A recent PhD thesis on why some repressive regimes stay in power longer than some others:

A recent PhD thesis on why some repressive regimes stay in power longer than some others:

Regimes where the population is suppressed arbitrary, in the sense that anyone can be persecuted, imprisoned and killed, have shorter lifespan than regimes that essentially suppresses opinion leaders and leading dissidents, says fellow Havard Mokleiv Nygård at the University of Oslo. Using statistical analysis, in his doctoral dissertation he attempted to find answers to why some repressive regimes collapse while others can survive year after year.

Security Police provides stability
A dictator should therefore invest in a good and efficient, security police , according Nygård. The challenge is that this is expensive and complicated. Selective suppression is therefore often associated with poor finances. However, in regimes where it actively working to identify dissidents before they become a threat, we see a much greater stability. These regimes could stay in power year after year, says Nygård. He gives Jordan and China as an example of this. In both these countries they have an extremely active intelligence apparatus that neutralizes all opponents before they can organize themselves. This makes it harder to topple regime, explains Nygård. To topple a regime there must be someone who goes first, someone who is willing to take extra risks. If anyone who could potentially spearhead and organize a resistance movement is being jailed or killed, it is difficult to overthrow a regime.

Nygård illustrates the need for an organized resistance movement with an example from Egypt: He states that a major reason why the demonstrations in Tahrir Square was so extensive , was the presence of the food stalls and temporary toilets. Some dissidents had organized themselves and made sure that this was provided. Thus people could remain for several days instead of going home after a few hours, which in turn meant that the demonstrations were much larger in scope. It was also organized groups that sent out Twitter messages to indicate where the demonstrations will be organized. Should a resistance movement will be strong enough to be able to topple a regime, it is essential that someone organizes it all and makes sure to spread information. For an authoritarian regime, it is important to arrest the leaders of resistance movements, says Nygård. Iran's regime realized for example quickly that Twitter was a dangerous tool. But instead of shutting down Twitter, as they have done in many other places and that has not always been effective , chose the Iranian regime and send out the wrong information. For example, they could send out false information about where a demonstration was to take place. By creating confusion and uncertainty about who actually send out messages and what actually is true, destroys regime opposition mobilization policy, says Nygård .

Semi-democracies are most unstable
Nygård has sorted world governance into three categories: democracies (50%), authoritarian regimes (25%) and semi-democracies (25%). Semi-democracies are the regimes that lies somewhere between democracy and authoritarian rule. Semi - democracies are , according to the researcher , generally more volatile than both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Such regimes have a shorter life and are more prone to civil war, says Nygård .

Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria are all countries that can be characterized as semi - democracies, Nygård explains. The real turning point for the Arab regimes in our countries came when the military no longer supported the regime , he said. We see that in general the role of the military takes is very important for the outcome of a rebellion. When the military chose not to intervene against rebels in Tunisia, the Ben Ali's days are numbered. Part of the reason that semi - democracies are more unstable than authoritarian regimes, think Nygård is because if a first regime has opened up a little, people like to have more. That was partly what we saw in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, says Nygård. For a dictator it is a bad strategy to give in to demands for liberalization. When the ball start rolling - and the dictator can quickly lose control of their regime. I know too many dictators and so many people are not voters to make liberalization at all - for fear of losing power, says Nygård .

Dictators in these countries risk not only popular revolt and demands for further liberalization if they open something up - they also risk sanctions by the relevant international organization if they try to suppress the rebellion. It can cause them not dare to give any liberalization whatsoever, he says.

Reference:
Håvard Nygård Mokleiv : Five Essays on the Political Economy of Regime Survival , PhD thesis at the Department of Political Science , University of Oslo, 2014

http://forskning.no/demokrati-menneskerettigheter-statsvitenskap/2014/01/nar-fungerer-undertrykking-og-nar-fungerer-det