty stadia from shore, was Adulis, a fair-sized village, from which it was a three-day journey to Coloe, an inland town and the first market for ivory. From that place to the city of the people called Auxumites was a five-day journey more. All the ivory was brought to that place from the country beyond the Nile through the district called Cyeneum, and thence to Adulis. Practically the entire number of elephants and rhinoceroses killed live in places inland, although at rare intervals they are hunted on the seacoast even near Adulis. Before the harbour of that market town, out at sea on the right are a great many little sandy islands called Alalaei. They yield tortoiseshell, which is brought to market there by the Fish-Eater[4]s.”

The Axumite Kingdom even invaded Yemen with the support of the Caesar of Rome, who provided the Aksumites with a fleet of ships to use to carry Abyssinian soldiers to the west coast of Yemen. As a landlocked kingdom, Aksum possessed no ships and had no maritime domains but did have limited access via the port of Adulis[5]. The Aksumites’ army was headed by Abraha, viceroy of the sixth-century Aksumite king Kaleb, who also ruled Yemen (himself and his son) for about seventy years. The invasion was in support of persecuted Himyarite Christians of Najran of Yemen (presently part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), whom Kaleb considered coreligionists. When Roman Emperor Justin I sent sent an embassy under Nonnus, to Axum to invite participation in the war against Persia, the kingdom was still powerful and warlike, though the king, Asbaha, pleaded he had no ships and borrowed sixty ships[6] from Justin. Dhu Nuwwas , the last of Himyarite kings of Yemen, had Jewish sympathies and was a notable prosecutor of the Christians. Asbaha of Axum, who was alleged later to have become a monk, was an equally fanatic Christian and the expedition which he equipped for the relief of his co-religionists  was successful. Dhu Nuwwas was killed, and the Yemen became a dependency of Axum with a governor appointed by the king.

Abraha’s career is of particular interest on account of his expedition to Mecca in 570 which is mentioned in the Koran, as ‘Battle of the Elephant’. The town of Saphar was the seat of a Church desecrated by the Arabs of Quraish and in revenge Abraha marched to Mecca, the site of a sacred stone later to be famous as ‘Ka’ba’ with thirteen elephants and a large army. He failed as his army was smitten by smallpox.

 

You can read, the book, ‘ The periplus of the Erythrean Sea’ at this link:

https://hedgait.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-periplus-of-erythrean-sea.html

 

 

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[1] Schmidt, P. R., M. C. Curtis and Z. Teka (2008). The archaeology of ancient Eritrea. Trenton, NJ, Red Sea Press

[2] Brandt, S. A. M., A.; Perlingieri, C. (2008). Linking the Highlands and Lowlands: Implications of a Test Excavation at Kokan Rockshelter, Agordat, Eritrea. The Archaeology of Ancient Eritrea. P. R. Schmidt, Curtis, Matthew, Zelalem Teka. Trenton (NJ), Red Sea Press. : 33-47.

[3] Wilfred Harvey Schoff, The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea: Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), 60.

[4] Same book as above, p.22

[5] Al-Shami, Al-Manhal Fi Tarikh Wa Akhbar al-Afar (Al-Danakil), 124–32.

[6] Paul A. History of the Beja, p. 48-49

A Tale of Two reform Movements in PLF/EPLF/PFDJ of 1973 and of 2001

 

A Tale of Two reform Movements in PLF/EPLF/PFDJ of 1973 and of 2001

This text looks at a comparison of two significant reform movements within the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), specifically focusing on the so called ‘Menkae’ or ‘destructive movement of 1973’ as labelled by the leadership of PLF, but a ‘Democratic Movement’ by others on one side, and the G15 demands of 2001. Both movements, despite being separated by 28 years, share striking similarities in their objectives and outcomes, particularly in their confrontation with a central figure, the accused and the perpetrator, Isaias Afwerki.

The Menkae movement of 1973, labelled as the "destructive movement" by the PLF leadership, was detailed in an extensive 86-page report. Notably, 23 pages of this report contained responses to the issues raised by the movement, written by Isaias Afwerki himself and endorsed fully by the leadership on November 6, 1973. The Menkae accused Afwerki of overstepping his bounds by interfering in various departmental functions, despite the presence of appointed heads. This accusation is encapsulated in Musie Tesfamichael's criticism, as cited by Mesfin Hagos (p. 88), where Tesfamichael likened Afwerki's handling of the revolution to the casual use of a handkerchief,  “You consider the revolution like a handkerchief, you fold it into your pocket or blow your nose with it when you chose.” The conflict took a provincial dimension, most of the Menkae group were from the highland province of Akle Guzai and most of the fighter of PLF 1 at that time were from Hamassein province by virtue of their location in the province. Traces of this provincial phenomena still haunts Eritrea.

Haile Menkerios, a new fighter then, who in 2001 was a member of the G 15,  described the division of a revolutionary front into three distinct groups during the 'Menkae uprising':

The Menkae Group: This faction consisted of educated fighters who criticized the front's leadership as backward. They advocated for a complete overhaul of the leadership, promoting scientific socialism as their guiding principle. Their aim was a national democratic revolution with socialist characteristics, ultimately leading to communism. This group was strongly leftist, sharing many beliefs with the general ideology of the front. They viewed the leadership as feudal and believed Isaias was aligned with feudalist perspective that a change was necessary.

Solomon’s Group: Originating from the Hamasien region, they initially sided with the Menkae but later opposed both them and Isaias. Initially, there were claims of Solomon being targeted for assassination, but his group refrained from glorifying him. They began to perceive Solomon as indistinguishable from the rest of the leadership, advocating for change. Eventually, Solomon shifted his allegiance back to the leadership, helping to form a united front against both the Menkae and his former supporters. He had a history of fluctuating alliances, initially attacking the Akele Guzai, then supporting the Menkae, and ultimately opposing both. Solomon was recognized for his effective organizational skills and began to imprison fighters.

The Third Group: This faction agreed that the leadership was feudalistic but argued for a systematic approach to change. They believed that a rapid overhaul would exacerbate the existing divide between the Hamasien and Akele Guzai regions, potentially leading to more significant issues. This group sought a more gradual and strategic approach to leadership transition, aiming to maintain unity and stability within the front.

Similarly, in 2001, the G15 group, comprising members of the leadership of the  People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), expressed concerns in an open letter. They criticized the President for acting in an illegal and unconstitutional manner, failing to consult, and highlighted the lack of oversight by legislative and executive bodies. Intriguingly, Petros Solomon, who was pardoned in 1973 during the Menkae movement, found himself again in the midst of controversy as part of the G15. Similarly, Mesfin Hagos, who had previously supported the PLF leadership's severe measures against the Menkae, joined the 2001 group, echoing similar demands for reform. The reformists of 1973 stated that it was important to form mass organizations and recruit through them to reduce the problem of enemy spies infiltrating the organization and indicated there was no unit established to address this issue. Ironically the unit called, Halawa Sowra (guardians of the revolution) was established after their purge and this unit became the main instrument of Isaias’s consolidation of power in the EPLF.

The Menkae criticised the leadership of the PLF, for lack of democratic practises, for lack of accountability, for failures in 7 battles that resulted in unnecessary death of fighters, for restrictions in the freedom of expression, for intimidation of those who challenged the leadership, for using force against the masses instead of dealing with them with respect.

The G15 additionally stated that confidence of the general membership of the front as well as the general public in the leadership and the party has been reduced, criticized the disastrous consequences of the border war with Ethiopia 1998-2000, indicated People want a transparent, accountable, institutionalized, and legal administration, asked for guarantee for human and democratic rights of citizens, expressed need for concrete measures to implement and guarantee their professed aims of establishing a constitutional government, establishment of a constitutional government through free and fair elections, and that differences inside the front and the government to be resolved peacefully, democratically and legally.

It is difficult to predict what would have happened if the reformists of 1973 would have won and Isaias’s ambitions were curtailed at an early stage; but one thing is clear, his absence would have set the Eritrean revolution in the right path.

Isaias created the perception that he was indispensable to the organization in both 1973 and in 2001. Mesfin Hagos recalled in his book (p. 234) that he several times thought of killing Isaias because he had continuously demonized  him, but later did not pursue that goal because as he stated, “at no point I could convince myself that the revolution could find a replacement for Isaias as half effective as he.” In 2001, many PFDJ  leaders may have stood with Isaias for the same reasons.

The fate of the reformists of both 1973 and 2001 was similar. As Isaias was not strong enough in 1973, the presumed ring leaders were arrested, investigated, and tried by committees loyal to the leadership and the final decision was approved by the leadership of the PLF.  The prominent leaders of  the movement were summarily executed. Isaias made sure since then that no one challenged him and if they did, they were eliminated. The G 15 members who happened to be in Eritrea and all those who were suspected to be their supporters have disappeared since their arrest on the 18^th of September of 2001. Most are feared dead. Ten years later even some of the PFDJ leaders  who demonised the G 15, were suspected of involvement in the army uprising of 2013 and have since disappeared.

In the response Isaias gave to the reformists of 1973, on lack of democracy. He explained that in a revolutionary organization, all members of the organization, elect a legislative Council (LC) that represents them in a democratic way. This Council in turn formulates the political program and structure of the organization and elects an Executive Committee (EC), The Legislative Council  represents the highest power. The EC, based on the directives of the LC distributes the roles and responsibility and functions to each member of the organization. At the designated dates of the meetings, the EC presents its reports to the LC.

The G 15, in their open letter, highlighted the irregularities in the functioning of the Executive Committee and Central Council of the PFDJ (People's Front for Democracy and Justice). They pointed out that since 1994, the Executive Committee had met only 11 times instead of the scheduled 84, and the Central Council met just twice during the three-year war with TPLF, instead of nine times as scheduled. This lack of regular meetings effectively centralized decision-making power in the hands of the Chairman, leading to a decline in transparency, accountability, and democratic processes, particularly evident during the border war with Ethiopia.

But the domination of Isaias did not begin in 2001. Yemane Teklegergish reported that during the 2nd congress of the EPLF's clandestine party in March 1987 Isaias told the participants that the nine central committee (CC) members and two reserve members elected in 1976 never met, not even for a single day, and thus the CC did not do its job. When challenged to explain why the CC did not meet for ten years, Isaias responded by saying there were and still are contradictions among them, and those contradictions had spread to other members, but he did not elaborate what sort of contradictions those were. However, when pressed hard, Isaias told the gathering, “When I say that the CC did not meet, I do not mean that no work was done. Each of the members took instructions from me and worked.” Yemane interprets this to mean that Isaias was telling us he was the only one who worked in the party and the EPLF.

This narrative draws attention to the cyclical nature of political dissent and reform within the context of the Eritrean liberation struggle, highlighting the enduring issues of leadership, governance, and accountability.

 

The 2001, G 15 open letter to all PFDJ members in Tigrinya:
http://www.snitna.com/docs/Open_Letter_to_PFDJ_Members_by_G_15_tigrinya.pdf

The 2001, G 15 open letter to all PFDJ members in English:
http://www.snitna.com/docs/Open_Letter_to_All_PFDJ_Members_by_G_15_english.pdf

https://hedgait.blogspot.com/2023/11/haile-menkerios-on-plf-leadership.html

https://hedgait.blogspot.com/2016/03/1973-plf-2-isaiass-group-version-on-so.html

Mesfin Hagos with Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, 2023. An African Revolution Reclaimed: A memoir of an Eritrean Freedom, Red Sea Press

Teklegergish, Yemane, My Experience with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Part 2 (Germany: 2018).

 

The Lutheran Church of Sweden and its Evangelical Mission in Eritrea 1866-1993

 

Sweden in Eritrea 1866-1993

Eritrea and Sweden share a history of more than a century and a half. On the foundation of religious, cultural, educational and health cooperation summarized in this report, today’s bonds between the two peoples are strong.

For centuries, Eritrea was colonized by successive external powers. In the shadow of Egyptian, Italian, British and Ethiopian rule, there was strong engagement in Sweden for the people of Eritrea.

The Lutheran Church of Sweden and its Evangelical Mission, particularly, worked for more than a hundred years to promote education and vocational training, typography and book printing, health care and opportunities for the deaf. Swedish civil society support for Eritrea’s independence struggle culminated in the official recognition of Eritrea as an independent state in 1993.

Download the report: Sweden in Eritrea 1866-1993

برقيد نحمدو ظلال التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع: نظرة تحليلية بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

 برقيد نحمدو ظلال  التاريخ، مخاض الإنتماء وحقائق الواقع

بقلم عبد الرازق كرار

:المقدمة

إن الحراك الذي ينتظم الكثير من مدن المهجر تحت مظلة (برقيد نحمدو) أو لواء الأرض وفق الترجمة الشائعة، وإن كان حراكاً في الخارج لكن يمكن وصفه بأنه ضمن الحالات النادرة التي حدث فيها تحدي حقيقي لسلطة النظام مما أفقده البوصلة، وبدأ في توجيه الاتهام الى الموساد الاسرائيلي والمخابرات الغربية، وكأنه يريد أن يقول أن عمل منظم بهذا الشكل هو فوق قدرات الجاليات الإرترية المعارضة في الخارج، وهو أكبر من قدرات الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير تغراي والتي إلى وقت قريب كانت متهمة من قبل أذرع النظام الظاهرة والخفية بأنها من تقف خلف هذا الحراك بسبب هزيمتها العسكرية في الحرب الأخيرة في إثيوبيا.

بيد أن المعارضة الارترية بشكل عام وفي شقها المنظم على وجه الخصوص ليست أفضل حظاً في فقدان البوصلة تجاه هذه الحراك من النظام، حيث نشهد انقسام واضح تجاه (برقيد نحمدو) هو ما ستحاول هذه المقالة الاجتهاد في مناقشته، لعلها قد تفتح الباب لنقاش موضوعي بناء حول هذا الحراك أسبابه ومآلاته وكيفية التعاطي معه.

الخاتمة:

إن حراك برقيد نحمدو هو في جوهره تمظهر لغضب متراكم جراء سياسات النظام، وقد ساهمت عوامل اجتماعية وسياسية داخلية واقليمية في ظهوره في هذا التوقيت وبهذا الشكل، وهو واحد من الظواهر المعدودة التي أربكت النظام الإرتري، وبالتالي ليس من الحكمة التماهي مع توصيفات النظام أو سياساته في شيطنة الحراك، ولكن في نفس الوقت ليس من الحكمة أيضاً التغافل عن أوجه القصور التي تتعلق بطرحه ومنهجه. واضعين في الاعتبار القواعد التي أرستها المقالة في الفقرة السابقة، فإن المطلوب تعاطي إيجابي بناء مع هذا الحراك وليس التماهي الأعمى معه. إن القوى السياسية والمدنية والناشطين والباحثين عليهم مسؤولية أكبر في صياغة خط يراعي الظروف الاجتماعية والسياسية التي أدت الى ظهور الحراك بشكله الحالي، وفي ذات الوقت تنتبه لطبيعة الحلول التي يقترحها قادة الحراك سواء ذات الرافعة الاجتماعية المحدودة، أو الهويات العابرة للحدود القومية للدول، ولا يتم هذا إلا من خلال مد خطوط التواصل وبناء جسور الثقة مع الحراك وقادته وقواعده، ودعمه في الأهداف المشتركة المتمثلة في التصدي للنظام القمعي وسياساته، في ذات الوقت الاشارة الى كل أوجه القصور التي تعتري الحراك، والمساهمة الفاعلة والمباشرة أو غير المباشرة في معالجة أوجه القصور إذا كان ذلك متأتياً، فحراك بهذه الأهمية ليس من الحكمة تجاهل وجوده أو تأثيره على الحاضر والمستقبل الإرتري

يتناول الكاتب

المقدمة:

البدايات:

الرافعة الاجتماعية:

التمظهر السياسي لإعادة التأسيس النفسي والاجتماعي:

استدعاء التاريخ في فهم الظاهرة:

حراك برقيد نحمدو من منظور محلي: 

حراك برقيد نحمدو والحلول التجزيئية لمشكل يتطلب حلول شاملة:

كيفية التعاطي معه:

الخاتمة:

للمزيد:

https://www.mediafire.com/file/n5semyjd94aymwx/برقيد+نحمدو-+ظلال+التاريخ،+مخاض+الانتماء+وحقائق+الواقع.pdf/file

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea November 2023

 

The US Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Eritrea, reviewed and updated on November 17, 2023,

Unlike the 2022 US strategy, which described Eritrea as one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States; the new 2023 strategy commends Eritrea on some sectors and intends to engage with Eritrea. It has also watered down its criticism of the country's human rights record. While the 2022 strategy called, "Prepare for the post-Isaias era: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for better relations in the post-Isaias era by building ties with the Eritrean people. The president is in his late seventies. He will not rule forever. Our public diplomacy programs, including the American Center, which attracts 100-250 visitors per day, are designed to cultivate close relations with students, educators, artists, intellectuals, businesspeople, religious leaders, technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civil society contacts. We also coordinate closely with local diplomatic counterparts who share our values and vision for a more democratic Eritrea." 

The current strategy aims to  "Sharing American values and fostering relations with Eritreans: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for building ties with the Eritrean people."

Can be downloaded at the link below:

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

 Chief of Mission Priorities 

The November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement brought an end to a two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia and precipitated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the Tigray region. The peace process and Eritrea’s de-escalation of military presence provides an opportunity to reshape bilateral relations with Eritrea to a more productive end, including peace and development in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Eritrea, strives to build on this positive change and increase the understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Eritrea. Eritrea’s return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also presents an opportunity to encourage positive and constructive relations between Eritrea, its neighbors, and regional organizations, and to promote resolution of Horn of Africa matters with a focus on sustainable regionally led solutions. 

The Embassy’s ability to capitalize on such initiatives to promote democracy and good government, however, is constrained by the absence of the usual foreign assistance and constructive policy tools. In 2005, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) ordered USAID, other bilateral donors, and international NGOs to depart the country. In 2022, the GSE ordered the Embassy to close the American Center indefinitely, restricting the Embassy’s ability to engage with the citizens of Eritrea. Further, the U.S. government implemented sanctions against Eritrean individuals and entities for their involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, in addition to human rights abuses committed by Eritrean troops. An atrocities determination also was issued against all parties in the conflict, including Eritrea’s military. Eritrea’s tier 3 rating for Trafficking in Persons, and designation as a Country of Particular Concern with regard to religious freedom, further impede use of funds for targeted programs.

While sanctions remain in place, the embassy will endeavour to open communication lines to establish commonalities that serve the interests of the people of both countries. To accomplish these goals, the embassy will share information on American values and interests, seek opportunities to increase cultural and professional exchange programs between Americans and Eritreans, listen to Eritrean perspectives on regional and international issues, and promote the positive inclusion of Eritreans in regional initiatives

As a priority, the Embassy will continue to encourage Eritrea to become a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including continued pursuit of improved relations with neighbouring countries, and within the region. 

Compare it with the 2022 strategy:

1. Chief of Mission Priorities 

Eritrea’s destabilizing military involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia that began in November 2020 destroyed any hope that the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement would usher in a new era of stability and development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean forces committed widespread and serious human rights abuses in Tigray. In August 2021, the United States imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on the head of the Eritrean Defense Forces and in November, under Executive Order 14046, sanctioned several Eritrean entities and individuals. Since September 2021, the Embassy has maintained an NSC-endorsed policy of “disciplined confrontation” with the Eritrean government under which it rigorously challenges government mis/disinformation, seeks to isolate Eritrea’s toxic regional influence, and limits its engagement with political-level regime officials. The policy supports the Administration’s goal to defend and advance American values abroad, including by combatting threats to free societies by limiting Eritrea’s anti-democratic and destabilizing influence in the Horn of Africa. Our primary strategic policy goal is to cultivate Eritrea’s next generation and prepare for a post-Isaias era. 

Embassy Asmara’s team consists of 12 USDHs, six EFM/EPAP hires, and 237 LE staff, led since 2010 by a Chargé d’Affaires because the Eritrean government will not accept the credentials of an American ambassador. In addition to the Chargé, the current USDH staffing pattern includes a Deputy Chief of Mission, Management Officer, Pol/Econ/Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, Security Technical Specialist (currently staffed with a one-year TDYer, will be vacant again starting in late 2022), Consular Officer, Information Management Officer, entrylevel Information Management Specialist, Office Management Specialist, an EFM RSO Office Management Assistant (currently vacant), a part-time EFM Community Liaison Officer, an EFM General Services Assistant, and an EPAP Assistant PAO. In 2022, we expect to add PAO and GSO positions. This ICS aligns the Embassy’s ends with its modest means, i.e., our mission goals and objectives are realistic for a small post with a limited budget operating in one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States. 

Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our ACS “customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during 

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_AF_Eritrea_Public.pdf

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni

 

Shifting Dynamics in Sudan: The Strategic Implications of RSF's Takeover of Wad Medeni

The situation in Sudan is becoming increasingly complex with the recent advances of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Their capture of Wad Medeni, the capital of Gezira State, marks a significant strategic gain. Gezira, a key agricultural region and a symbolic heartland for the northern and central elites, is now under RSF control. This move not only provides the RSF with critical access points to other states but also represents a psychological blow to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), historically plagued by poor equipment and limited combat experience.

The rapid fall of Wad Medeni has led to internal questioning within the SAF's supporters, especially regarding the leadership of Al Burhan. This event is likely to exacerbate existing tensions between Islamist factions and other groups within the army. Furthermore, the RSF's control over this region could alter the regional dynamics, particularly in terms of regional support for both SAF and RSF. The proximity of RSF to the Ethiopian border is notable, as Ethiopia's alliance with the UAE could facilitate logistical support for the RSF. Similarly, Eritrea, bordering eastern Sudan, might perceive a threat from RSF dominance in the area and consequently enhance its support for the SAF. Egypt, distracted by election issues, and Gaza conflict might now redirect attention and support towards the SAF.

The geopolitical landscape is further complicated by Iran's interests in Sudan, considering its conflict with the US and the strategic position of its allies in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in its rivalry with the UAE, might also choose to back the SAF. However, the outcome of this conflict remains uncertain, as history has shown that initial defeats in battle do not necessarily predict the final result of a war. The RSF currently seems to have the upper hand, but significant support from Egypt, Eritrea, and Iran to the SAF could shift the balance.

Ultimately, the prolongation of this conflict is likely to exacerbate the suffering of the Sudanese people, many of whom have already faced multiple displacements in recent months. The situation remains fluid, and the impacts of these developments on both the regional and international stages are yet to be fully understood.

Testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s

 

Recent testimonials of a Sudanese Intelligence Officer on the Proxy war between Sudan and Ethiopia from 1970s to early 1990s

Irwa to the right of Meles: Mekelle 1991

In six episodes of YouTube videos on the Horn of Africa, Al Fateh Irwa, has documented his testimonials on his role in the Horn of Africa. He is a seasoned intelligence professional from Sudan, who claims to have played a pivotal role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. His career spanned various regimes in Sudan, starting with President Numeri’s rule (1969-1985) and extending into President Omer Al Bashir's era (1989-2005). Initially part of the Sudanese army, Irwa transitioned to the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Sudan National Security Agency in 1976. His focus was primarily on Ethiopia, but his expertise also took him to Moscow for a year (1977-1978), where he engaged in intelligence operations, including recruiting Ethiopian officers.

Irwa's tenure included a significant diplomatic assignment as a security officer at the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa from 1980 to 1984. Following the dissolution of Sudan's National Security after Numeri’s overthrow in 1985 and a brief imprisonment, he worked in Saudi Arabia, advising on Horn of Africa affairs and advocating for support of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). He says the TPLF had an office in Saudi Arabia but he helped promote their presence there. , Irwa advised Saudi Arabia against supporting ELF factions, asserting their nationalist and Arabist stance would not lead to Eritrea's liberation. He argued that their efforts would be futile, even over a span of 600 years.

Recalled by Al Bashir in 1989, Irwa resumed his intelligence role, later ascending to state minister in the president's office and special advisor on intelligence. Despite challenges, including conflicts with Islamist leaders over their support for Eritrean and Ethiopian Islamist groups, he maintained influential connections, facilitating discussions between leaders like Isaias, Meles, and Islamist ideologue Hassen Al Turabi.

Irwa's strategic vision for the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, culminated in a policy formulated in 1990 that aimed at regime change and the establishment of a decentralized Ethiopian state. Their aim was to weaken Ethiopia contrary to the Egyptians who wanted Ethiopia’s disintegration. His illustrious career also saw him serve as State Minister at the Ministry of Defence in 1995 and as Sudan's delegate to the United Nations from 1996 to 2005, navigating complex international dynamics including sanctions and legal challenges.

Connections to Eritrean and Ethiopian oppositions organizations

Al Fateh Irwa recounts his early  interactions with Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition organizations. He described  the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), as a leftist group with connections to the Soviet Union, comprising nationalist and Arab-oriented factions like those led by Osman Sabbe. According to Irwa, while most Arab countries favoured the ELF, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) aligned more with Chinese leftist ideologies, finding limited Arab world support, primarily in Kuwait. As a personal note,  when the ELF observed that Khalifa Kerar of Sudan's General Security Agency, favoured and promoted  the EPLF, the ELF leadership  tried to gain Kerar's favour with ordinary unexpensive gifts, he pointedly showed them a new Land Cruiser, indicating it was a gift from the EPLF, highlighting the competitive dynamics between these groups.

Irwa's connections extended to Ethiopia, until 1984 when he was declared persona non grata in retaliation for Sudan's expulsion of an Ethiopian security officer. During his period in Ethiopia he recruited numerous Ethiopian military officers and developed strong ties with Ethiopian armed opposition, especially the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Convinced of Ethiopia's threat to Sudan, particularly due to its support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Irwa advocated for weakening Ethiopia to induce regime change favourable to Sudan. He sought a decentralized Ethiopia with autonomous nationalities, countering Amhara dominance, rather than Ethiopia's disintegration. He believed the TPLF and EPLF were key to achieving this regime change in Ethiopia.

On Isaias Afwerki

Al Fateh Irwa's depiction of Isaias Afwerki paints a picture of a fearsome and uncompromising leader. According to Irwa, Afwerki's reputation as a brutal dictator was well-known, and he commanded fear even among his closest associates, unhesitatingly quashing any opposition to his ambitions.

Irwa recounts a visit to EPLF-controlled areas in 1990, where he experienced Afwerki's intimidating presence first-hand. During a dinner at an underground guest house in Amberbeb, a disagreement between Ali Seid Abdella and Mohamed Ali Omaro was abruptly silenced by Afwerki's stern command, ‘Shut Up’ demonstrating his authoritative control over his colleagues. Irwa notes that even in the presence of a guest, Afwerki's scolding was fierce, leaving no room for apology.

The narrative continues with the 'Peace and Democracy conference' in Addis Ababa in July 1991. Irwa recalls a conversation with Afwerki at the State Guest house, where Afwerki, in a reflective and intoxicated state, lamented inheriting a barren Eritrea in contrast to the TPLF's lush and green Ethiopia. Afwerki expressed regret for not heeding Paul Hentz's early advice to aim for control over all of Ethiopia rather than just Eritrea, revealing his broader ambitions.

Irwa also shares an incident where Afwerki publicly humiliated Haile Menkerios, a Harvard-educated colleague, during a meeting, dismissing the value of his education compared to the 'real Harvard' of field experience. Afwerki's complex relationship with the TPLF, as described by Irwa, was marked by a sense of paternalism and rivalry, contributing to his eventual decision to go to war with them. His animosity towards the Amhara was also notable during this period.

Irwa recalls the events surrounding Eritrea's independence in 1993, highlighting Afwerki's refusal to allow Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia to attend the celebrations, despite Sudanese presidential intervention. Afwerki's dismissive stance towards international diplomacy, preferring to engage with 'masters' in the USA or Israel rather than intermediaries, further underscores his assertive and often confrontational approach to foreign relations.

On Meles Zenawi

Al Fateh Irwa offers a highly favourable assessment of Meles Zenawi, depicting him as an exceptional leader. He praises Meles for his intelligence, strategic thinking, and dedication to his cause, describing him as far-sighted, humble, and friendly. Irwa notes the strong relationship that developed between Meles, Sudanese President Al Bashir, and himself, highlighting their close friendship. He recalls participating in preliminary meetings in Mekelle with both Isaias and Meles, planning the 'Peace and Democracy' Conference that was later held in Addis Ababa, which he also attended.

On The Sudanese role in arming and advising the EPLF and TPLF

Regarding the Sudanese role in supporting the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements, Irwa shares his initial involvement with the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) led by Ras Mengesha. However, he quickly shifted his support to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), seeing it as the most viable force against Mengistu's regime. He asserts that Sudan sourced weapons from China to arm both the EPLF and TPLF and provided military advice for their offensives.

As the geopolitical landscape shifted with the Soviet Union's support moving from Somalia to Ethiopia, Irwa describes Ethiopia becoming a significant threat to Sudan, which was allied with the West. This situation was compounded by interventions from southern Yemen and Libya, which supplied arms to Ethiopia and the SPLM, destabilizing the region further. He details a covert operation in 1984 where Sudanese intelligence, posing as opponents of the Numeiri regime, duped Libya into supplying weapons that were then used by the Sudanese military.

The rivalry between the EPLF and TPLF posed a challenge to Sudan's objectives, leading to efforts to reconcile the two groups. Irwa underscores the mutual assistance between these organizations and Sudan in countering the SPLM, heavily supported by Ethiopia. He recalls the deployment of two EPLF divisions to Sudan to combat SPLA fighters in Kurmuk  and drive them back To Beni Shangul in 1990.

Under the civilian government of the Umma Party led by Al Sadig Al Mahdi in 1986, Sudan's policy shifted. The Umma Party's historical ties with Ethiopia and animosity towards Eritreans led to a decline in support for the liberation movements and increased Ethiopian aid to the SPLM. Irwa mentions a plan by the Interior Minister, Mubarek Al Fadel, to arrest Isaias Afwerki and extradite him to Ethiopia, reflecting the changing dynamics during the civilian government's rule.

Irwa also discusses the TPLF's strategic shift from advocating Tigray's self-determination to seeking control over the Ethiopian state. He recalls a critical moment during the TPLF's final offensive on Addis Ababa, facing a severe shortage of tank ammunition. Persuading President Omer Al Bashir to supply the TPLF from Sudan's border reserves, despite military reservations, significantly aided their advance. Omer Al Bashir later convinced them saying, “ We have all the tanks on the border to fight against the Habesh and the TPLF are now doing  this job for us.” Sudan's swift recognition of the TPLF regime in Ethiopia following their victory underlined the depth of their support.

He recalled that Eritrean forces entered Addis with the Tigrayan forces and played an important role to secure Addis, he added that the Eritrean community in Addis was bigger and well organised than its Tigrayan counterpart. Thus, Eritreans knew Addis very well. He travelled to the London conference together with Isaias and Meles. He said the aim of the negotiation with the Derg government was meant to keep the negotiations until there was nothing to negotiate about. This was later what happened when EPLF took Asmara and TPLF Addis.

He came back from the London Conference with Meles in a charter plane. As Meles was keen to go to Addis quickly to assert his TPLF’s rule. He piloted a Sudanese Cessna plane with five seats to take Meles, Sium Mesfin, Fessaha Afwerki, AliMireh Hanfare and an Amhara dignitary to Addis.  When they landed at Addis Ababa airport they were received by Kinfe Gebremedhin, TPLF’s Security Chief. later took Meles in a plane to Mekelle and Isaias arrived from Asmara and the three planned the preparations for ‘Peace and Democracy Conference’. He later took Isaias to Axum where they visited the main church there and later took Isaias to back to Asmara and came back to Mekelle to take Meles back to Addis. He attended the deliberations of the conference in Addis. He also had strategic discussions with Meles and Isaias.

On the US relations with the EPLF and the TPLF

Al Fateh Irwa recounts that initially, the United States showed little interest in establishing relations with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), viewing them as leftist organizations. Despite his advisories, the U.S. continued to support the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), even after he warned them of EDU's infiltration by Mengistu's regime. This oversight led to a significant setback for the U.S. when Ethiopian forces exposed and expelled the EDU.

Irwa notes that the EPLF had earlier begun cultivating ties with American entities, possibly aided by American and Israeli lobbying efforts. However, the U.S. only expressed significant interest in the TPLF as they were advancing towards Asmara and Addis Ababa. Herman Cohen from the U.S. approached Sudan to facilitate meetings with the leadership of both organizations. These leaders agreed to meet but insisted the meetings occur in Khartoum under the observation of Sudanese security, to demonstrate their transparency and respect for Sudan.

On The Oromo

Regarding the Oromo people, Irwa states that the Sudanese security saw them as the largest but most oppressed ethnic group in Ethiopia, unable to independently effect regime change due to divisions along religious, geographical, and cultural lines. Despite this, Sudanese security was keen on assisting the Oromo in their resistance against the regime. The tensions between the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were notable, especially after the TPLF formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), created from Derg soldiers captured by the TPLF. Although the OLF historically had more Oromo support, the OPDO proved more effective, leading Sudan to work towards reconciling these groups to contribute to the downfall of Mengistu's regime.

Relations of TPLF and the Islamist regime after 1991

According to Irwa the relations between Meles and Al Bashir were excellent. They consulted on important regional issues and the TPLF opened their depots of weapons to the regime in Sudan to help them fight the SPLM. The Sudan also brought army boots and uniform from Sudan sometime for money but most of the time free. He also recalls an incident in 1992 where a unit of the TPLF stationed in Gambella and led by Tadesse Werede, current leader of the Tigray defence Forces, helped them to control an important SPLM outpost inside South Sudan.

Sudan’s  Islamic regime links to the apartheid regime of South Africa

In one of the episodes Irwa narrated that Sudan under Numeri had relations to the security services in Apartheid South Africa, where both exchanged information. This relationship extended to close relations as South African regime helped Sudan to repair and maintain its aircraft, after the relationship deteriorated with the US.  Irwa was the link where he travelled to South Africa from time to time and even met the president, de Klerk in one of those meetings.